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MATTER LINCOLN G. SCHMIDT (12/31/68)

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT 1968.NY.44118 <http://www.versuslaw.com>; 296 N.Y.S.2d 49; 31 A.D.2d 214 December 31, 1968 IN THE MATTER OF LINCOLN G. SCHMIDT, AS PRESIDENT JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUFFOLK COUNTY, RESPONDENT Proceeding to remove the President Judge of the District Court of Suffolk County. Solomon A. Klein, counsel appointed to prosecute the charges. Joseph C. Hogan for respondent. Christ, Acting P. J., Brennan, Rabin, Benjamin and Martuscello, JJ., concur. Author: Per Curiam


Proceeding to remove the President Judge of the District Court of Suffolk County.

Christ, Acting P. J., Brennan, Rabin, Benjamin and Martuscello, JJ., concur.

Author: Per Curiam

 By order of this court made on May 17, 1967 Mr. Justice Thomas P. Farley was designated to conduct an investigation of the District Court of Suffolk County. Upon the submission of his report, this court found that sufficient cause existed for the institution of a proceeding (pursuant to N. Y. Const., art. VI, § 22, subd. i; UDCA, § 103, subd. [e]; Code Crim. Pro., § 132) to remove respondent, President Judge of the District Court of Suffolk County, from office for cause.

There were 4 charges in the original statement of charges served upon respondent; thereafter, 10 additional charges were preferred against him. There is no basic dispute as to the material facts. In his answer to the original 4 charges, respondent substantially conceded all of the factual allegations of these charges but pleaded for "Leave to show extenuating and mitigating circumstances" with respect to each of them. As to the additional 10 charges respondent, in his answer and in his testimony at the hearing before this court, has similarly conceded the factual occurrences, but has denied any impropriety in connection therewith.

CHARGES

It is alleged in the first charge of the statement of charges that in the prosecution of a truck driver for a violation of section 385 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, the driver having discharged his attorney and the owner of the truck having sent the driver home from court, respondent directed that the owner be taken into custody until an appropriate information charging the owner with a violation of said section could be drawn against him. It was charged that the respondent's actions with respect to the owner, in directing that he be placed in custody, as a result of which the owner was handcuffed in the courtroom, constituted "improper, high-handed and oppressive conduct". It was further charged that the imposition by respondent of fines in the amount of $100 on each of five violations was contrary to and in violation of subdivision 16 of section 385 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

As alleged in the statement of charges and as developed at the hearing, it appears that in 1966 Paul Jackson, a truck driver employed by William A. Thompson, the owner of the truck, was given five summonses for driving an overloaded truck in violation of section 385 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. In November, 1966 the driver was found guilty before the respondent with respect to two of the five violations and was fined the minimum amounts mandated by the statute, to wit: $100 for the first offense and $250 for the second offense.

On December 9, 1966, with a third case marked peremptorily for that date, the driver, his attorney and the owner of the truck appeared before the respondent on the third violation. The attorney asked the respondent to disqualify himself on the ground that he had previously heard two cases involving the same defendant, the same truck and the same conditions and that he might thereby be prejudiced. The motion was denied. Subsequently that day, the attorney moved to withdraw as counsel because of a dispute as to his fee. Respondent told Jackson that he would give him a short time to obtain an attorney and proceed to trial at 1:30 p.m., since the file indicated that the case had been continuously adjourned and had been marked peremptorily against him. When the court reconvened at 1:30 p.m., Thompson advised respondent that he had been unable to find an attorney and that he had sent Jackson home because he had complained of being ill. Thereupon, respondent directed that Thompson be placed in custody for the purpose of having an information drawn against him as the owner of the vehicle. Thompson was led from the courtroom with one wrist handcuffed.

Respondent testified that when he ordered the owner of the truck to be taken into custody for the purpose of having an information drawn against him, he believed that a prosecution for violation of the statute would properly lie against him as owner. However, during the recess, he was advised by the Assistant District Attorney that the charge could not be successfully prosecuted against the owner because of the difficulty of proving that he did "knowingly permit" the overweight violation. Thereupon, Thompson was released from custody, and in February, 1967 he appeared in respondent's chambers and delivered a check for $500 in full payment of all five violations. Respondent reduced the original $250 fine for the second overload violation and imposed $100 fines for each of the three remaining overload violations. Respondent testified that, at that time, it was not uncommon for a Judge of said court to impose fines of less than $250 for second or subsequent offenses although the statute provided for a fine of not less than $100 for a first offense and not less than $250 for a second or subsequent offense. He explained that the administrative problems of processing the work through the court had, unfortunately, led him "to cut corners in some cases to get the work done and this was one of them".

The second charge, as amended, relates to a summons for speeding which one Richard Felice received on January 6, 1966, returnable on February 16, 1966 in Patchogue. Felice did not appear on February 16 and, although respondent was not assigned to Traffic Court in Patchogue on that day, nevertheless, he dismissed the case for lack of prosecution and indorsed the dismissal on the back-up sheet. While admitting these facts, respondent denied that it was "improper, irregular and contrary to the orderly administration of justice".

Respondent testified that on the day in question he left the court in Commack, where he had been presiding, and, in accordance with his usual practice, brought with him certain court records to be filed in Patchogue. At the court house in Patchogue, where he arrived after 4:30 p.m., he was given the file in the Felice case and a Clerk requested that he initial the dismissal so that the books could be closed for that day. Seeing a notation on the summons and back-up sheet indicating that the defendant had been advised of his right to counsel and of the provisions of section 335-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the case had been adjourned to February 16, 1966, and being advised by a Clerk that the case had been dismissed earlier that day by the Judge who had presided in Traffic Court, but who had failed to appropriately mark the papers, respondent made the notation as above indicated dismissing the case.

The third charge, as amended, alleges that in 1965 one Joseph Gauch received a summons for passing a red light, which was returnable in Patchogue on December 22, 1965. The defendant did not appear on that day; however, he did appear in court late in the afternoon of the following day, December 23. The Judge assigned to Traffic Court on that day had already left when Gauch arrived and Gauch was referred to respondent, who had just entered the building. Respondent asked Gauch how he pleaded. Gauch pleaded guilty and handed his driver's license to respondent. Respondent looked at the license and dismissed the charge. Respondent has admitted these facts but has denied that such disposition was "contrary to the proper and orderly administration of justice".

At the hearing before this court Gauch testified that when he arrived at the court building on December 23, 1965 he was referred by a Police Sergeant to respondent; that he explained to respondent that he had passed a red light in order to avoid an accident and that if he had stopped, the automobile coming up behind him would have hit him; and that upon hearing this explanation, respondent signed the summons and said "Here, Merry Christmas". Respondent conceded, at the hearing, that he was "carelessly wrong" in dismissing the charge in the absence of the police officer who issued the summons.

The substance of the fourth charge is that respondent became involved in a bitter matrimonial dispute between one of his wife's sisters and her husband (William King). On September 27, 1965, respondent signed a complaint against his brother-in-law, charging him with disorderly conduct. That charge was dismissed in July, 1966 for lack of prosecution. On September 6, 1966, respondent signed an arrest warrant upon the complaint of another one of his wife's sisters, whose husband had been taken to the hospital earlier that ...


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