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PULLMAN'S PALACE CAR COMPANY v. METROPOLITAN STREET RAILWAY COMPANY.

decided: March 4, 1895.

PULLMAN'S PALACE CAR COMPANY
v.
METROPOLITAN STREET RAILWAY COMPANY.



ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.

Author: Harlan

[ 157 U.S. Page 107]

 MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.

The facts found by the court below, as above detailed, bring this case within a very narrow compass, and render it unnecessary

[ 157 U.S. Page 108]

     to make an extended review of the very large number of adjudged cases, American and English, cited in argument.

The subject of implied warranty in sales of personal property was examined by this court in Kellogg Bridge Company v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108, 116, and, subsequently, in Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Co., 141 U.S. 510, 518. In the first of those cases it was said that "when the seller is the maker or manufacturer of the thing sold, the fair presumption is that he understood the process of its manufacture, and was cognizant of any latent defect caused by such process, and against which reasonable diligence might have guarded. This presumption is justified, in part, by the fact that the manufacturer or maker, by its occupation, holds himself out as competent to make articles reasonably adapted to the purposes for which such or similar articles are designed. When, therefore, the buyer has no opportunity to inspect the article, or when, from the situation, inspection is impracticable or useless, it is unreasonable to suppose that he bought on his own judgment, or that he did not rely on the judgment of the seller as to latent defects of which the latter, if he used due care, must have been informed during the process of manufacture. If the buyer relied, and under the circumstances had reason to rely, on the judgment of the seller, who was the manufacturer or maker of the article, the law implies a warranty that it is reasonably fit for the use for which it was designed, the seller at the time being informed of the purpose to devote it to that use." This principle was reaffirmed in the other case above cited and it was there said: "But it is also the rule, as expressed in the text-books and sustained by authority, that where a known, described, and definite article is ordered of a manufacturer, although it is stated by the purchaser to be required for a particular purpose, still, if the known, described and definite article be actually supplied, there is no warranty that it shall answer the particular purpose intended by the buyer."

These cases were much commented on in argument, and, for that reason, we have deemed it proper to indicate the principal ground upon which each was determined.

The present case has some features that were not in either

[ 157 U.S. Page 109]

     of the others. By the written contract between the parties the cars that the plaintiff agreed to construct were to be inspected and accepted at the works of the plaintiff, after which they were to be delivered by the plaintiff, free on board the cars, at Pullman Junction, Kensington, Illinois. After ten or twelve cars were completed, and were inspected at the works of the plaintiff by the superintendent of the defendant, the latter expressed himself satisfied with them, and requested the plaintiff to finish the others in the same way and forward them. Clearly, upon such inspection and acceptance, the title as to those cars passed to the defendant company. There is no claim that the remainder of the cars were not finished in the same manner as the first lot inspected by Lawless. As to these, the title certainly passed to the defendant when they were put on the cars at Pullman Junction to be forwarded, if it did not pass before and as each lot was completed under the order to make them like those that had been personally inspected and accepted at the works of the plaintiff. Halliday v. Hamilton, 11 Wall. 560, 564, and authorities cited; The Mary and Susan, 1 Wheat. 25, 35; Stack v. Inglis, 12 Q.B.D. 564.

To what extent was the defendant concluded by the actual inspection and acceptance of the first lot of cars, and of the acceptance, in advance of their completion, of the remaining cars when finished or constructed in the same way?

The court below found that the cars could not be operated successfully with the brakes that were put upon them by the plaintiff, and that this fact was not apparent nor discoverable upon any reasonable inspection at the place of manufacture, and could not be discovered until after a practical test upon the road.

The contention, therefore, of the defendant is that the plaintiff, having knowledge that the cars were to be used on the defendant's road, impliedly warranted that the brakes placed on them would be sufficient for the purposes for which they were designed. The plaintiff insists that the provision in the contract for inspection and ...


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