The opinion of the court was delivered by: GODDARD
This matter came on to be heard upon the verified petition of Charles T. Douds, Regional Director of the Second Region of the National Labor Relations Board [herein called the Board], for a temporary injunction, pursuant to Section 10(l) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(l) [herein called the Act], pending the final adjudication of the Board with respect to this matter, and upon the issuance of an order to show cause why injunctive relief should not be granted as prayed in said petition. Respondent filed an answer to said petition. A hearing on the issues raised by the petition and answer was duly held on May 24, 1954. All parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard, examine and cross-examine witnesses, present evidence bearing on the issues, and to argue on the evidence and the law. The Court has fully considered the petition, answer, evidence, and argument and briefs of counsel.
Petitioner seeks this temporary injunction against an alleged violation of Section 8(b)(4)(A) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(4)(A). The respondent union, representing the shipping and service departments of Royal Typewriter Company, is engaged in a strike against Royal, and, in connection with this strike, has been picketing the premises of companies which use Royal machines, and of independent typewriter service companies which repair typewriters, including Royal machines.
The picketing has been conducted in front of the premises of these secondary employers at entrances used in common by employees of these secondary employers, deliverymen, and the public at large. It has been conducted, in some instances, at an hour when employees of the secondary employer would be arriving but before the public would be likely to appear; at premises of the secondary employer when no employee of Royal was there; at premises where the secondary employer did little or no business with the public; and at premises where the vast majority of the people using the building were employees of the secondary employer.
In one instance, an employee of one of the independent service companies refused to cross the picket line.
The picket signs initially read 'Royal Typewriters at [giving the name of the secondary employer] are being repaired by scabs.' After the Board challenged the legality of the picketing, the signs were changed to add to them 'Notice to the public only', but the manner of picketing was not changed.
Respondent ceased picketing the independent service companies two days after the parties first appeared before me on the hearing of this motion for an injunction, and four days before the trial of the issues.
Pursuant to Section 10(l) of the Act, whenever the Board has reasonable cause to believe there has been a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(A), the Court may grant an injunction pending the final adjudication of the matter by the Board. As the Court said, in Penello v. Brewery Drivers, 32 L.R.R.M. 2095:
'* * * it is not necessary for the Court to determine that the practice complained of is illegal. That is for the Board to do. All that the Court determines is whether there is probable cause and a reasonable probability that the practice may be held illegal.'
Respondent argues that they made no appeal to the employees of the secondary employer, and that in fact the employees took no concerted action, though it concedes that one of the objects of the picketing is to induce or force the secondary employers to cease doing business with Royal.
In the first place, it is sufficient if the union induces or encourages concerted conduct by the employees of a neutral employer to engage in a strike, though the effort fails. N. L. R. B. v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 10 Cir., 1952, 193 F.2d 421.
In the second place, the Board, in a recent decision, rejected the argument that such picketing was directed only at the public. In Brewery & Beverage Drivers & Workers, Local No. 67, 107 N.L.R.B. No. 104, it stated:
'This broad argument, that picketing -- wherever it occurred -- is aimed only at publicizing a labor dispute and not at inducing work stoppages by employees who are required in their regular employment to cross the picket line, has been too often rejected to require further elaboration here.'
In that case, it held that picketing of a common entrance of a secondary employer, which was used by its employees, employees of suppliers and the public at large, where the signs of the pickets purported to appeal to the public, was a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(A).
Under the circumstances of this case, I find that the Board has reasonable cause to believe that there is a violation of the Act, and ...