The opinion of the court was delivered by: HAIGHT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff B. V. Bureau Wijsmuller ("Wijsmuller"), a Netherlands towing and salvage company, brings this suit in admiralty to recover an award for salvage services rendered to the USS JULIUS A. FURER ("FURER"), a warship owned by defendant United States of America, after the FURER grounded on June 30, 1974 on a sandbar off the Dutch coast. Jurisdiction is based upon the Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. § 781 et seq., the Government having conceded for the purposes of this action the requisite reciprocity, 46 U.S.C. § 785, and this Court having rejected plaintiff's prior effort to compel arbitration of its claim in London under the terms of a Lloyd's Open Form salvage agreement executed by the FURER's commanding officer.
Four tugs owned by Wijsmuller allegedly assisted the FURER off the strand. The Government concedes that Wijsmuller rendered salvage services to the FURER, and is consequently entitled under the general maritime law to a salvage award. The ultimate question for decision is the reasonable amount of that award. The parties assume their traditional postures. Wijsmuller, as salvor, contends that its highly skillful efforts preserved the FURER from a substantial risk of total loss. The Government, as owner of the salved property, contends that there was little risk to the FURER, and that the assisting tugs' efforts had little to do with her refloating. In addition to the questions which derive from that basic issue, common to most salvage cases, two additional questions arise: whether Wijsmuller should be regarded as a professional salvor, and thus entitled to the particular consideration which the law gives to such entities in making salvage awards; and whether the Court's award should include a factor reflecting the change in the rate of exchange between United States and Dutch currency which has taken place since the rendition of the salvage services, and the entry of judgment. The case having been tried to the Court without a jury, the Court now enters the following Findings of Fact, Discussion and Conclusions of Law.
1. The FURER was a United States Navy guided missile armed, anti-submarine warfare escort ship. The FURER had a bulbous bow consisting of a sonar dome, which is ordinarily kept filled with 94 tons of water. The dome extended ten feet below the straight line keel. The propeller, at its deepest point, extended 7 feet 71/4 inches below the keel. At 1355 hours on June 29, 1974, the FURER sailed from the Dutch port of Den Helder, bound for Aalborg, Denmark. At about 2100 hours on June 29, the FURER's medical staff diagnosed a sick crewman's condition as appendicitis. The FURER reversed her course, and increased speed to 20 knots to rendezvous with a Dutch medical evacuation helicopter. The helicopter turned back because of alleged poor visibility, and the Dutch naval authorities instead sent a tug to meet the FURER and evacuate the crewman. The FURER changed course again to rendezvous with the tug. While proceeding at about 20 knots on a heading of 125o true, the FURER ran aground at about 0123 hours on June 30. The FURER grounded on the Haaksgrunden Bank sandbar, to the west of Den Helder, at a position later established by cross bearings to be 52o 57' 42 N and 4o 35' 54 E. At the time of the grounding, the sonar dome was filled with water.
2. The FURER was launched in July 1966, and commissioned on November 11, 1967. Since the value of the salved property is an important element in determining the proper amount of a salvage award,
considerable evidence was offered on this point. The FURER was a specially designed and constructed vessel, having a value only for a special purpose, and thus no market value can be established. In these circumstances, the FURER's salved value is its replacement value, less depreciation.
At the time of rendition of the salvage services, the Navy was carrying the FURER at a depreciated book value of $ 20,000,000. This is based upon a reproduction cost in 1974 of $ 40,323,718, a figure testified to by a Government witness and accepted by the plaintiff;
and the application of a 16-year depreciation period which the Government derived from a statutory definition, 10 U.S.C. § 7295, of when a naval vessel is "underage."
The Government bases its calculation of a depreciated value for the FURER, in July of 1974, of $ 20,000,000 (in round numbers) upon the fact that of this statutory life of 16 years, 8 years had passed since the vessel's launching in July of 1966, an event also referred to as the "keel date." Wijsmuller argues for a higher salved value, on the theories that a meaningful period of depreciation cannot run until the vessel was commissioned and fully ready for service; and that the vessel's useful life might well exceed the 16 years specified by the statute. In that latter regard, evidence was adduced that some World War II destroyers were still in commission at the time of trial, some 30 years later. I do not regard the precise salved value of the FURER as of overwhelming importance, since by any yardstick it amounts to at least $ 20,000,000, far and away the highest salved value involved in any reported American salvage decision. To the extent that a precise finding is necessary, I find that the salved value of the FURER was $ 23,400,000, a figure which reflects the replacement cost of $ 40,000,000, and the fact that only 6.64 years had passed since the FURER was commissioned and her useful operational life began. Wijsmuller's evidence with respect to the longer lives of different kinds of vessels (which if adopted to the FURER would result in a longer period of depreciation and hence a higher salved value) does not support a finding with respect to a vessel of the FURER's particular characteristics. I therefore apply the 16-year statutory period of depreciation, but measure that period from the date of commission, not the keel date.
