The opinion of the court was delivered by: PALMIERI
Plaintiffs are former members of Department and Varieties Stores Union, Local 1115A, Retail Clerks International Association (Local 1115A). Defendants are (1) trustees and successor trustees of a Welfare Fund which was established by Local 1115A and the employers of the Local's members; (2) the President of the International Association; and (3) the trustee of Local 1115A.
The complaint alleges, upon information and belief, that 'in or about March or April of 1957 * * * Local 1115A, disaffiliated from the International, whereupon the plaintiffs and others similarly situated, resigned their membership in Local 1115A.' It appears from other papers on file in this case that an independent union was established at the time of the disaffiliation and that the International Association appointed a trustee for Local 1115A and that the trustee appointed himself and another as successor trustees for the Welfare Fund.
Article VI of the Declaration of Trust under which the Welfare Fund was administered is set forth in the complaint.
The complaint then alleges that, since the disaffiliation, the Welfare Fund has received no contributions 'from the employers with whom said Local had collective bargaining agreements;' that there are not, presently, any employers who are required, under a collective bargaining agreement with Local 1115A, to contribute to the Welfare Fund;
and that the Fund should terminate and its proceeds be distributed to the plaintiffs and others similarly situated
The complaint also alleges that a number of actions are pending in which each of the defendants seeks possession of the Welfare Fund. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants' claims are violative of Section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 157, 29 U.S.C.A. § 186. It is also alleged that, if defendants are successful in obtaining possession of the Welfare Fund, the plaintiffs will be denied benefits to which they are entitled under the terms of the Declaration of Trust. It appears, from other papers on file on this case, that the actions referred to above are pending in the New York State courts; that the actions seek to determine the rights to the Welfare Fund as between the officers of Local 1115A and the independent union; that the present plaintiffs are not parties to those actions; and that those actions do not seek distribution of the corpus of the Welfare Fund to the ex-members of Local 1115A.
The complaint seeks both declaratory and injunctive relief. The declaration of rights sought is that, 'by reason of the occurrence of the conditions set forth in said Declaration of Trust,' the trust has been terminated; that 'under the terms of the Declaration of Trust' the plaintiffs are entitled to a pro rata distribution of the corpus; that the defendants have no right to the corpus of the trust; and that the defendants' retention of the corpus or obtaining the corpus, is prohibited by 29 U.S.C.A. § 186.
The injunction sought would restrain defendants from dealing with the assets of the Welfare Fund; restrain them from proceeding with any action to recover or retain possession of the Welfare Fund; and restrain them from interfering with plaintiffs' rights to 'claim, use and enjoy' the corpus of the Welfare Fund. An accounting is also sought, as well as a direction that the Welfare Fund be distributed pro rata among plaintiffs and all others similarly situated.
Two of the defendants move for an order dismissing the complaint on the ground that this Court is without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Plaintiffs allege that this Court has jurisdiction under the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201, 2202 (1952 and Supp. V); and under Section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 157, 29 U.S.C.A. § 186.
The Declaratory Judgments Act, however, applies only to cases within the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Supp. V). It 'did not extend their jurisdiction.' Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1950, 339 U.S. 667, 671, 70 S. Ct. 876, 879, 94 L. Ed. 1194. Accordingly, I turn to a consideration of whether such jurisdiction is otherwise conferred upon this Court.
Jurisdiction Under 29 U.S.C.A. § 186.
Plaintiffs rely upon subsection (e) of 29 U.S.C.A. § 186,
and cite five federal cases for the proposition that that subsection vests the federal courts with broad equity jurisdiction over welfare funds established in industries affecting interstate commerce. Copra v. Suro, 1 Cir., 1956, 236 F.2d 107; Hobbs v. Lewis, D.C.D.C.1958, 159 F.Supp. 282; Wilkens v. De Koning, D.C.E.D.N.Y.1957, 152 F.Supp. 306; Conditioned Air and Refrigeration Co. v. Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Labor-Management Relations Trust, D.C.S.D.Cal.1956, 159 F.Supp. 887; and American Bakeries Co. v. Barrick, D.C.N.D.Ohio 1958, 162 F.Supp. 882. With the exception of the Copra case, however, it appears that the jurisdictional issue was not raised in any of these cases, or that the relief sought was that particularly provided in 29 U.S.C.A. § 186(e), i.e., an injunction to restrain the defendants from accepting payments alleged to be in violation of 29 U.S.C.A. § 186(a) and (b).
Part III of this opinion contains a discussion of whether this suit presents a problem 'arising under' these subsections. The same reasoning which leads to a negative answer to that question leads to the conclusion that the relief sought here is not that provided for in subsection (e), and that, therefore, that subsection is of no avail to plaintiffs here even if it does confer jurisdiction on this Court
Copra v. Suro, supra,
is, not surprisingly, cited by both plaintiffs and defendants in support of their respective positions. For the Court, in Copra, stated that 'the legislative history suggests to some extent * * * that Congress intended in (29 U.S.C.A. § 186(e)) to create a broad equity jurisdiction that * * * would also authorize (the District Courts) to exercise a more general equity power over the welfare funds * * *' 1 Cir., 1956, 236 F.2d 107, 115. But the holding, in Copra, was that the District Court did not err in denying plaintiffs' motion for an interlocutory injunction. The Court came to this conclusion because it felt that the District Court had not erred in finding that there were 'serious doubts' as to its jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C.A. § 186(e). Id. at loc. cit.
I do not believe that 29 U.S.C.A. § 186(e), in itself, vests any jurisdiction in the District Courts. Such an interpretation would be possible if the subsection, quoted in footnote 3, supra, ended after the words 'restrain violations of this section.' But the subsection as a whole indicates, I believe, that its purpose was to remove the bar of sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 738 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. § 17, 29 U.S.C.A. § 52, and the bar of the Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-110, 113-115, so as to permit the courts of the United States, in cases in which jurisdiction was otherwise present, to enjoin violations of subsections (a) and (b) of 29 U.S.C.A. § 186. This conclusion is buttressed by a comparison of the language of this subsection with the language Congress employed in Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a).
That subsection provides jurisdiction in the federal courts for 'suits for violation of (labor-management) contracts.' Interpreting that broad language, the Supreme Court has held that Congress had power to regulate labor-management controversies, that 185(a) directed the federal courts to fashion federal law to regulate those controversies, and that jurisdiction to decide these controversies was present because they would 'arise under' the federal law which the federal courts were to fashion. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 1957, 353 U.S. 448, 456-457, 77 S. Ct. 912, 1 L. Ed. 2d 972. I find, from the language of 186(e), no Congressional mandate to the federal courts to fashion federal law for the administration of union welfare trusts. In my opinion, that subsection does no more than clear the way for permitting federal courts to enjoin violations of § 186(a) and (b).
My interpretation of 29 U.S.C.A. § 186(e) is further buttressed by the legislative history of the Act,
and by a dictum in a recent decision of the Court of Appeals for this Circuit.