The opinion of the court was delivered by: PIERCE
Petitioners on this motion, David A. Field (Field) and Anthony G. DiFalco (DiFalco), are attorneys who have been subpoenaed to appear before a United States Federal Grand Jury for the Southern District of New York. The purpose of the grand jury's inquiry has been stated to be determining the whereabouts of one Carlo Bordoni (Bordoni), a client of Field and DiFalco and a person sought by the grand jury as a witness. Field and DiFalco have moved, pursuant to Rule 17(c), Fed.R.Crim.P., to quash the subpoenas on the ground that to require them to provide the information sought would violate Bordoni's attorney-client privilege.
The facts, as set forth in the affidavits submitted by the parties, are as follows:
In July of 1975, the July additional 1975 grand jury was impaneled and continued an investigation previously conducted by several other grand juries into the facts surrounding the collapse of the Franklin National Bank. On August 11, 1975, that grand jury returned an indictment naming Bordoni, among others, as a defendant. Bordoni had been a director of the Franklin New York Corporation, a holding company owning the Franklin National Bank. A warrant for Bordoni's arrest remains unexecuted.
The grand jury investigation continued after the filing of the indictment and, according to the government, it has been determined that Bordoni may have information which is of importance to the investigation. Therefore, in an effort to locate Bordoni, subpoenas were served on Field and DiFalco.
The law firm of which Field and DiFalco are members (the firm) has represented Bordoni on several occasions. In July, 1974 the firm commenced lawsuits on behalf of Bordoni growing out of several newspaper articles attributing to Bordoni certain of the losses sustained by the Franklin National Bank. Also in July, 1974, Field accompanied Bordoni to the Securities and Exchange Commission where Bordoni gave testimony to staff attorneys conducting an investigation into possible violations of the Securities Acts by the Franklin New York Corporation. Finally, some time between July and October of 1974, Bordoni consulted the firm in connection with his desire to change his residence from Milan, Italy to some other jurisdiction.
According to the affidavits of Field, Bordoni requested the firm to review the laws of a number of named jurisdictions in connection with Bordoni's proposed change of residence. The research was completed and communicated to Bordoni. Bordoni then changed his residence from Milan, Italy to one of the named jurisdictions, informed the firm of his new residence, and requested that the firm obtain counsel for him in that particular jurisdiction, which was done. Bordoni requested the firm to keep his new residence confidential.
Since Bordoni relocated, the Securities and Exchange Commission has commenced a civil action against him and others to enjoin each from further violations of the Securities Laws. Several private civil actions have been commenced against Bordoni and other members of the Board of Directors of the Franklin New York Corporation. And, the previously mentioned indictment has been filed against Bordoni and others. However, the Court has been made aware of no criminal investigation or suit which was pending against Bordoni at the time he relocated.
The facts as set forth have not been disputed in the affidavits submitted on this motion. Nor has either of the parties requested an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of challenging the assertions in the affidavits. Therefore, the Court considers these facts to be established for the purposes of the instant application.
The grand jury has traditionally been accorded wide latitude to inquire into violations of the criminal law and the duty of every citizen to testify has long been recognized. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345, 94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438, 52 S. Ct. 252, 76 L. Ed. 375 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281, 39 S. Ct. 468, 63 L. Ed. 979 (1919). The power of the federal court to compel persons to appear and testify is not in doubt. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S. Ct. 1653, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1972). Further, it has been held specifically that the grand jury may inquire as to the whereabouts of unlocated witnesses. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488, 71 S. Ct. 814, 95 L. Ed. 1118 (1951). Thus, there is no question in this case of the grand jury's general power to engage in the inquiry in question.
It is equally well settled that the subpoena powers of the grand jury are not unlimited. Specifically, the Supreme Court has noted that the grand jury "may not itself violate a valid privilege, whether established by the Constitution, statutes, or the common law." United States v. Calandra, supra, 414 U.S. at 346, 94 S. Ct. at 619. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688, 92 S. Ct. 2646, 33 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1972); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331, 70 S. Ct. 724, 94 L. Ed. 884 (1950); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereafter, Wigmore]. In this instance the petitioners assert that to compel their testimony would violate the attorney-client privilege. Therefore, the first question to be addressed is whether the information sought from Field and DiFalco, i.e., the whereabouts of their firm's client Bordoni, is within the attorney-client privilege.
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to promote freedom of communication among attorneys and their clients by removing the fear of compelled disclosure by the lawyers of confidential information conveyed for the purpose of receiving legal advice. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951, 83 S. Ct. 505, 9 L. Ed. 2d 499 (1963); United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 752, 65 S. Ct. 86, 89 L. Ed. 602 (1944); Wigmore § 2291. The scope of the privilege, as set forth by Wigmore, has been adopted by this Circuit as follows: "(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived." Wigmore, § 2292. See United States v. Stern, 511 F.2d 1364, 1367-68 (2d Cir. 1975); United ...