UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
decided: November 28, 1967.
IN RE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
LORING J. WHITESIDE
Lumbard, Chief Judge, and Kaufman and Feinberg, Circuit Judges.
Author: Per Curiam
This is an appeal by Loring J. Whiteside from an order of the District Court for the District of Connecticut, Blumenfeld, J., disbarring appellant from practice before that Court. In 1913 Mr. Whiteside was admitted to the Bars of the State of New York, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and this Court, but, with two minor exceptions, he did not practice law after he moved to Connecticut in 1921. On February 17, 1964, Mr. Whiteside moved for admission and was admitted to the Bar of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut in order to represent the plaintiffs in the case of Tkaczyk v. Gallagher et al., D.C., 265 F. Supp. 791.*fn1 On August 5, 1966 he filed a 12-page complaint in the District Court charging a conspiracy between 22 individuals, comprising in the main lawyers, a state's attorney, a deputy coroner, and various Connecticut judges including all 5 judges of the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors. The following are typical of the allegations in the complaint which Judge Blumenfeld*fn2 found grossly disrespectful of the judicial office and for which Whiteside was disbarred: "In numerous instances certain Superior Court Judges, certain State Supreme Court Justices and one certain probate judge entered into the conspiracy to conceal the murder [of the Tkaczyk's daughter] and perform overt acts of their own, attributable in some instances to their desire to protect from exposure the increasing number of prominent attorneys and of the State Judiciary and others who had gradually been sucked in and become involved in the matter * * the transcript disclosed a Superior Court judge aiding and abetting DeAndrade in attempted subornation of perjury and an attempt to extort a ransom under false pretenses."
Mr. Whiteside has stated that the allegations against the state judges were based only on the public record of their actions in connection with the Tkaczyk's lawsuit. He is of the view that by exercising their judicial judgment -- separately or collectively -- adversely to his clients, they became "conspirators" in concealing the facts concerning the alleged murder. In the conceded absence of any facts tending to show anything more than that the rulings complained of, at worst, might have been erroneous, the district court was justified in finding that these grossly disrespectful allegations, repeatedly made, were so totally unfounded and so clearly in violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics*fn3 as to justify disbarment.*fn4
We do not pass judgment on whether appellant behaved as he did because of his long absence from the law or because of faulty judgment. But it is clear that in addition his conduct in presenting these wholly unsupported charges is such as to put in doubt his ability to exercise the judgment which advocacy requires.