The opinion of the court was delivered by: GOETTEL
1. At all material times Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. was, and still is, a New York corporation and the owner of the Tug OCEAN PRINCE. Red Star Towing & Transportation Company (hereinafter collectively referred to with Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. as "Plaintiffs"), was, and still is, a West Virginia corporation with an office and principal place of business in New York, and at all material times was the charterer of the Tug OCEAN PRINCE, and manned, victualed, supplied and operated said Vessel.
2. The Tug OCEAN PRINCE is a United States documented, steel hulled, diesel driven, single screw, 1,800 horsepower tugboat built in 1958, having an overall length of 94.7 feet, an extreme breadth of 27.1 feet and a deep draft of about 13 to 14 feet. Her registered gross tonnage is 198 tons and her registered net tonnage is 134 tons.
She was at all material times equipped with direct pilothouse engine controls, a gyro compass, a magnetic compass, a Decca radar and a searchlight. Her chart for the area was a 1969 edition. Although a subsequent edition was available, there were no material differences between the charts in the location and characteristics of the relevant aids. Buoy "21" had been renumbered to Buoy "25".
3. Red Star had no written procedure for supplying its tugs with navigational information or material. The ordering of charts was left to the captain without the office having a system to check what charts and other navigational publications were needed. Red Star had no procedure for checking that this material was obtained by the Captains. On the voyage in question, the OCEAN PRINCE was carrying current editions of the Light List and Coast Pilot.
4. Red Star Towing & Transportation Company (hereinafter singly referred to as "Red Star") is engaged in the business of general towage in the coastal and inland waters of the United States, including New York Harbor and its tributaries.
5. Red Star Marine Services, Inc. is a company which at all material times provided "management services" for Red Star, including "operations" such as booking of work, scheduling and dispatching of tugs to accomplish that work, hiring and firing of personnel, and overseeing the total operation of the Red Star fleet which includes the Tug OCEAN PRINCE.
6. Red Star and Red Star Marine Services, Inc. are related companies, and have the same president, Mr. Robert W. Sanders.
7. Walter Kristiansen at all material times was vice-president of operations of Red Star Marine Services, Inc.
8. The Red Star companies are also related to the Bushey shipyard at Brooklyn, New York and the various Bushey companies in the New York Harbor area.
9. Red Star has offices at 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, where its tug dispatchers are located.
10. The dispatchers of another related company, at all material times, were located in the same offices, and used the same radios and frequencies.
11. Captains, Relief Captains, Mates and other crew members serving on Red Star tugs are hired by Red Star Marine Services, Inc. but are paid by Red Star.
12. Red Star Marine Services, Inc. had internal requirements for the hiring of navigators, which included a requirement that Tug Captains and Mates it employed either have or obtain a Coast Guard license for the operation of Red Star tugs as a condition to their employment, which company policy preceded subsequent Coast Guard licensing requirements. In addition, when one of the navigators was unfamiliar with the area the tug was dispatched to, Red Star's policy was that the other navigator have extensive experience in and be familiar with the area, and that this man be available to assist the other navigator whenever necessary or if requested by the man on watch.
13. Pittston Marine Transport Corporation (hereinafter "Pittston") is a New York corporation and, at all material times, was engaged in the business of transporting petroleum cargoes by barge in, among other places, New York Harbor and its tributaries. At all material times Pittston owned, operated, manned, victualed and supplied the tank barge NEW LONDON, of 1,665 gross and net tons and having overall dimensions of 295 feet in length and 43 feet in breadth. The Barge is equipped with a pushing well or notch at its stern into which the bow of a pushing tug fits, providing motive power and steering control.
14. The United States of America (hereinafter the "Government") is a sovereign which, under the auspices of the Coast Guard, establishes, maintains and operates an aids to navigation system on the entire length of the Hudson River in the State of New York. It does so under statutory authority to serve, inter alia, the needs of the commerce of the United States. (14 U.S.C. § 81).
15. On February 2 and 3, 1974, the Tug OCEAN PRINCE carried a full crew of six men including two United States Coast Guard licensed (for uninspected towing vessels not more than 200 miles off-shore) navigators, John Kiernan and Walter Reimer, two deckhands, an engineer and a cook.
16. At all relevant times, Mate Reimer held a valid license issued by the United States Coast Guard which gave him authority to serve as operator of uninspected towing vessels upon the inland waters of the United States, including the Hudson River. Reimer had been a Tug Captain for five years, and was qualified generally to serve as a Tug Captain, although he had never before navigated the Hudson River. He had served as a deckhand on tankers on the Hudson River briefly some six years earlier. He worked for Red Star in the capacity of Captain, Relief Captain and Mate, principally on board the OCEAN PRINCE, for a period of one and one-half (1 1/2) years before the voyage in question.
