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decided: May 10, 1897.




[ 167 U.S. Page 155]

 MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

Two questions arise in this case in regard to the liability of the insurers upon the policy in suit: the one being whether what took place before the vessel left her berth in New York amounted to a collision within the meaning of the policy; the other being whether, in case there was a collision, the company is liable for a subsequent loss which did not in any way occur by reason or arise out of the collision.

As to the first, we think that the vessel was "in collision" within the meaning of the language used in the certificate which represented and took the place of the policy. It was not necessary that the vessel should itself be in motion at the time of the collision. If while anchored in the harbor a vessel is run into by another vessel, it would certainly be said that the two vessels had been in collision, although one was at anchor and the other was in motion. We see no distinction, so far as this question is concerned, between a vessel at anchor and one at the wharf fully loaded and in entire readiness to proceed upon her voyage, with steam up and simply awaiting the regulation of some insignificant matter about the machinery before moving out. If, while so stationary (at anchor or at wharf), the vessel is run into by another, we should certainly, in the ordinary use of language, say that she had been in collision. How important or material were the results of the collision in regard to the condition in which the vessel was left, would be a matter of further and more detailed description. The ordinary meaning of the words "in collision,"

[ 167 U.S. Page 156]

     when applied to a vessel, does not require that the result of the impact shall be so far reaching as to impair her seaworthiness. Very serious results, in the matter of expense of repairing, at least, might follow from the impact, wherein the seaworthiness of the vessel would not be at all impaired, and yet no one would doubt that, within the ordinary meaning of the words, such a ship had been in collision.

It is impossible, as we think, to give a certain and definite meaning to the words "in collision," or to so limit their meaning as to plainly describe in advance that which shall and that which shall not amount to a collision, within the meaning of this policy. The difficulty of limitation or description is much the same in kind as that pertaining to another expression in the same memorandum in regard to when a vessel is "burned." It is, however, obvious that a vessel would be said to have been in collision when the effect upon the vessel, or the evidence of such collision, might be very much less than would be necessary to exist in a case of fire before one would describe a vessel as a burned vessel.In the case of The Glenlivet (1893, Prob. 164; same case on appeal, 1894, Prob. 48), the question arose as to whether the vessel was "burned" within the meaning of this language in the memorandum. There had been a fire on three several occasions among the coals in the bunkers of the ship, and some small damage to the ship by fire took place on two voyages, and the question was whether, under the circumstances, the ship was burnt within the meaning of the memorandum. Lord Justice Smith, in the Court of Appeals, in the course of his judgment, said:

"Suppose the cabin curtains were burnt, he should have told the jury that that did not constitute a 'burnt' ship; but suppose the after part of the ship was burnt altogether, and the fore part was not burnt at all, I think he should have told them that they might, if they liked, find that was a 'burnt' ship, although there was only a partial burning.

"It seems to me impossible to lay down absolutely in the affirmative or the negative as to whether a partial burning does constitute a 'burnt' ship or not within this policy; it

[ 167 U.S. Page 157]

     may or may not, according to the actual facts appertaining to the partial burning."

Further on in the course of his judgment, in speaking in regard to the directions to be given to the jury, he said:

"My own view is that you would have to tell the jury what I have already said about partial burning, and then you would have to tell them that a partial burning may, under some circumstances, constitute a 'burnt' ship, and may not under other circumstances, and having given that direction you would have to ask them, Has the fire been such as to bring the ship to such a condition that you consider her a 'burnt' ship within the ordinary meaning of the English language?

"This, in may judgment, is the nearest direction which can be given as to what is meant by a 'burnt' ship in the memorandum; it is not possible to lay down any hard and fast rule upon the subject."

Lord Justice Davey said:

"Counsel for the plaintiffs says that the clause applies if a fire breaks out in any part of a ship or stores, although it is got under before any great amount of damage is done to the ship.

"I cannot bring myself to think that any person would, either in the accurate use of language or in ordinary parlance, say that in such a case as that the ship has been 'burnt.'"

The learned judge also said: "I think that it is really a question to be answered by the jury, Has the ship in the circumstances of this case been burnt?"

