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AHEARN v. HOLMES ELEC. PROTECTIVE CO.

March 17, 1953

AHEARN et al.
v.
HOLMES ELECTRIC PROTECTIVE CO.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: FOLEY

This action was tried by the Court at New York City in the Southern District of New York, and is brought under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq. It was originally commenced for 224 employees of the defendant company in 1947. The number of plaintiffs, for various reasons, was reduced at the trial and at the time of submission of the issues to 183 plaintiffs. The original period for which unpaid overtime is claimed under the Act, by amended complaint, now runs specifically from January 4, 1942 to September 14, 1943.

The business of the defendant company and the operation in such business of its employees have been described in detail judicially, administratively and by the president of the defendant. *fn1" It would be judicial waste to encumber the record again with such detail, except where it specifically applies to the issues presented. It suffices to state generally that the defendant, seemingly alone in this field, furnishes protection service from burglary and unauthorized entry to its various subscribers throughout the great metropolis of New York. The bulk of the subscribers is business establishments. The protection is provided either by the physical presence of employees at certain premises or, as in most instances, by the maintenance of intricate electrical circuits which upon disturbance give alarm back to control and service stations of the defendant and cause investigation of the premises by certain employees of the defendant charged with that duty. The first function of guarding physically is a simple one and such employees rendering such service are designated 'patrolmen.' The electrical function is a coordinated one and entails the integrated duties of many employees bearing titles, as guards, senior guards, chauffeur guards, repairmen, linemen, deskmen, switchboard operators. Such titles give good indication of the work performed by them.

 Sixty-three plaintiffs during the period claimed acted as patrolmen and the assignment of sixty-one of such number during the period involved are shown in plaintiff's Exhibit 52. All the remaining plaintiffs, and for some period twenty-one of the above patrol groups, participated in some part of the wiring and electric alarm control system during the period claimed (plaintiff's Exhibits 53, 53-A). The majority of the remainder acted as guards, who were stationed at control and service stations, and responded to alarms by going immediately to the premises to apprehend intruders. The defendant concedes in its brief, and the concessions are few, that patrolmen physically guarding telephone exchanges and premises of occupants engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce would be covered by the Act during the period they were so engaged.

 Throughout the trial and in the submission of the case, the defendant put the plaintiffs 'to their proof' in the most literal sense of that phrase. The result has been a masterful presentation of proof, and the careful preparation of exhibits digested from the records of the defendant that are most helpful to decision. The intolerable burden sought to be placed upon the plaintiffs would be an unconscionable one because of the employer-employee relationship and is contrary to settled authority. See Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686-688, 66 S. Ct. 1187, 90 L. Ed. 1515; Guess v. Montague, 4 Cir., 140 F.2d 500. To decide otherwise in the application of the Act, broad in its humane and economic purposes, the law might well earn the fiction 'a ass, a idiot.'

 By its answer the defendant denies that the Act covers the particular plaintiffs here and asserts that even if covered the plaintiffs were paid all overtime compensation in conformity with the Act. Separate affirmative defenses are set up as a bar to complete and partial recovery under Sections 9 and 11 of the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 258, 260. I shall discuss such issues in the order stated.

 First, in my judgment, there is sufficient showing in the proof that the plaintiffs in the discharge of their duties during the periods involved and claimed come within the coverage of the Act. There have been established throughout the years many judicial guides for the situation presented here.

 The highest authority has passed upon similar activities several times. It is clear that a mathematical or rigid formula cannot be found in the Act. However, specific ideas have been advanced as to the general tests to be applied. Such test is related to the employees' activities; it is enough that the occupation be 'necessary to production for commerce,' not indispensable; there be present a close and immediate tie with the process of production for commerce, not a tenuous relation. 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(j); Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 61 S. Ct. 1116, 85 L. Ed. 1638; Walton v. Southern Package Corp., 320 U.S. 540, 64 S. Ct. 320, 88 L. Ed. 298; Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 65 S. Ct. 165, 89 L. Ed. 118.