17. Kiernan was also licensed by the Coast Guard and had extensive experience as a Tugboat Captain on the Hudson River which spanned over a period of more than 30 years. He was employed by an associated company as a Tug Captain, but was temporarily assigned to Red Star to fill a vacancy on the Tug OCEAN PRINCE and went on board on February 1, 1974.
18. During the voyage in question, Kiernan and Reimer stood alternating six hour watches, with Kiernan standing the 6:00 to 12:00 watches in the morning and evening and Reimer standing the 12:00 to 6:00 watches. One deckhand was assigned to each watch. The Captain or Mate of the watch did the steering and navigating. The deckhand performed various chores, such as line handling, general maintenance on board the tug, and, if requested by the Captain or Mate, lookout duties, steering under the Captain's or Mate's supervision, and getting coffee, which was well known to Red Star's vice-president of operations.
19. Prior to the voyage in question, the tug OCEAN PRINCE had operated in southern waters, in Georgia, Florida, Texas and Louisiana for over a year. During December of 1973 and January of 1974, it operated in and about New York but Reimer was on vacation at that time. He rejoined the Tug in New York on February 2, 1974 at the Bushey shipyard in Brooklyn. Kiernan was already on board. Kiernan had never met Reimer before February 2, 1974, but knew that he was regularly assigned to the OCEAN PRINCE. He was not advised and was unaware of Reimer's lack of familiarity with the Hudson River.
20. While the plaintiffs knew that Reimer lacked familiarity with the Hudson when he rejoined the OCEAN PRINCE on February 2, it was assumed that this lack of experience would be discussed between Reimer and Kiernan when they met on the vessel.
21. Red Star's Personnel Department was responsible for designating the Captain of the Vessel. Red Star intended Kiernan would be Captain. Kiernan indicated doubt in his own mind that he was Captain, but he took certain steps which were appropriately done by the Captain. It is the Captain's duty to know the experience and qualifications of the Mate.
22. On Friday, February 1, 1974, Pittston phoned in an order to Red Star, advising that it would need a tug to tow its Barge NEW LONDON to Kingston, New York sometime during the weekend. The order was entered on a job order card, which was given to the tug dispatcher's office. In response to Pittston's order, the dispatcher, Philip Keenan, decided to assign the Tug OCEAN PRINCE to do the job, and did so at 1800 hours on February 2nd. Keenan did not discuss with Kiernan or Reimer who was to be Captain and who the Mate.
23. Keenan was aware of the make-up of the pilothouse crew on the OCEAN PRINCE on February 2nd, and had been told by the day dispatcher, Robert Fitch, that Kiernan was Captain and Reimer was Mate. Keenan was aware of Reimer's lack of experience as a navigator on the Hudson. He decided, however, that the OCEAN PRINCE would be suitable for the voyage since Kiernan, who had extensive experience as a tug navigator on the Hudson River, was on board and would be available to assist Reimer if necessary. He also assumed Reimer's lack of experience on the Hudson River would be discussed between Kiernan and Reimer. The dispatcher's decision to assign the OCEAN PRINCE to the NEW LONDON job was in accordance with accepted practice in the tugboat industry of dispatching a tug to an area one of the navigators had not navigated before so long as the other navigator on board has experience in the area.
24. From the Bushey shipyard the OCEAN PRINCE, with Kiernan on watch, proceeded to Esso dock in Bayonne, New Jersey, and made up to the loaded Barge NEW LONDON. Reimer, who was off-watch, nevertheless assisted the deckhands in making up the tow, and then went below when the Tug and Barge left on the voyage to Kingston, New York.
25. The NEW LONDON was taken in tow forward of the OCEAN PRINCE in push-tow fashion with the bow of the Tug snuggly secured in the Barge's stern notch with steel cables and several parts of synthetic lines. The overall length of both Vessels was about 385 feet, with steering and propulsion being supplied by the Tug. Both Vessels had a combined gross tonnage of 1,863. The Barge had a draft of about 12 feet. In its loaded condition, the Barge had only two feet freeboard and the view ahead from the Tug's pilothouse was unobstructed.
26. John Kiernan was in charge of the navigation during the first leg of the voyage which commenced at 1915 hours. At 2330 hours, Mate Walter Reimer came to the pilothouse of the Tug and relieved Captain Kiernan of the watch. Kiernan remained with Reimer for about 15 minutes, and then retired without any discussion of navigation on the river. The Tug and her Tow were approaching Haverstraw, New York at the time. The Tug, with Reimer now in charge of navigation, continued the trip northbound past Peekskill, New York and through Bear Mountain Bridge. At about this time, Reimer sent his deckhand to the galley to get coffee, leaving Reimer alone in the wheelhouse.
