Appeal from conviction for bank robbery and aggravated bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), (d), before Walter Bruchhausen, J., of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, and a jury, on ground that court failed to adequately instruct jury on elements of crimes charged. Conviction reversed and case remanded.
Danaher,*fn* Feinberg and Mulligan, Circuit Judges.
After a jury trial before Judge Walter Bruchhausen in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, appellant Horsun Howard was found guilty on both counts of an indictment charging him with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (bank robbery) and 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (aggravated bank robbery).*fn1 Judgment of conviction was entered in October 1971,*fn2 and Howard was sentenced to concurrent 15-year terms on each count. Howard did not file a timely appeal, but in a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 successfully sought permission to file an out of time appeal. 492 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1974). Because Howard was convicted by a jury operating without adequate instruction as to the elements of the crimes charged, we find plain error and reverse and remand for a new trial.
The bank robbery for which Howard was convicted took place on Christmas Eve, 1970. In about five minutes, four armed men took almost $15,000 from a Flushing, New York, savings and loan association. Five bank employees identified appellant at trial as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Surveillance photos taken during the robbery also indicated that Howard was among the robbers. In short, there was ample evidence to sustain a conviction had the jury been properly instructed.
When the trial judge gave the jury the case, his instructions were quite brief. In what was to be the only mention of the crimes charged, the court summarized the two counts of the indictment:
In count one of the indictment, the defendants Fred Fernandez and Horsun Howard are charged with the crimes of knowingly and wilfully robbing the First Federal Savings & Loan Bank located at 4404 Kissena Boulevard, Queens, New York, on December 21st [sic], 1970, and taking therefrom approximately $15,000, and aiding and abetting in the commission of the robbery.
In count two of the indictment, the said defendants are charged with the crimes of knowingly and wilfully placing in jeopardy the lives of employees of the bank and other persons present in the commission of the robbery and aiding and abetting.
The judge then went on to discuss aiding and abetting and the meaning of knowingly and wilfully. However, there was no further definition of the crimes charged, although the judge did explain to the jury such matters, among others, as the need to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the meaning of reasonable doubt, the nature of circumstantial evidence, and the credibility of witnesses. Of the 12 pages of charge, only the one-half page quoted above specifically described the offenses with which the jury was to concern itself.
Even a cursory reading of the bank robbery statutes indicates that more than the few short sentences of the charge quoted above are required. At the very least, this jury should have been told that it had to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the following elements of the crime for Count One, charging a violation of section 2113(a): The defendants took money from a federally insured savings and loan association; the taking was accomplished through the use of force and violence, or by intimidation, and from the person or presence of individuals other than defendants; the money taken was in the care, custody, control, management or possession of the association; and the taking was done with wrongful intent, that is, knowingly and wilfully. United States v. Cooper, 462 F.2d 1343, 1344 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 34 L. Ed. 2d 303, 93 S. Ct. 452 (1972); Scruggs v. United States, 450 F.2d 359, 361, 364 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1071, 92 S. Ct. 1521, 31 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1972); 2 E. Devitt & C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 48.01 et seq. (1970). For Count Two, charging a violation of section 2113(d), the jury should have been instructed that, along with the elements specified above, it had to find that defendants assaulted or placed in jeopardy the lives of any person by use of a dangerous weapon or device. United States v. Marshall, 427 F.2d 434, 437-38 (2d Cir. 1970); Scruggs v. United States, supra; United States v. Cooper, supra.*fn3
It is clear that the judge's charge did not cover all of these elements of the crime. The Government contends, however, that the error was harmless because the only truly contested issue for the jury was the identity of the bank robbers. While that may be substantially true, we do not think it harmless error for a jury to find a man guilty of a federal offense without even knowing what the elements of the offense are. As we said only last year:
If justice is to be done in accordance with the rule of law, it is of paramount importance that the court's instructions be clear, accurate, complete and comprehensible, particularly with respect to the essential elements of the alleged crime that must be proved by the government beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .
United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240, 248 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Byrd v. United States, 119 U.S. App. D.C. 360, 342 F.2d 939 (1965). When Howard exercised his constitutional right to a jury, he put the Government to the burden of proving the elements of the crimes charged to a jury's satisfaction, not to ours or to the district judge's. Thus, even if we believe that there was overwhelming proof of the elements not charged, we must still reverse.
To be distinguished from this case is our recent decision in United States v. Pravato, 505 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1974), which also involved bank robbery. In that case, after telling the jury that it had to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, all the elements listed above, the court inadvertently said that the existence of force and violence was included in a stipulation of counsel, when no such agreement had been made. In refusing to reverse the conviction, we pointed out that defendant's attorney did not object to the charge, apparently for strategic reasons, and in fact referred, in his closing argument, to the possibility of misidentification due to the "terror and fright" of the witnesses.*fn4 The difference between Pravato and this case is the difference between a jury knowing precisely what the elements of the crimes charged are (some of which, it is told, are conceded to have been proved) and deliberating upon ...