GEORGE L. ARMOUR, as Trustee under a Deed of Trust Made by BERNARD R. ARMOUR for the Benefit of GERALDINE R. THEIL and Others, Respondent,
JOSEPH BROADMAN, as Ancillary Executor of GERALDINE R. THEIL, Deceased, et al., Respondents, and A. CHAUNCEY NEWLIN, as General Guardian of TOBY ARMOUR, an Infant, et al., Appellants.
APPEALS from a judgment of the Supreme Court at Trial Term (STEUER, J.), entered September 22, 1953, in New York County, settling the account of George L. Armour as trustee of
an inter vivos trust. The appeals brought up for review an intermediate order of said court, entered July 24, 1953, which approved a compromise agreement.
A. Chauncey Newlin of counsel (Asbury Hayne de Yampert and Harold A. Wescott with him on the brief; White & Case, attorneys), for A. Chauncey Newlin, as general guardian of Toby Armour, appellant.
William F. Bleakley of counsel (J. Robert Bleakley and Charles L. Brieant, Jr., with him on the brief; Bleakley, Platt, Gilchrist & Walker, attorneys), for William F. Bleakley, as general guardian of Ruth Armour, an infant, and another, appellants.
James J. Crisona, as guardian ad litem for Ruth Armour and another, infants, respondents.
Herman B. Goodstein, as guardian ad litem for Rachel Armour, an infant, respondent.
Stephen P. Duggan, Jr., of counsel (Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, with him on the brief; Lewis & MacDonald, attorneys), for George F. Lewis, Jr., and others, as executors of Bernard R. Armour, deceased, respondents.
Murray I. Gurfein of counsel (Christopher J. Taylor and James F. Cahill with him on the brief; Judd & Gurfein, attorneys), for George L. Armour, as trustee, respondent.
This action was brought in the Supreme Court by the trustee of an inter vivos trust for the settlement of his accounts. Application was made for permission to settle and compromise certain issues presented by the pleadings. The application was based upon a compromise agreement made between the plaintiff trustee and the special guardians for the infant beneficiaries, who were over fourteen years of age. An order was made approving the compromise agreement and a judgment entered settling the accounts of the trustee. The notices of appeal of the general guardians of the infants state that the sole issue raised is whether the lack of written consent of the infant beneficiaries requires a reversal of the order approving the compromise and the judgment settling the accounts of the trustee. It is claimed that such consents are required by the provisions of paragraph (b) of subdivision 4 of rule 294 of the Rules of Civil Practice.
At the time the present Civil Practice Act was enacted in 1920 the Legislature provided for a convention representing the judiciary and the Bar to consider and adopt rules of civil
practice not inconsistent with the Civil Practice Act or the Judiciary Law (L. 1920, ch. 902, as amd. by L. 1921, ch. 370). The convention in 1921 adopted the Rules of Civil Practice which superseded the previous General Rules of Practice. Among the new rules adopted was rule 294 which provided that 'On any application for the approval by the court of a settlement of a cause of action belonging to an infant, the court shall require the attorney so applying to disclose his relation to the defendant, and whether he has become concerned in the application or its subject matter at the instance of such defendant, or has received or is to receive any compensation from such defendant and the amount thereof, or has had any part in ...