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MIRIAM ELKON v. ANDRE ELKON (04/21/69)

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, TRIAL TERM, NEW YORK COUNTY 1969.NY.41225 <http://www.versuslaw.com>; 300 N.Y.S.2d 259; 59 Misc. 2d 725 April 21, 1969 MIRIAM ELKON, PLAINTIFF,v.ANDRE ELKON, DEFENDANT Gainsburg, Gottlieb, Levitan & Cole (Emanuel Baetich of counsel), for plaintiff. Doman, Spellman & San Filippo (Howard Spellman of counsel), for defendant. Theodore R. Kupferman, J. Author: Kupferman


Theodore R. Kupferman, J.

Author: Kupferman

 This is an action by the wife for divorce, for alimony and child support, counsel fees, and the award of the marital residence.

The parties, Miriam Elkon and Andre Elkon, were married on December 4, 1966 in New York City. Prior thereto and since that time, they have been New York State residents. They have resided at 170 East 78th Street, in Manhattan, of which residence exclusive possession is sought by the wife. This is a three-room rent-controlled apartment, the current rental for which is $260 a month. There is one child, a daughter, Nicole Louise, born on April 26, 1968.

The parties stopped cohabitation in September, 1967. The wife's motion for exclusive possession of the marital residence was granted pendente lite by Mr. Justice Harry B. Frank on November 26, 1968. In view of the imminence of trial, the motion by plaintiff for temporary alimony, counsel fees and custody was denied on March 17, 1969, without prejudice to renewal at the trial, by Mr. Justice Thomas C. Chimera. The trial commenced before me on March 19 and continued for several days.

The parties have agreed that the court should make a determination on the claim for divorce and also fix alimony and child support, reserving all other aspects, including but not limited to counsel fees, visitation privileges and specific requests by the husband for certain personal property in the marital apartment, being a living room rug, music stand and fireplace brass bucket, as well as the request by the wife for the return to her of the engagement ring she had given back to him.

No previous decree of divorce having anywhere been obtained by either of the parties and the period for conciliation proceedings having expired, as required by section 215 of the Domestic Relations Law, the court, after a trial of the issues, finds that allegations of the complaint as to the defendant's cruel and inhuman treatment of the plaintiff had been proven by a preponderance of the credible evidence.

Accordingly, judgment of divorce is found in favor of the plaintiff.

Custody of the infant issue of the marriage is awarded to the mother on the basis that she will be in a better position to care for the child, and there is no finding made that the father would not be competent to have custody. While the husband originally objected to having the child, he is now clearly interested in the child's well-being. The question of visitation privileges is reserved.

As to alimony and child support, the husband suggests $7,500 per year. The wife requests $450 per week as fair and reasonable, based on "25% to 33 1/3% of a spouse's income" as "within the guidelines laid down by the courts" and as reasonable, considering the tax consequences to the plaintiff and the tax advantages to the defendant. However, this percentage is applied to a substantially high income figure, to which the defendant takes exception.

Defendant has conceded that he has the financial ability to pay any amount fixed by the court for alimony and child support, based on the preseparation standard of living of the parties. Such standard of living or manner in which accustomed to live, for the period of the marriage, was undoubtedly on a scale less than the recent income of the husband permitted. The defendant contends that only the "preseparation standard" controls. Further, defendant points out that the recent change in section 236 of the Domestic Relations Law requires that the length of time of the marriage and the ability of the wife to be self-supporting are also factors to be taken into account. This recent change, as pointed out by plaintiff, merely codifies what has been judicial practice. (See Recent Amendments to the Domestic Relations Law by Alfred Selter and James P. Dollard, Jr., The Advocate, Bronx County Bar Assn., vol. 16, #2, March-April, 1969, pp. 29, 31.)

During the trial, testimony was permitted over defendant's objection as to his income and assets. Despite the defendant's concession that he could meet payments based on the previous standard of living and his contention that this limited the avenue of inquiry, the court proceeded on the basis that while the previous style is the main test, other factors might be taken into account.

As was stated in Borchard v. Borchard (5 A.D.2d 472, 477-478 [1st Dept., 1958]): "In fixing the amount of alimony it has been said that it may not be determined by any mathematical formula. In general it is decided by consideration of several factors (cf. Phillips v. Phillips, 1 A.D.2d 393, 398). Usually, however, the balancing of these factors is of greater relevancy when awarding alimony from a modest income. In determining the amount to be paid by a husband of wealth and a substantial income, the other factors become of less importance and the search becomes to a large extent one to determine the standard of living of the parties." (See, also, Stahl v. Stahl, 16 A.D.2d 467, 468, [App. Div., 1st Dept.], and the opinion below in that case by Mr. Justice Harry B. Frank, 221 N. Y. S. 2d 931, 950 [1961].)

The parties were married only a short time (although they knew each other previously) and had already parted at the time their daughter was born. The wife is capable -- the problem of caring and rearing the child aside -- of earning a normal, moderate living. She had been a department store employee in the merchandising area prior to marriage and during the marriage had held a part-time job. Their joint Federal income tax return for 1967 (filed in 1968) includes the sum of $3,400 of her earnings. They had lived on a moderate scale during marriage, except for summers in the Hamptons and club membership there, together with a summer car rental, and membership in a well-known club in Manhattan. They had part-time cleaning help. He had previously worked for his father in the diamond business and then gone to Loeb, Rhoades & Co. as a registered representative. The 1967 joint Federal income tax return afore-mentioned has total earnings of $48,200 (includes wife's $3,400), plus income from sales and exchanges of $38,500.

It is the husband's contention that his capital gains were for future business purposes and to start a "hedge fund" and no part of the living standard. His withholding statement (W2 form) for 1968 shows wages of $48,535 (slightly more than the previous year). While this does not include capital gains, it is contended that in one transaction (Westec) there was a substantial loss. The ...


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