 It was emphasized throughout these above cases that the maintenance of a safe, habitable building is indispensable to the activity of interstate commerce in which tenants engage. In Walton v. Southern Package Corp., supra, and Armour & Co. v. Wantock, supra, the insurance saving contributed to any business by the presence of watchmen and firemen was an important factor in decision. Strikingly similar to our situation is the statement in Armour & Co. v. Wantock, supra, 323 U.S. at page 133, 65 S. Ct. at page 168, 'Of course an employer, if he chooses, may hire a man to do nothing, or to do nothing but wait for something to happen. * * * That inactive duty may be duty nonetheless is not a new principle invented for application to this 'act.' Several recent decisions of the Supreme Court again indicate the liberal interpretation to be given to coverage of employees under the Act. Alstate Construction Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13, 73 S. Ct. 565; Thomas v. Hempt Bros., 345 U.S. 19, 73 S. Ct. 568.

 Lesser authority has brought employees engaged in like occupations as here within the Act. Walling v. Thompson, D.C., 65 F.Supp. 686; Walling v. New Orleans Private Patrol Service, D.C., 57 F.Supp. 143.

 Applying these settled principles, the facts concerning the activity of the plaintiffs in their employment indicate clearly to me coverage under the Act. The electrical lines of protection were maintained and serviced throughout an industrial area in the City of New York that stagger the imagination. The manufacturers in the fur district, the garment district, the jewelry district, subscribed for this protection as a routine part of their business and their insurance savings were very substantial. In D. A. Schulte, Inc., v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 120, 66 S. Ct. 925, 90 L. Ed. 1114, it was judicially noticed that New York City produces more garments for interstate shipment than any other city in the nation.

 The protection provided to the banks, involved the largest commercial banks in the world. Under Bozant v. Bank of New York, 2 Cir., 156 F.2d 787, 790, such large commercial banks were engaged in 'producing goods for commerce'. It seems foolish quibbling to me to distinguish the branches of these large institutions from the main office bank. The noteworthy reference in the Bozant case is that it is not necessary that the whole document be prepared in the building. These branches are not in any sense the 'country store' type of branch, and in my reasoning the whole should be the sum of its parts. The branch activity was magnificently described by one banking witness from the National City Bank, 'we say the bank around the corner can serve you around the world.' (R. 792)

 The only refutation to the activities of the plaintiffs in protecting these substantial interstate activities was the development on cross examination that the protection extended into some retail and miscellaneous businesses. However, there was sufficient showing that the activities of the plaintiffs were substantial in relation to such interstate commerce. It does seem logical to set as the test the lines running into the various premises, because in my judgment, the installation, maintenance and guarding of such lines is, in this modern day, the same as a physical presence. The guards were on the alert to rush armed with weapons to apprehend intruders on the subscribers' premises. However, even under a count as individual subscribers, the activities of the plaintiffs would be substantial and necessary in the production of goods for interstate commerce. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 33).

 The percentage of activity of the tenants and the percentage of activity of the employees necessary to be substantial is discussed in Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 571, 572, 63 S. Ct. 332, 87 L. Ed. 460; Baldwin v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 2d Cir., 150 F.2d 524, 525, 161 A.L.R. 1234, certiorari denied 326 U.S. 767, 66 S. Ct. 171, 90 L. Ed. 462; Fleming v. Post, 2 Cir., 146 F.2d 441, 443, 158 A.L.R. 1384; Skidmore v. John L. Casale, Inc., 2 Cir., 160 F.2d 527, 529. The activities shown here as to tenants and plaintiffs are far above the percentage and standards fixed. Also in Schulte v. Gangi, supra, and U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609, it was established that the individual products do not have to be traced into commerce but that fact may be reasonably inferred.

 The plaintiffs here, consisting of patrolmen guarding telephone exchanges and large industries by physical presence; guards waiting at control or service stations for alarms and daily testing such alarms; repairmen who maintain and repair such lines, and the switchboard operator so essential to this integrated function of ...


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