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United States v. Wolfson

decided: December 27, 1968.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE,
v.
LOUIS E. WOLFSON AND ELKIN B. GERBERT, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS



Moore, Woodbury*fn* and Smith, Circuit Judges.

Author: Woodbury

WOODBURY, Senior Circuit Judge:

It was stipulated at the trial that at all relevant times there were 2,510,000 shares of Continental Enterprises, Inc., issued and outstanding. The evidence is clear, indeed is not disputed, that of these the appellant Louis E. Wolfson himself with members of his immediate family and his right hand man and first lieutenant, the appellant Elkin B. Gerbert, owned 1,149,775 or in excess of 40%. The balance of the stock was in the hands of approximately 5,000 outside shareholders. The government's undisputed evidence at the trial was that between August 1, 1960, and January 31, 1962, Wolfson himself sold 404,150 shares of Continental through six brokerage houses, that Gerbert sold 53,000 shares through three brokerage houses and that members of the Wolfson family, including Wolfson's wife, two brothers, a sister, the Wolfson Family Foundation and four trusts for Wolfson's children sold 176,675 shares through six brokerage houses.

Gerbert was a director of Continental. Wolfson was not, nor was he an officer, but there is ample evidence that nevertheless as the largest individual shareholder he was Continental's guiding spirit in that the officers of the corporation were subject to his direction and control and that no corporate policy decisions were made without his knowledge and consent. Indeed Wolfson admitted as much on the stand. No registration statement was in effect as to Continental; its stock was traded over-the-counter.

The appellants do not dispute the foregoing basic facts. They took the position at the trial that they had no idea during the period of the alleged conspiracy, stipulated to be from January 1, 1960, to January 31, 1962, that there was any provision of law requiring registration of a security before its distribution by a controlling person to the public. On the stand in their defense they took the position that they operated at a level of corporate finance far above such "details" as the securities laws; as to whether a particular stock must be registered. They asserted and their counsel argued to the jury that they were much too busy with large affairs to concern themselves with such minor matters and attributed the fault of failure to register to subordinates in the Wolfson organization and to failure of the brokers to give notice of the need. Obviously in finding the appellants guilty the jury rejected this defense, if indeed, it is any defense at all.

The appellants assert numerous claims of error. We shall dispose of the claims more or less in the order of their importance.

Section 5 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e, in pertinent part provides: "(a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly --

"(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell or offer to buy such security through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise; * * *."

However, § 4 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d, exempts certain transactions from the provisions of § 5 including:

"(1) Transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer."

The appellants argue that they come within this exemption for they are not issuers, underwriters or dealers. At first blush there would appear to be some merit in this argument. The immediate difficulty with it, however, is that § 4(1) by its terms exempts only "transactions," not classes of persons, see SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 247 (C.A.2, 1959), and ignores § 2(11) of the Act which defines an "underwriter" to mean any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to the distribution of any security, or participates directly or indirectly in such undertaking unless that person's participation is limited to the usual and customary seller's commission, and then goes on to provide:

"As used in this paragraph the term 'issuer' shall include, in addition to an issuer, any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect common control with the 'issuer.'" (Italics supplied.)

In short, the brokers provided outlets for the stock of issuers and thus were underwriters. United States v. Re, 336 F.2d 306, 309 (C.A.2, 1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 904, 85 S. Ct. 188, 13 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1964). Wherefore the stock was sold in "transactions by underwriters" which are not within the exemption of § 4(1), supra.

But the appellants contend that the brokers in this case cannot be classified as underwriters because their part in the sales transactions came within § 4(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(4), which exempts "brokers' transactions executed upon customers' orders on any exchange or in the over-the-counter market but not the solicitation of such orders."*fn1 The answer to this contention is that § 4(4) was designed only to exempt the brokers' part in security transactions. ...


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