3. The Wijsmuller company was formed in 1911, and has been engaged in the business of oceangoing towage, salvage, and other marine activities since then. In June and July of 1974 the company owned or operated 15 tugs and one special salvage vessel, the KRAB, which was designed not for towing, but for pumping, under-water cutting and repair, and lifting. Seven of the 15 tugs were oceangoing; the others were smaller and generally confined their activities to harbors. In 1974 Wijsmuller maintained some of its oceangoing tugs on "salvage station" in various parts of the world. A vessel on salvage station accepts no other employment. She stays in one place, monitors all emergency radio frequencies, and responds to any requests for assistance within her geographical area. The salvage stations Wijsmuller tugs maintained included the Persian Gulf, the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, the North Atlantic, South African waters, the English Channel, and the North Sea. These several stations were not continuously maintained by Wijsmuller tugs. Seasonal conditions and the likelihood of casualties were considered. The company would on occasion remove a tug from a salvage station and use her to perform an oceangoing towage contract if the circumstances indicated this was the most profitable present use to make of the vessel. At the time the FURER stranded, Wijsmuller had the tug GRONINGEN on salvage station in the Persian Gulf; the FRIESLAND on station in Durban, South Africa; the GELDERLAND on "mobile salvage station" in the North Atlantic; and the UTRECHT, specially designed as a rescue tug, on salvage station in the southern part of the North Sea. Some days before the FURER grounded, the Wijsmuller tug WILLEM BARENDSZ had been on salvage station in the English Channel off Penzance, and the UTRECHT in the North Sea. When the FURER grounded, the BARENDSZ was in her home port of Ijmuiden for routine repairs, and the UTRECHT was shifted to a more southerly position. Captain Nan. G. Halfweeg, who in 1974 directed Wijsmuller's salvage department, estimated that in that year 50 percent of the company's operations related to salvage; in addition to salvage and towage, the company was involved in offshore installations, offshore maintenance, wreck removal, and diving services. The company's managing director, Dr. Johannes F. Wijsmuller (his degree is in law), gave evidence and introduced documents from which more precise calculations might arguably be made; but no further precision is necessary to arrive at the pertinent findings of fact, which are that at the time of Wijsmuller's rendition of the salvage services in suit, the company devoted a substantial portion of its efforts to salvage, and in furtherance of that activity maintained specially equipped tugs on salvage stations for significant periods of time, in areas where vessels, their cargoes, and the lives of those on board could foreseeably require assistance.
4. Before the FURER was refloated in the early morning hours of July 1, a number of unsuccessful efforts were made. The details are for the most part undisputed, and set forth in the Statement of Agreed Facts. At 0131 on June 30 the FURER tried to back herself off, placing her engines back 1/3 at 0131 hours and back 2/3 at 0132. The FURER has a single propeller. After about three minutes the engines were stopped. Between 0140 and 0145 hours she tried again, with the engines at back 1/3 and then back 2/3. She did not come free. The FURER's captain requested assistance from Royal Dutch Navy authorities. At about 0254 hours the Dutch naval tug ordered to meet the FURER for the medical evacuation made up on the FURER's starboard side and tried to tow her off the strand. The tug was a small vessel of about 300 horsepower. The FURER assisted with her engines, which were placed on back 2/3 at 0301 hours; back full at 0305; back 2/3 at 0307; stop at 0322; back 2/3 at 0327; back full at 0338; and stop at 0345. The FURER remained aground. At about 0517 a second Dutch naval tug arrived. Both tugs tried to free the FURER, without success. The FURER's commanding officer, Cdr. Stephen Edwards, decided not to make further use of his vessel's engines, to avoid the possibility of damaging them. He also decided not to pump out the sonar dome. Prior to the arrival of the second naval tug, the naval officers and Den Helder port authorities had advised Cdr. Edwards that if he was not willing to use the FURER's engines, the available navy tugs lacked sufficient power to free the vessel. In the circumstances they recommended that Edwards engage civilian tugs, and recommended Wijsmuller which had tugs at the nearby port of Ijmuiden. Edwards agreed, and at his request the navy authorities contacted the Wijsmuller office.
