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March 31, 1961

LEVER BROTHERS COMPANY and Monsanto Chemical Company, Defendants

The opinion of the court was delivered by: KAUFMAN

This is an antitrust action brought by the government against Lever Brothers Company and Monsanto Chemical Company, in which the government contends that the purchase by Lever from Monsanto of certain assets connected with a synthetic detergent product known as 'all' constituted a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A ยง 18.

On September 7, 1960, plaintiff served written interrogatories, calling for the production of certain documents, upon both The Procter & Gamble Company and the Colgate-Palmolive Company, competitors of Lever. As a result of negotiations between these companies and the government concerning the information requested by these interrogatories, stipulations were signed pursuant to which much of this information was furnished to the government. These stipulations were approved by the Court. (The order as to Procter & Gamble was dated November 14, 1960; the order as to Colgate was dated December 5, 1961.) Both orders contained a provision that the information was to be disclosed 'Solely to the Court, to counsel for the parties, and to those employed by the Court and counsel for the parties who have duties in connection with this action * * *.' The orders further provided that 'the persons to whom information in response to these interrogatories is disclosed shall treat such information as completely confidential and not to be disclosed to any other person unless and until otherwise ordered by the Court.'

On January 11, 1961, Lever filed a motion under Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. seeking production by the government of various documents, including the material which had been furnished to the government by Procter & Gamble and Colgate. A consent order providing for the production of these documents was agreed upon between the government, Lever and Monsanto, and was submitted to the Court.

 However, on March 17, 1961, Procter & Gamble filed a motion pursuant to Rule 30(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeking (1) the return to it of the material which it had furnished the government pursuant to the November 14 order; or, (2) in the alternative an order limiting disclosure of this material to counsel for Lever and those employed by counsel, and prohibiting disclosure to any officers or other personnel of Lever. It is this motion which is now before the Court.

 The documents involved in this motion can be subsumed under four basic categories: (1) Material indicating Procter & Gambles' domestic net sales, domestic net profits, and domestic net worth for the fiscal years ending from June 30, 1953 to June 30, 1958; (2) Copies of reports furnished by Procter & Gamble to the United States Bureau of Census for the years 1953-58; *fn1" (3) Copies of reports submitted by Procter & Gamble to the Sales Census of the American Association of Soap and Glycerine Producers for the period from 1953 to 1958; (4) Copies of reports furnished by the A. C. Nielsen Company to Procter & Gamble for the period from 1953 to 1958.1A

 Procter & Gamble's basic contention, with respect to these documents, is that disclosure of their contents to Lever, a competitor, would result in irreparable injury to Procter's competitive position in the soap and synthetic detergent products industry. Procter argues that armed with this information, a competitor could easily ascertain or estimate Procter's current sales, expenditures, profits, volume of production and product trends. Thus, Procter urges that these documents not be disclosed to Lever personnel. Lever, on the other hand, argues that disclosure will not result in any foreseeable injury to Procter, since the data involved is not current, and does not contain any breakdown by brand names. It urges further that this data is absolutely necessary to the preparation of its defense, and that an examination and evaluation of it by expert Lever personnel is necessary if the data is to have any meaningful significance to counsel in this preparation.

 At the outset, it should be noted that the instant motion is addressed to the discretion of the Court. See Developments in the Law -- Discovery, 74 Harv.L.Rev. 940, 1017 (1961). This discretion, however, should be exercised in a manner consonant with the liberal spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and specifically with the objectives of the liberal discovery provisions of these Rules. As the Supreme Court noted in Hickman v. Taylor, 1947, 329 U.S. 495, 507, 67 S. Ct. 385, 392, 91 L. Ed. 451, '* * * the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment * * *. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.' See generally 4 Moore, Federal Practice Sec. 26.02, at 1012-16 (2d ed. 1950).

 In the instant case, it is apparent that Lever has made the necessary showing that the information and documents sought are not only highly material and relevant to the issues in the case, but also are absolutely necessary to the preparation of its defense.

 This is an antitrust case which presents such complex and difficult issues as the delineation of the relevant market and the determination of whether the sale of assets in question may result in the requisite substantial lessening of competition. An informed resolution of these issues necessarily requires a somewhat detailed examination of sales and production data of Lever's two major competitors, Colgate and Procter & Gamble. As the government pointed out in its memorandum: 'The material is not only relevant, but essential to the trial of this action. * * * To try a Section 7 case in the detergent industry without information concerning Procter & Gamble would be like trying an automobile industry case without information with respect to General motors.' Government's Memorandum, pp. 1-2. Similarly, the Court commented, in Service Liquor Distributors v. Calvert Distillers Corp., D.C.S.D.N.Y.1954, 16 F.R.D. 507, 509, that 'in an action under the antitrust, laws, based upon an alleged abuse of competition, a competitor's business records, where good cause has been shown, are not only not immune from inquiry, but they are precisely the source of the most relevant evidence.'

 It is equally clear that Lever's counsel should be permitted to discuss this data with company personnel. The information involved is of a nature which inherently requires discussion with expert personnel and those intimately familiar with the industry, to be meaningful. Expert analysis and comparisons will be a necessity if the defense of this action is to be adequately prepared.

 Moreover, Procter & Gamble has not made the showing of serious and clearly defined injury which in some instances may require absolute and rigid restrictions on disclosure. Indeed, Procter's concern perhaps stems primarily from the fact that it is not a party to this litigation, and that merely as a third party, it is being asked to disgorge itself of what it considers to be important information. However, the framers of discovery rules gave much thought and consideration to this facet of the problem, and concluded that the inconvenience caused to third parties in the federal courts was outweighed by the public interest in seeking the truth in every litigated case, with both sides better prepared, and the element of unfair surprise completely eliminated.

 The data requested in the instant case does not involve secret processes or customer lists, categories which have traditionally been considered to be entitled to greater protection. See e.g. American Oil Co. v. Pennsylvania Petroleum Prod. Co., D.C.D.R.I.1959, 23 F.R.D. 680, 684. See also In the Matter of H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., Federal Trade Commission, Docket No. 7709 (March 14, 1961). In a recent case involving information of the nature sought here, the Court in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, D.C.N.D.N.Y., 193 F.Supp. 249, 250, allowed full disclosure in a closely analogous situation and pointed out that

 'Any prejudice or harm to be occasioned by the companies answering the questionnaire seems more theoretical than practical. The purpose of the action is to protect the public interest which definitely includes the interest of defendant's competitors. Approximate business statistics are available through investigating agencies and this court is of the opinion that under present business conditions production and sales figures are not a well kept secret from business competitors.'

 Further, the documents involved do not contain any current information; they cover primarily the period from 1953 to 1958. *fn2" In this connection, it is noteworthy that in the course of negotiations between the government and Procter which eventuated in the November 14 order, Procter objected most strenuously to the government's requests for more current data; these requests were thus withdrawn, and Procter agreed to produce the documents now in dispute. In addition, the sales, production, and profit figures do not contain breakdowns by brand names, ...

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