UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
decided: September 23, 1975.
JOSE GIL OJEDA-VINALES, PETITIONER,
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, RESPONDENT
Petition for review of a final order of deportation entered by the Board of Immigration Appeals. Held, that petitioner's arrest was not illegal and that the deportation order was valid. Petition denied.
Gurfein, Van Graafeiland and Meskill, Circuit Judges.
Author: Per Curiam
This is a petition for review of a final order of deportation entered against Jose Gil Ojeda-Vinales by the Board of Immigration Appeals on November 21, 1974. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a).
Petitioner does not dispute the following facts in the record before the Board, upon which this appeal must be determined pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4). Petitioner entered the United States as a non-immigrant visitor on or about October 24, 1972, authorized to remain until December 31, 1972. In December of 1973 the New York Office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (I.N.S.) received an anonymous phone call, complaining that an illegal alien, named Jose, was working as a mechanic at a specified address. Two immigration officers began an investigation; upon arriving at the specified location, the officers were told by the garage owner that a person fitting the description in the complaint was in fact employed at the garage.
Petitioner was then summoned by the garage owner, and asked by the officers whether he was "Jose" and whether he was a tourist. Ojeda-Vinales volunteered that he was Jose, a tourist, and of Paraguayan nationality. He did not produce identification or any other form of proof that his employment in the United States was legal. The officers then arrested petitioner, and took him to the I.N.S. office. The I.N.S. immediately instituted deportation proceedings, which ultimately resulted in the final order of deportation now on review. Petitioner's sole contention at all stages of the proceeding has been that his arrest was illegal and that the illegal arrest taints the entire proceeding and requires vacation of the order of deportation.
The arrest was legal under Section 287 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357, the relevant portion of which is quoted in the margin.*fn1
Section 287(a)(1) permits I.N.S. officers to interrogate and temporarily detain an alien upon "circumstances creating a reasonable suspicion, not rising to the level of probable cause to arrest, that the individual so detained is illegally in this country." Au Yi Lau v. I.N.S., 144 U.S. App. D.C. 147, 445 F.2d 217, 223 (1971). The anonymous phone call received by the I.N.S. in this case contained detailed and specific information which, if true, established a violation of the immigration law. This was not "probable cause" for the procurement of a warrant. But it was a sufficient ground to initiate an investigation. When the information that appellant was employed there was furnished by the garage owner, and Jose was produced, the agents were permitted sufficiently to interrogate appellant to establish the suspect's identity. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 92 S. Ct. 1921 (1972). "The ability to gather proof against these illegal entrants independent of a reasonable opportunity for interrogation is exceedingly difficult." Au Yi Lau, supra, 445 F.2d at 222. And see United States v. Salter, 521 F.2d 1326, slip op. p. 5647, 5641 (2 Cir. 1975). There was a "reasonable suspicion" that appellant was an alien. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607, 43 U.S.L.W. 5028, 5032 (1975). The garage owner, whose reliability has not been questioned, supplied the direct evidence of employment.
Petitioner's own voluntary responses to the agents' questions provided the extra measure of evidence needed to establish probable cause for his arrest. The agents knew from what the owner told them that the petitioner was employed at the garage and, from what petitioner told them, that he was a tourist and a Paraguayan citizen. This combined information established a prima facie violation of conditions imposed on non-immigrant visitors, since the acceptance of unauthorized employment by a non-immigrant visitor is a ground for deportation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(9); 8 C.F.R. § 214.1(c); Londono v. I.N.S., 433 F.2d 635 (2 Cir. 1970). Petitioner's failure to produce identification which might have established the legality of his employment could have been taken by the agents as further indication that he was in violation of the immigration laws. See United States v. Santana, 485 F.2d 365, 368 (2 Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931, 39 L. Ed. 2d 490, 94 S. Ct. 1444 (1974). We hold that, in the totality of the circumstances, there was probable cause for Ojeda-Vinales' arrest.
The second condition imposed by Section 287(a)(2) for a warrantless arrest is a likelihood that the alien might escape before a warrant can be obtained. Petitioner has not argued, nor could he, that this condition was not satisfied here. We conclude that petitioner's arrest was legal under Section 287(a)(2). In view of that determination, we obviously do not decide whether the deportation order would have been valid nonetheless, even if the arrest had been illegal.
We find the deportation order to be valid, and we deny the relief sought in the petition to review.
It is so ordered.