5. Wijsmuller maintains a radio room in its offices at Ijmuiden which continuously monitors all emergency and shipping frequencies. The radio officer on duty received the request to assist the FURER. Pursuant to standing orders, the radio officer directed two Wijsmuller tugs, the CYCLOOP and TITAN, stationed at the company's berth at Ijmuiden, to proceed to the FURER. The CYCLOOP sailed from Ijmuiden at 0400 hours and the TITAN at 0415. Both tugs arrived at the FURER at about 0700. The TITAN prepared its towing gear, made up to the FURER's stern at 0747, and dropped anchor waiting for the next high water. The CYCLOOP anchored nearby awaiting further orders. The radio officer, having dispatched CYCLOOP and TITAN to the scene, telephoned salvage superintendent Halfweeg at his home. Halfweeg then drove to the office, arriving about 45 minutes after he had been awakened from sleep, and telephoned the naval authorities at Den Helder, who described the FURER and the general situation. Halfweeg examined the weather forecasts, which indicated a depression developing in the North Atlantic. He telephoned the weather bureau and asked for a forecast for the area of the grounding. The bureau responded with a prediction that within about 24 hours, the weather, which was then favorable, would deteriorate with northwesterly winds of force 6 to 8 on the Beaufort scale.
6. Captain Jozef Handgraaf, a Wijsmuller tug master, boarded the FURER as salvage coordinator. No salvage work was performed until Cdr. Edwards signed the Lloyd's Open Form of salvage agreement, which he did at about 1100 hours on June 30. The two Royal Dutch Navy tugs and a Navy diving boat, which had also been in attendance, cleared away. At about 1120 hours the CYCLOOP, having made up on the FURER's port side forward of amidships "Chinese style," or bow to stern, began scouring sand, a process which involved washing sand away from the FURER's bottom with the tug's propeller wash and Kort water nozzles.
7. Halfweeg, at the Wijsmuller offices at Ijmuiden, learned during the early morning of June 30 of the FURER's sonar dome. He concluded that the vessel was imprisoned by the dome having grounded in the sand. In view of the forecast of deteriorating weather, and the physical characteristics of the sand bank upon which the FURER had grounded (see P 17, post ), Halfweeg decided to send increased towing power to assist the warship. He ordered the WILLEM BARENDSZ to make ready for sea and sail from Ijmuiden, and ordered the UTRECHT to make for the scene from her North Sea salvage station. The BARENDSZ left Ijmuiden at 1310 hours on June 30, arrived at the FURER at about 1540, and made up aft. The UTRECHT received Halfweeg's radio orders at 0835, got underway at 0855, and arrived at the FURER at 1630 on June 30.
8. There is a degree of dispute between the parties as to the value of the vessels employed by Wijsmuller in the salvage operation, that being one of the elements considered in fashioning a salvage award. The CYCLOOP was built in 1957. She was a seagoing, single screw diesel tug, specially designed for salvage work on the Dutch coast, although also able to perform long-distance towing. Her length overall was 103 feet 4 inches, her gross tonnage was 255, and her engines were capable of 2150 IHP (indicated horsepower). The TITAN, built in 1956, was of virtually identical characteristics. The WILLEM BARENDSZ was an oceangoing, single screw diesel tug, specially designed for ocean towage, rescue and salvage work. Her length overall was 172 feet 11 inches, her gross tonnage was 658.53, and her power was 6350 IHP. The BARENDSZ was built in 1963. The UTRECHT, built in 1956, was an oceangoing, single screw diesel tug, also specially designed for ocean towage, rescue and salvage work. Her length was 173 feet 1 inch overall, her gross tonnage 638.20, and her power 4200 IHP. Plaintiff offered in evidence (PX4) a written statement of the four tugs' market value as of June, 1974, prepared by an experienced London ship broker. The valuations given were: CYCLOOP, 240,000; TITAN, 240,000; WILLEM BARENDSZ, 900,000; UTRECHT, 645,000. The value of the English pound on July 1, 1974 was $ 2.386. Accordingly these calculations of market value for the CYCLOOP, TITAN, BARENDSZ, and UTRECHT translate into dollar figures of $ 572,640, $ 572,640, $ 2,147,400, and $ 1,538,970, respectively, for a total of $ 4,831,650. The Government challenges these figures, as inflated and prepared with a view toward litigation. In that regard, the Government points to a special review of the assets of the company made by its auditors (PX9), which refers to a sale value of all seven tugs in the seagoing service in a total amount of 11,500,000 Dutch florins. This is referred to in the exhibit as a "rough" total, prepared by a Mr. Van Lambaart (a Wijsmuller employee) at the end of 1973, the total sale value having also been "reduced by a 20% safety margin." The parties stipulated that the average value of the florin (or guilder) in