UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
December 22, 1978
Kenneth Earl SAULS, Plaintiff,
BRISTOL-MYERS COMPANY, Defendant
The opinion of the court was delivered by: WEINFELD
Plaintiff Kenneth Sauls, a former employee in defendant Bristol-Myers' Internal Audit Department, commenced this employment discrimination action, alleging that because of his race and color he was subjected to discriminatory treatment while in the defendant's employ, was fired on the pretense of substandard work performance, and has been denied redress by the New York State Human Rights Division and the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") because of a continuing conspiracy between the defendant and these agencies. He further claims that defendant has made false and derogatory statements about him to employment agencies, thus denying him prospective employment. His multi-count complaint alleges causes of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C., section 2000e et seq.; the First Amendment of the United States Constitution; 18 U.S.C., sections 241, 242 and 245; 42 U.S.C., sections 1981, 1983 and 1985; and under state tort law for libel and slander, malicious interference with his wife's peace of mind, and false imprisonment. Defendant now moves for summary judgment on all counts except for Title VII, section 1981, and the state law claim for libel and slander. The motion is granted.
Plaintiff has taken what is in essence a single claim for racial discrimination and fragmented it into numerous, largely unnecessary and unsupported, claims. The wrong of which he complains, if proven, may be enjoined and the plaintiff adequately compensated under Title VII and section 1981 two theories which have been used extensively to redress employment discrimination.
The alleged additional claims add nothing to the complaint and are insufficient to survive the motion for summary judgment.
The conclusory allegations of government involvement in the alleged discrimination, premised apparently on nothing more than unsupported inferences drawn from adverse administrative rulings,
fail to satisfy the government action requirement of a First Amendment claim
or the "color of state law" requirement of a section 1983 claim.
Nor will these allegations supply the requisite concert of action by two or more persons to state a cause of action for conspiracy under section 1985.
Plaintiff cannot convert his failure to prevail in administrative proceedings under Title VII into broader claims of governmental deprivation of constitutional rights. Title VII entitles plaintiff to de novo judicial review of the merits of his charges against his employer.
The remaining counts require little discussion. Sections 241, 242 and 245 of Title 18 provide criminal remedies for the violation of certain constitutional rights, not a private right of action.
The applicable state law provides no support for his false imprisonment claim
or for his attempt to state a derivative cause of action for his wife's injuries.
Summary judgment for defendant on counts 2, 3, 6, 7, and that portion of count 4 which is based on 42 U.S.C., sections 1983 and 1985, is granted.