The opinion of the court was delivered by: LASKER
Petitioner, Joseph Denti, is currently serving an indeterminate prison term of three years for a New York State gambling violation. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his conviction on the grounds that 1) it was based on evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment; 2) the trial court's instructions to the jury were so erroneous as to deny due process; and 3) scienter was established by virtue of an unconstitutional presumption contained in N.Y. Penal Law § 225.35(1), under which proof of possession of gambling records is presumptive evidence of possession with knowledge of their contents.
1. The Fourth Amendment Claim
Pursuant to an endorsement decision dated June 7, 1976, an evidentiary hearing on the Fourth Amendment issue was held on July 19, 1976. Shortly before the hearing, however, the Supreme Court handed down a decision which precludes consideration of the merits of this claim. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976) the Court held that
"where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." U.S. , 96 S. Ct. at 3052.
Despite Denti's arguments to the contrary, the holding of Stone applies to this petition. Denti raised the Fourth Amendment issue by motion to suppress in the state court and obtained a full evidentiary hearing. In fact, he prevailed at the trial level, but the Appellate Division reversed, People v. Denti, 44 A.D.2d 44, 353 N.Y.S.2d 10 (First Dept. 1974). On remand, Denti was tried and convicted, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal. Under these circumstance, Denti's argument that because the appellate court reversed the trial court without ordering a further hearing, the state procedure was not "an opportunity for full and fair litigation" within the meaning of Stone and in fact, was violative of due process, is without merit.
It is true that the state court proceedings in this case were somewhat unusual. The trial court failed to make findings of fact as expressly required by statute, N.Y.C.P.L. § 710.60(6), and the Appellate Division purported to remedy this oversight by making its own findings based on the transcript of the hearing below. 353 N.Y.S.2d at 14. Upon review of the transcript we entertained some uncertainty whether the facts as set forth by the state court were entirely supported by the record and whether the facts had been as fully developed as desirable. In the exercise of our general discretion to air the facts fully where unclarity exists, see LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 410 U.S. 690, 701 n. 2, 93 S. Ct. 1203, 35 L. Ed. 2d 637 (Marshall, J., dissenting), we therefore decided to conduct a hearing.
Our decision to conduct a hearing did not, however, constitute a definitive finding that the state decision was unsupported by the record, nor does it compel the conclusion that under Stone, Denti was denied an opportunity fully and fairly to litigate his claims. The emphasis of the formulation of the Stone court appears to be on provision by the state of an opportunity fully and fairly to air the claim, not, as in earlier decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), on the fullness or fairness of the hearing that was conducted. Contrast, e.g., United States ex rel. Regina v. LaVallee, 504 F.2d 580, 582 (2d Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Williams v. LaVallee, 487 F.2d 1006, 1010 and n. 13 (2d Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Liss v. Mancusi, 427 F.2d 225, 227 (2d Cir. 1970). This understanding of the opinion is in harmony not only with the Court's constant phrasing of the exception, (i.e., "an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim"), but more importantly with the guiding concern of the Stone court for principles of finality and comity in state criminal proceedings. See U.S. at , , 96 S. Ct. at 3042, 3062. (Brennan, J., dissenting). And see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 256 & 259, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1972), (Powell, J., concurring). Implicit in the holding is the notion that federal courts should be hesitant to reexamine state court determinations in "grey, twilight [areas]" of Fourth Amendment law such as that presented by Denti's claim. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, 412 U.S. at 269, 93 S. Ct. 2041 (Powell, J., concurring).
In this case Denti received ample opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in the state courts. Moreover, the facts in the state record are, for the most part, uncontroverted and where there is conflict reasonable minds could differ in the inferences to be drawn from them. In retrospect, and particularly in light of the decision in Stone, our decision to conduct a hearing may well have reflected an overabundance of caution. We are convinced that whatever shortcomings may have transpired in the state proceeding, they do not rise to the level which would justify consideration of the merits of Denti's claim by a federal court under the rationale of Stone.
Urging that Stone should not be applied "retroactively," Denti also argues that the decision does not apply to his case because an evidentiary hearing had been ordered prior to the Stone decision. Since the Court in Stone purported only to clarify a previously unexamined proposition rather than to overrule prior law, however, the applicability of the holding to this case is clear. See U.S. at , 96 S. Ct. at 3042. Moreover, that Denti's claim should be governed by Stone is entirely consistent with the court's express refusal to limit the effect of that ruling to prospective application. See at , , 96 S. Ct. at 3052, 3070. (Brennan J., dissenting).
Denti was tried for possession of all the gambling slips found in the car, the single slip spotted by Officer Schachtel on the rear floor in the amount of $9,095, and the two groups of slips found upon the ensuing search representing a total of $57,000 in wagers. The latter slips were discovered tucked into a mid-seat arm rest on the front seat of the auto, a position directly behind the stack of money and immediately at the side of petitioner, who had been driving. Thus, none of the contraband was discovered in his actual possession.
In recognition of this the trial judge charged the jury on the theory of constructive possession. (Tr. 392) He determined that the jury could fairly conclude from the totality of the circumstantial evidence, including the surreptitious activities observed by the police and the facts that petitioner had been driving, the car belonged to his wife, he had been sitting immediately next to the arm rest and the cash, and the betting slip found in the rear was in the exact amount of the cash, that Denti possessed the two groups of slips found in the front arm rest. He ruled as a matter of law, however, that the jury could not find Denti guilty of possession of the single slip found on the rear floor, ...