Reimer did not ask Kiernan to stand the watch with him, although Kiernan would have if asked. This is customary practice aboard towboats. At all relevant times the tide was ebbing, there was ice in the river, and visibility was two miles with snow flurries. The Tug was making good a speed of about 6 knots over the bottom (the Vessels were proceeding against the current). At this time the Tug's radar was operating and in use. A navigation chart for the area was open and was also in use. Reimer was able to see both shorelines of the river to port and starboard and was also able to see over the full length of the Barge and a safe distance ahead. He was using his radar from time to time to confirm his visual sightings and to locate aids to navigation and other points of reference ahead. At all times the Tug's radar, steering system and engine controls were operating properly.
27. Reimer had not attended any navigation school and never had any formal training in the use of the radar, but was familiar with its operation.
28. The river north of the Bear Mountain Bridge is bounded on both sides by mountains. There was ice flowing on the river with heavy accumulations along parts of the shorelines.
Dead ahead of the Bear Mountain Bridge, west of the navigable channel, approximately one and three-quarter miles north of the Bridge is an obstruction consisting of a pinnacle rock or rocky area, the apex of which is 7 feet below the mean low water line and not visible to vessels in navigation. It is located east of a wide shoal area along the west shore which also is not visible from the surface. The rock obstruction and shoal area west of it projects almost 400 yards into the river from its westerly shore.
About 600-800 yards north of the rock is lighted beacon #27 located on the easterly shore of Con Hook Island. The light is 46 feet above the water according to the Light List and is visible to a tug from the town of Manitou about 1.3 miles south.
The River is 800 yards wide off Mystery Point, and narrows to 450 yards off Con Hook Island. The channel east of the rock described above, which is located between Mystery Point and Con Hook Island, is about 500 yards wide. The river depth in this area varies between 35 feet and 127 feet.
29. The rock presents a dangerous hazard and obstruction to navigators in the Hudson River, apparent on the chart and well known to mariners familiar with the waters and to the Coast Guard.
30. The obstruction is marked by the "25" lighted buoy, which was established and is maintained and operated by the Coast Guard for the purpose of marking the rocky obstruction near the channel. The buoy also marks the westerly extreme of the navigable channel and a bend in the river. The "25" light buoy is replaced by the Coast Guard annually in December at the commencement of the ice season by an unlighted, second class black can buoy. The can buoy was in use on February 3, 1974. This change is noted in the Light List.
31. Reimer knew of the existence of the buoy on the chart and the obstruction it designated.
32. As the Tug and her Tow passed abeam Mystery Point, Reimer did not locate the "25" can buoy either visually or on the radar. Because the said buoy marks a dangerous obstruction as well as a bend in the channel, Reimer reduced engine speed, turned on the Tug's powerful spotlight to illuminate the area ahead, and continued to search for the buoy visually and by radar.
33. Shortly afterwards, at about 0130 on February 3, 1974, the Barge struck the rock on its port bow resulting in damage to the Barge's forepeak and #1 and 2 port side cargo compartments. After impact, Reimer sighted the buoy to the starboard partially visible in the ice near the Vessels' wake. He assumed that the Barge and the Tug in making the turn to starboard after the incident had freed the buoy from the ice.
34. The buoy was obscured by ice and was not seen by Reimer as the Tug and Tow approached it. The ice flow and ice accumulation along the shorelines including north of Mystery Point on the easterly shore partially obscured the image of the shoreline both to the eye and on radar.
35. Immediately after the casualty Kiernan was summoned and returned to the pilothouse. He saw the lighted tower of Con Hook Island ahead and the "25" black can buoy about 50-75 feet off the starboard beam of the Tug. The Vessels were still on a northerly heading at the time. After turning around, the lights on the Bear Mountain Bridge about 2 miles south of the Tug's position were also visible. Kiernan brought the Tug and Barge to the Day Line Pier south of the casualty site where they remained until the NEW LONDON was partially lightened into another barge later in the day.
36. The grounding of the Barge NEW LONDON resulted, in part, from Reimer's lack of knowledge of local landmarks and experience on the Hudson River.
37. Reimer did not examine the Light List or the Coast Pilot very carefully because he was unfamiliar with the warning therein not to rely solely on buoys and the warning that ice covers the buoys in this area during the winter.
38. Reimer failed to post a lookout when conditions were such that same was required.
39. A navigator who is about to enter strange waters should familiarize himself with the applicable charts, the Light List and the Coast Pilot.
40. The Light List contains a number of warnings to the navigator including the following:
"It is imprudent for a navigator to rely on floating aids to navigation to always maintain their charted position and to constantly and unerringly display their advertised characteristics. The obstacles to perfect performance are of such magnitude that complete reliability is manifestly impossible to achieve. Buoys are liable to be carried away, shifted, ...