Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

UNITED STATES v. CURRENCY IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $

November 26, 1957

UNITED STATES of America
v.
CURRENCY IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $ 2,223.40, consisting of Moneys of the United States of America, bills and coins, in the sum of $ 2,220.40 and $ 3.00 in moneys of the Dominion of Canada



The opinion of the court was delivered by: BRENNAN

This is a civil proceeding which seeks to enforce the forfeiture to the United States of the currency described in this title. The proceeding is based upon the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.A. § 7302) in that said currency was intended for use in violating the provisions of the Internal Revenue Laws or which had been so used.

The libel charges generally that the alleged offending currency was intended to be used in violation of the Internal Revenue Laws by one, David Armour McCarthy, who was engaged in the business of accepting wagers at Syracuse, N.Y., from July 1, 1956, to November 10, 1956 and who wilfully failed to pay the special tax imposed under Sections §§ 4401(a) and 4411 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C.A. 4401(a), 4411, to the District Director of Internal Revenue at Syracuse, N.Y. See also Title 26 U.S.C.A. 4901.

 No question is raised as to the preliminary proceedings taken herein. Claimant McCarthy filed an answer to the libel which admits the seizure of the moneys in dispute from his personal possession, custody and control. He alleges that same was and is his property. That said moneys were intended to be used or had been used in violating the provisions of the Internal Revenue Law is put in issue by the denial in the answer. A hearing was held before the court. Documentary and oral evidence was offered by the United States. The claimant offered no evidence. Motions to dismiss the libel were made and decision thereon reversed. The parties have submitted their briefs and the problem is before the court for determination.

 Findings of Fact

 On March 18, 1957, claimant McCarthy entered a plea of guilty in this court to certain counts of an indictment. Count III is pertinent here and is set out below:

 'That on or about July 1, 1956, at Syracuse, State and Northern District of New York, David Armour McCarthy, the defendant herein, who did engage in the business of accepting wagers at and near Syracuse, New York, from on or about July 1, 1956, to on or about November 10, 1956, did unlawfully, knowingly and wilfully fail to pay the special tax imposed under Section 4411 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, to the District Director of Internal Revenue for the Syracuse Internal Revenue Collection District of New York, at Syracuse, New York. (Sections 4411 and 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.A. §§ 4411, 7203)).'

 The undisputed oral evidence discloses that one, Mascari, a special agent of the Internal Revenue Service, entered or visited the premises known as the Auditorium Cigar Store at Syracuse, New York, on eight different dates, between October 29, 1956 and November 7, 1956, inclusive. On each occasion, he placed a bet or wager on the result of certain horse races, using a betting slip on which the names of the horses were written and the amount of the wagers noted thereon. Transactions were had with claimant McCarthy and with persons named Beck and Murray. The findings here will relate only to the transactions with McCarthy, the claimant, because of the particular facts of this case and because he is the individual claimant of the moneys involved.

 After visiting the cigar store on October 29, 1956 and October 30, 1956, when Mascari made wagers with Beck, he again entered the store on October 31, 1956; sat at a table in the rear room and claimant McCarthy paid Mascari $ 3.80, the proceeds of a wager made with Beck on October 30, 1956. The agent then wrote out a betting slip with the names of two horses thereon indicating a bet of $ 6. The slip was handed to McCarthy, the claimant, and the $ 6 paid to him. On November 1, 1956, the agent again entered the store; went into the back room; prepared a betting slip showing a $ 6 combination bet. McCarthy paid Mascari $ 7.20, due on the wager made the day before, and the $ 6 betting slip and the $ 6 in cash were placed with McCarthy. On November 3, 1956, the agent followed a similar procedure of entry and claimant McCarthy paid to him the sum of $ 21.50 which represented the agent's winnings on a wager placed with Beck on November 2, 1956. The agent then prepared a betting slip; handed same to McCarthy, together with the sum of $ 6 representing the amount wagered. On November 6, 1956, on the occasion of the agent's visit to the above premises, he was handed $ 6 by McCarthy which represented a wager made on November 3, 1956, with one Murray. The agent then prepared a betting slip; same was handed to McCarthy, together with the sum of $ 6 representing the amount wagered.

 On November 10, 1956, several Internal Revenue agents, acting under the authority of a search warrant, entered the premises of the Auditorium Cigar Store and arrested claimant McCarthy. Within a couple of hours, he was taken to the Internal Revenue office and was directed or requested to empty his pockets. In response, three separate bundles or rolls of money were placed on the desk by McCarthy. Same was counted and found to consist of the currency described in the caption of this proceeding. Among the bills produced by McCarthy, as above described, were three $ 1 bills bearing the same serial numbers of bills used by the agent in making the bets, above referred to, he having kept a record of the serial numbers of all new money used in placing the bets but no record was kept of the serial numbers of the bills received by the agent in the payment of his winnings which were then used to make up the moneys wagered on the particular day such payments were made.

 Discussion

 It is beyond argument that a forfeiture proceeding, such as we have here, is civil in its nature although in some proceedings, brought under particular statutes, it is said to possess some of the attributes of a criminal case. United States v. One 1953 Oldsmobile Sedan, D.C., 132 F.Supp. 14, at page 18; United States v. One 1948 Cadillac Convertible Coupe, D.C., 115 F.Supp. 723, at page 728.

 The burden of proof is upon the Government to show the existence of the elements necessary to warrant a decree of forfeiture as authorized by the statute and particularly those elements as alleged in the libel. This principle is based upon the oft cited case of United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 34 S. Ct. 213, 58 L. Ed. 494. See also United States v. Plymouth Coupe, D.C., 88 F.Supp. 93, at page 96; United States v. 673 Cases of Distilled Spirits and Wines, D.C., 74 F.Supp. 622, at page 626 and cases cited. In this particular case, the facts as to violation of the law by the claimant and his possession of the currency in question, not being in dispute, the principal burden of the Government is to establish that same was intended for use in violating the provisions of the Internal Revenue Laws. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7302. The measure of the burden thus imposed is satisfied by proof which establishes the fact by a 'reasonable preponderance of the evidence'. United States v. 673 Cases of Distilled Spirits and Wines, supra, 74 F.Supp. at page 626.

 It is intimated, although not seriously urged, that the currency involved here is not subject to forfeiture under the provisions of the statute. There is no basis for such a contention. The words 'any property' as used in Title 26 U.S.C.A. 7302 are all inclusive. Currency has been held to be property subject to forfeiture proceedings under other forfeiture statutes which embody the words in a similar content as they are used in the statute under discussion. To warrant a decree of forfeiture, however, the currency must be shown to bear a relationship to the offense against the revenue laws. United States v. Foreman, 5 Cir., 95 F.2d 479; United States v. Jenello, 3 Cir., 102 F.2d 587; United States v. One Machine, etc., D.C., 267 F. 501. It seems to be true that the majority of the reported cases, dealing with forfeiture proceedings, relate to conveyances and equipment rather than to currency. The so-called wagering statute however is comparatively new and few decisions are found which are helpful in this particular case. It seems plain that the particular statutes of the Internal Revenue Code, dealing with the rights and liabilities of those engaged in wagering, must be construed in the light of their purpose.

 While currency and the use thereof may appear to be a remote accessory to the illegal manufacture, possession or transportation of spirits and narcotics, it would be naive to conclude that the same ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.