Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

STULL v. BAYARD

January 7, 1977.

Richard J. STULL, Plaintiff,
v.
Nicholas H. BAYARD et al., Defendants.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: WYATT

WYATT, District Judge.

This is a motion by plaintiff for an order (a) determining that this action may be maintained as a class action (Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1)) and (b) granting partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff (Fed.R.Civ.P. 56), determining that defendants are liable to plaintiff.

There are three cross-motions: (a) by defendants Howard Piper, Thomas F. Piper, and William T. Piper, Jr.; (b) by defendant Bangor Punta Corporation ("Bangor"); and (c) by defendant The First Boston Corporation ("First Boston"). The cross-motions are for summary judgment in favor of the moving defendants, based on a number of grounds. Because I find that the action is barred by the statute of limitations, the other grounds asserted by movants are not reached.

 1

 This action (denominated in the complaint as a "class-action") was commenced on August 1, 1975, and is one of many actions arising out of the battle in 1969 between Bangor and Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. ("Chris-Craft") for control of Piper Aircraft Corporation ("Piper"). As part of their competing efforts to obtain a controlling interest in Piper, Bangor and Chris-Craft each made tender or exchange offers to stockholders of Piper. The history of the controversy may be found in the opinion of our Court of Appeals in Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2 Cir. 1973).

 Plaintiff is Richard Stull, a New York lawyer who has been active in class and derivative actions. He is, and at all relevant times has been, married to Lillian Stull. In 1969 Lillian owned 150 shares and Richard owned 75 shares of Piper. There were 1,644,890 Piper shares outstanding. Richard had advised Lillian to buy her Piper shares (plaintiff deposition 168-9). Neither Richard nor Lillian accepted any tender offer of either Chris-Craft or Bangor for their Piper shares.

 2

 Chris-Craft began buying Piper shares in 1968 in the open market. On January 23, 1969, Chris-Craft made a public tender offer for 300,000 Piper shares at $65 in cash per share.

 On February 3, 1969, Lillian, represented by Richard as her attorney, commenced an action in this Court (69 Civ. 440; sometimes referred to hereafter as the "first Lillian action"). There were a number of claims against various defendants, the principal ones being asserted derivatively for the benefit of Piper. The defendants included the three members of the Piper family who are defendants in the case at bar. The gist of the complaint was that defendants had wrongfully adopted a plan to prevent Chris-Craft from securing control of Piper. Yet Lillian averred that the true value of the Piper shares was in excess of $100 per share (and if so the defendants conferred a benefit on Lillian and other stockholders).

 On May 12, 1972, Lillian, again represented by Richard as her attorney, commenced another action in this Court (72 Civ. 2055; sometimes referred to hereafter as "the second Lillian action"). In the second Lillian action, she sought to represent Piper stockholders as a class and to hold defendants liable because by false and misleading statements they induced the class not to consider the $65 per share tender offer of Chris-Craft, which offer was a "fair price" for the Piper shares. (The inconsistency of the claims in the two actions is glaring.)

 First Boston was not named as a defendant in either of the two Lillian actions.

 There was much activity for several years in the two Lillian actions, with Richard acting as attorney for Lillian. By order filed December 28, 1973, Judge Carter consolidated the two Lillian actions.

 Then on April 30, 1974, Judge Owen in the second Lillian action filed an order with opinion (reported at 63 F.R.D. 702) denying a motion by Lillian that the second Lillian action be maintained as a class action. Judge Owen's reason was that Lillian was not an appropriate representative of the class because (a) her husband Richard was her attorney and there was a "potential conflict of interest" which was "obvious" and (b) her sworn statements in her two actions were so "contradictory" that they made her "vulnerable to embarrassing cross-examination".

 At some point after Judge Owen's decision, Richard seems to have ceased to appear in any papers or proceedings as attorney for Lillian and the firm of Milberg & Weiss appeared as her attorneys. As part of a notice of motion for reargument before Judge Owen, a consent to substitute Milberg & Weiss as attorneys in the two Lillian actions was filed on May 9, 1974. Richard and his law partner arranged for this substitution (plaintiff deposition 80); apparently Lillian had nothing to do with the selection or retainer of Milberg & Weiss.

 On March 14, 1975, the two Lillian actions were, as part of a special program in this Court, ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.