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12/22/66 Federal Maritime v. Federal Maritime

December 22, 1966

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT VOLKSWAGENWERK AKTIENGE-SELLSCHAFT, PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENTS, PACIFIC MARITIME ASSOCIATION, MARINE TERMINALS CORPORATION, INTERVENORS 1966.CDC.230



Before the Commission, both MTC and PMA contested its jurisdiction, MTC arguing that they were not "other persons" under Section 1 of the Act*fn5 and PMA arguing that the exclusive jurisdiction given the National Labor Relations Board over collective bargaining precluded the Commission from having jurisdiction in the instant case. The Commission did not resolve the jurisdictional question, but rather assumed for the purposes of its decision that both MTC and PMA were subject to the Act. Even though it found the literal language of Section 15 broad enough to encompass any "cooperative working arrangement" entered into by persons subject to the Act, the majority of the Commission held Section 15 inapplicable to PMA's agreements regarding the mechanization fund because it interprets that section to apply

APPELLATE PANEL:

McGowan, Tamm and Leventhal, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM DECISION

This case is before this court on a petition to review and set aside an order of the Federal Maritime Commission. Petitioner is a German corporation which manufactures Volkswagen automobiles. It ships large quantities of automobiles to ports on the Pacific Coast by means of common carrier and chartered vessels. Marine Terminals Corporation [hereinafter MTC], respondent below, intervenor here, operates ocean terminals at San Francisco and Long Beach, California, where it provides stevedoring services for both common carriers and charter vessels. Pacific Maritime Association [hereinafter PMA], intervenor below and before this court, is a nonprofit corporation made up of common and contract carriers, marine terminal operators, and stevedore contractors. PMA was organized in 1949 for the purpose of negotiating and administering labor contracts with labor unions on behalf of its members. MTC is a member of PMA; Volkswagen is not, since shippers are not eligible for membership in the organization. I.

In order to understand the present controversy between the parties, it is necessary to review briefly the origins of their dispute. As noted, PMA serves as the collective bargaining representative for its members. In 1957 the members desired to introduce work-saving devices into the industry and to be free of strikes and slowdowns during the period of transformation to greater mechanization. In its capacity as the representative of longshoremen and marine clerks, the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union [hereinafter ILWU] desired assurances from PMA that its members would share in the monetary benefits realized from the introduction of work-saving devices.

As a result of extensive negotiations between PMA and ILWU, a "Mechanization and Modernization Fund" of $29,000,000 was agreed upon. This fund was to be collected over a nearly six-year period from PMA members and to be used to cushion the effects of higher production upon longshoremen and marine clerks displaced by the mechanization. Since PMA's membership was responsible for payment of the fund, the ILWU agreed to allow PMA to be sole determiner as to how the fund should be accumulated. The necessity for the fund itself is not here in controversy; in fact, all parties agree that it serves a salutary purpose. What is in controversy is the funding method approved by PMA to raise the money from its members.

In order to determine how its members should be assessed in accumulating the fund, a Work Improvement Fund Committee was appointed by PMA. The majority of the Committee recommended that members should be assessed on the basis of tonnage carried or handled, with bulk cargo being assessed one-fifth the rate of general cargo. *fn1 The rate for general cargo was set at 27 1/2 cents per ton carried or handled; the special category of bulk cargo was to be assessed at 5 1/2 cents per ton carried or handled. Each member of PMA was to remit to PMA, as trustee for the fund, an amount equal to the per tonnage assessment, a ton constituting for the purposes of the assessment 2000 pounds weight, or 40 cubic feet measurement.

The Committee recommended that the assessment be based on the cargo "as manifested" for loading or discharging at Pacific Coast ports. Usually any particular type of cargo is manifested, consistently, either on a weight or measurement basis. Thus the amount of the assessment for any particular commodity would be directly related to whether that commodity was manifested by weight or measurement tons.