The English court took the view that as to a burnt vessel, it must be such a burning as would constitute the vessel a burnt vessel within the ordmary meaning of the English language. The language is used in regard to the vessel as a whole. "The company is to be free from average unless the ship be burnt." That language would seem clearly to indicate some essential burning of the vessel itself and not such a case, as put by one of the judges, of the burning of the cabin curtains. The case is referred to for the purpose of showing that the English court held the expression was to be defined according to the ordinary meaning of the English language.

[ 167 U.S. Page 158]

     This leaves each case to be decided with reference to its own peculiar facts.

We perceive the same difficulties which confronted the English court, in the case mentioned, in defining and in accurately and precisely limiting the meaning to be given to the words "in collision," and we agree with those judges that the words contained in the memorandum are intended to be used, as Davey, Lord Justice, said, "in accordance with the ordinary use of language," or, as said by Lord Justice Smith, "within the ordinary meaning of the English language." Taking the meaning of the words in that sense, while we cannot state in advance and in all cases what shall amount to a collision, but must leave each case for determination upon its own facts, yet it seems to us there can be no doubt that the vessel in this case had been in collision, although her seaworthiness was not impaired in the slightest degree as a result thereof. Being run into by another vessel, as a result of which cracks were made from half an inch to an inch and three quarters wide in the iron plating of her bulwarks (which were half an inch thick) for a distance of eleven feet, certainly shows a somewhat serious impact -- what would be called in plain English a collision; it shows that there was no mere "grazing," but that a force sufficient to crack iron half an inch thick was exerted upon the hull of this steamship, and that it was sufficiently serious in its nature to cause the captain to have an examination of it made and a claim for damages asserted, resulting in the delay of the vessel in proceeding on her voyage of two days, and the payment of $250 as damages occasioned by such collision. In the ordinary use of the English language, would it not be proper and appropriate to describe the results to the steamship as arising from a collision? We think it would.

So in relation to the use of the word "stranded" in the same memorandum. It is said that if a ship "touches and goes" she is not stranded; McDougle v. Royal Exchange Assurance, 4 Camp. 282; but if she "Touches and sticks" she is. That is, in places in which she, in the ordinary course of her navigation, is not suffered to touch. A distinction between

[ 167 U.S. Page 159]

     what is regarded as a stranding and what is held not to be a stranding has been in many cases held to be a very narrow one.

In the above-cited case, decided in 1815, where a ship in the course of her voyage in going out of the harbor of New Grimsby, with a pilot on board, struck upon a rock about a cable and a half's length from the shore, and remained there on her beam end for a minute and a half, Lord Ellenborough held that it was not a stranding, and added: "There has been a curiosity in the cases about stranding not creditable to the law. A little common sense may dispose of them more satisfactorily."

Taking what seems to us to be the common-sense view, we should say that this steamer had, as a matter of fact, been in collision, although the consequences of the collision were not serious enough to affect the seaworthiness of the steamship. It is enough if within the ordinary use of language the circumstances could be fairly described as amounting to a collision. We think this is the case here. If anything more than that is required, if it must be a collision of so serious a nature as to impair the seaworthiness of the vessel, or such as might naturally lead to further injury to the ship or cargo, it is at once seen how large and broad is the field of investigation in order to determine whether the vessel has in fact been in collision within the meaning of the policy. If this be its true meaning, it is neither fairly nor reasonably expressed by the words used. It leaves open for construction in each case a question that may require long and expensive investigation to determine whether it be covered by or is outside of the policy. If the company by the use of the expression found in the policy leaves it a matter of doubt as to the true construction to be given the language, the court should lean against the construction which would limit the liability of the company. National Bank v. Insurance Company, 95 U.S. 673.

In the case cited Mr. Justice Harlan, in delivering the opinion of the court, uses this language at page 679: "The company cannot justly complain of such a rule. Its attorneys, officers or agents prepared the policy for the purpose, we

[ 167 U.S. Page 160]

     shall assume, both of protecting the company against fraud and of securing the just rights of the assured under a valid contract of insurance. It is its language which the court is invited to interpret, and it is both reasonable and just ...

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