The opinion of the court was delivered by: GURFEIN
A petition was filed in this Court by the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board (the "Board") pursuant to Section 10(l) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 149; 73 Stat. 544; 29 U.S.C. § 160(l)), for a temporary injunction pending the final disposition of the matter involved in a charge filed by Hazantown, Inc., pending before the Board, alleging that respondent, Joint Board of Coat, Suit and Allied Garment Workers Union, ILGWU, AFL-CIO (the "Joint Board"), has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act.
The petition is predicated on petitioner's conclusion that there is reasonable cause to believe that the respondent has engaged in the unfair labor practices charged and that complaints of the Board based on the charges should issue under Section 10(l) of the Act. A short evidentiary hearing was held on Thursday, November 8, 1973.
The facts are not in serious dispute. Hazantown filed a charge with the Board that the respondent Union on September 12, 1973 threatened to picket it and has, since September 17, 1973, continued to picket for the purpose of obtaining recognition, and has not filed a petition for election within that period of time which exceeds thirty days.
Hazantown is a New York corporation engaged in the business of importing and manufacturing garments. In the course and conduct of its business operations, Hazantown, in the past year purchased and caused to be delivered to it goods and materials valued in excess of $ 50,000 from states other than the State of New York and from firms located outside the United States.
In relation to its manufacturing operations, Hazantown follows the predominant pattern of the garment industry in New York. That is, it purchases raw materials from suppliers, delivers such materials to contractors who manufacture finished garments and upon their return to Hazantown, it sells the garments to retail establishments. Accordingly, the number of functions and employees of Hazantown in relation to the direct manufacture of garments is quite limited. Hazantown arranges for, rather than engages in, the direct manufacture of the garments it sells.
On September 12, 1973, Hazantown was visited by agents of the Joint Board. The agents who visited the shop were Bernard Saslaw and Louis Fradkin. After identifying themselves, Saslaw and Fradkin said that they would like Hazantown to sign a contract with the union. When this demand was rejected, Saslaw stated that unless the company signed up immediately they would strike and engage in picketing.
On Monday, September 17, 1973, the Joint Board commenced picketing Hazantown at the building in which the company is located on Eighth Avenue, New York City. This picketing has been carried out continuously to date. The Joint Board has not filed any representation petition pursuant to Section 9(c) of the Act. The picket signs being utilized read:
Joint Board, Cloak, Suit, Skirt, and Reefer Makers' Unions, ILGWU
None of the employees of Hazantown has participated in the picketing and none has engaged in a strike against their employer. There can be no doubt that the picketing which commenced on September 17, 1973 is in furtherance of the demands by Saslaw and Fradkin made on the employer on September 12, 1973, i. e., the demand that Hazantown, as a jobber, execute a contract with the union.
The Joint Board by letter dated October 18, 1973 notified Hazantown that the Joint Board desired the company to sign a "jobbers' agreement, under which your firm would obligate itself to send work to or deal only with union contractors, i. e., contractors whose employees are already represented by our Union." Respondent in this letter also disclaimed any interest in representing Hazantown's direct employees.
I find that the sole purpose of the strike was to obtain from Hazantown a jobber's agreement which would require Hazantown to agree, among other things, to deal with union contractors, that is, contractors who are in contractual relations with the respondent union, and to guarantee certain obligations which such union contractor has to its workers under its labor agreement with the respondent union. I find that there was no intention to enroll the direct employees in the union and that they were not the type of worker which the union generally recruits for membership. I find that, in this industry, the employees of contractors are not employees of the jobbers themselves. I find that the effect of the picketing was to induce a stoppage of deliveries, as shown by reports of truckers received in evidence.
The issue is fairly joined. The Petitioner says that the attempt by the Union to make the jobber sign an agreement with it is an attempt to "require the employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees." Section 8(b)(7). The Union responds that it is not seeking to bargain "for his employees," since the employer has no direct employees. The Union relies, in part, on the exemption contained in Section 8(e) of the Act. That section, in pertinent part, provides that "[it] shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization to enter into any contract whereby such employer agrees to cease doing business with any other person," but it provides, among other things, that "'any other person' shall not include persons in the relation of a jobber, manufacturer, ...