There is no uniform way of manifesting automobiles. In the foreign trades they are manifested on a unit basis on chartered ships, but weight and sometimes measurement is shown (the unit price including costs, overhead and profit to the terminal operator, as well as an assessment for PMA dues.) On common carriers both weight and measurement are shown. Tariffs are on a unit basis but dependent upon measurement. In the coastwise trades, autos are manifested and freighted by weight.

Despite the fact that automobiles were manifested in these different ways, PMA determined that automobiles should always be assessed for the mechanization fund on a measurement ton basis regardless of how they were manifested. This treatment of automobiles was in contradistinction to all other cargo which was assessed according to the manner in which it was manifested. II.

Cast against this background, Volkswagen's grievance comes into sharper focus. If considered on a measurement ton basis, a Volkswagen automobile measures 8.7 tons, whereas if a weight ton basis is utilized, it measures only 0.9 tons. An assessment for the fund based on measurement tons at 27 1/2 cents per ton equals $2.35 per automobile; the same assessment based on weight tons equals $.25. Thus the utilization of the measurement ton as the standard results in an assessment more than ten times greater than if the weight ton were to be used.

Volkswagen promptly protested to PMA the "discriminatory burden" imposed upon automobiles in general and Volkswagens in particular. Since this make of automobile constitutes by far the largest number of automobiles imported through Pacific Coast ports, the "ten times heavier tax," it argued, was in fact an excessive tax on Volkswagens. In addition, Volkswagen protested favorable treatment accorded by PMA to scrap metal and lumber cargo which were relieved of paying a major part of the assessment by virtue of "depressed" conditions in these industries. Petitioner also argued that the "tax" was particularly inequitable as applied to its operations since, because of previous modernization made in the handling of automobiles, no substantial savings could be expected in the handling of Volkswagens as a result of the institution of the mechanization fund. Petitioner's arguments to PMA were to no avail; Volkswagen has, however, refused to pay the assessment as calculated on a measurement ton basis.

Volkswagen's refusal to pay the assessments on its automobiles prevented the terminal operators (and particularly MTC) from paying to the PMA fund the assessments due on this cargo. It was both theoretically and practically impossible for the terminal and stevedoring companies to absorb the 27 1/2 cents per ton assessment on automobile cargo ($2.35 per auto) since their profit per automobile does not exceed $1.00. MTC sought advice from PMA as to what "stand we can take in demanding payment of the assessment." MTC requested PMA's Board of Directors for authority "to bring suit against Volkswagen for the monies due." Rather than have MTC sue Volkswagen directly, however, it was determined by PMA that it would sue MTC and the other onshore operators engaged in discharging Volkswagen automobiles and they would in turn implead Volkswagen. PMA did bring suit against MTC in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California; when Volkswagen was impleaded by MTC, the District Court stayed the proceedings in that court at the request of Volkswagen to enable it to institute proceedings before the Federal Maritime Commission under the Shipping Act of 1916, amended, 46 U.S.C. ยง 801 et seq. (1961). The district court granted the stay and petitioner began these proceedings.

The following issues were submitted to the Commission for its determination:

"1. Whether the assessments claimed from [Volkswagen] are being claimed pursuant to an agreement or understanding which is required to be filed with and approved by the Federal Maritime Commission under Section 152 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, 46 U.S.C. 814 (1961), before it is lawful to take any action thereunder, which agreement has not been so filed and approved.

*fn2. Whether the assessments claimed from [Volkswagen] result in subjecting the automobile cargoes of [Volkswagen] to undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in violation of Section 16 of the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, 46 U.S.C. 815. *fn3

3. Whether the assessments claimed from [Volkswagen] constitutes an unjust and unreasonable practice in violation of Section 17 . . .." *fn4

Subsequently hearings were held, and the Examiner issued his initial decision finding, inter alia, that MTC and PMA were persons subject to the Shipping Act and that the agreement entered into between MTC and other PMA members was a "cooperative working arrangement." The examiner went on to find, however, that the cooperative working arrangement between MTC and the other members of PMA was not such an arrangement required by Section 15 of the Shipping Act to be filed with and ...


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