December of 1973 was 35.615 cents per guilder (Tr. 81). Thus the total sale value of the seven tugs, according to this document, and reduced by the "20% safety margin," was the equivalent of $ 4,095,725. Taking this figure as 80% of a more realistic sale value, a total value of $ 5,119,656 for the seven oceangoing tugs results. This would appear somewhat inconsistent with a claimed total value in excess of $ 4,800,000 for the four tugs which engaged in the salvage operation. Dr. Wijsmuller, in his testimony, suggested that the Van Lambaart figures were too low. The only evidence of actual sale in the record is that of the UTRECHT in January of 1977, Wijsmuller having sold the vessel for 2,000,000 guilders. In December of 1974 the guilder was worth 39.331 cents (Tr. 81); thus, measured by that rate of exchange, the sale was the equivalent of $ 786,620, but the guilder had probably appreciated further in relation to the dollar as of January, 1977, although the record does not indicate the precise rate of exchange at that date. Furthermore, I accept Dr. Wijsmuller's testimony that owing to world shipping conditions, the market value of tugs had declined between 1974 and 1977. I am certainly not prepared to disregard entirely the evidence of expert ship brokers introduced by the plaintiff; to be sure, these estimates were prepared with a view toward litigation, but if the Government felt the estimates were completely out of line, it could have offered evidence from a ship broker of its own choosing. No precise valuation of the salvor's property is necessary, in the context of the case. The element is less significant in computing the amount of a salvage award. It is evident from the record that the four tugs employed in the salvage service had a total value, at the time of rendition of the services, of several million dollars, certainly not less than $ 3,000,000, and in greater likelihood about $ 4,000,000. That is a sufficient valuation for the purposes of decision.
9. As with the case of the initial efforts made by the Royal Dutch Navy tugs, the initial, unsuccessful efforts of Wijsmuller's tugs to refloat the FURER are for the most part covered by the Statement of Agreed Facts. After inspecting the FURER, Dutch Navy divers had reported that a sandbar extended from the sonar dome to the vessel's bridge. Soundings were taken by the FURER's crew, and at 0957 hours on June 30 the warship's status was recorded in her deck log as follows: "Sonar dome in sand, rest of ship sitting in sand. Damage being inspected now. Screw possibly in sand." At 1120 hours the CYCLOOP began scouring sand, in the manner described ante. At about 1200 the TITAN began towing and sheering. "Sheering" involves sudden acceleration of the tug with a slack towing wire, so that a jerking or sudden pulling effect is accomplished. The CYCLOOP and TITAN combined in these efforts throughout the early afternoon of June 30. They could not free the FURER. Upon one occasion the CYCLOOP's pennant wire parted; upon another so did the pennant wire of the TITAN. The tugs reattached themselves to the FURER, and went on working. The next predicted high water was at 1620 hours, with a range of 6.0 feet. Captain Handgraaf, who had boarded the FURER from the CYCLOOP, hoped to free the FURER during that high tide. The WILLEM BARENDSZ, which had arrived in the vicinity of the FURER about 1540 hours and made up aft, began towing at about 1600 hours, thereafter increasing to full power. The CYCLOOP and TITAN were also towing in tandem. The FURER's deck log records that at 1612 hours the rudder seemed to be clear, and that at 1615 hours the vessel appeared to be moving, there was no apparent pressure on the rudder fantail, and the vessel appeared to be floating free. At 1642 hours, the FURER's engines were placed on 1/3 back for about 17 minutes. The UTRECHT arrived at 1630, but did not participate in the presently ongoing efforts. The CYCLOOP's pennant wire parted again, at about 1627 hours. At 1635 the bitt on the FURER to which the BARENDSZ's towing wire was connected began bending, and at 1713 the bitt began tearing out of the FURER's deck. The Government contends that this particular bitt should not have been used for towing purposes, and that Handgraaf made no inquiries as to which bitt should have been used. Plaintiff counters that if the bitt should not have been used, the FURER's personnel should have told Handgraaf so. I do not regard the issue as a significant one. It was at about this time, however, that Handgraaf and Cdr. Edwards decided to stop the attempt to free the FURER until shortly before the next high tide, which was predicted for 0456 hours on July 1.
10. The next effort to free the FURER, in the early morning hours of July 1, was successful. The manner in which that happy result was achieved, and the relative values of the contributing forces, give rise to significant disputes between the parties. In formulating the findings of fact which address these questions, I must rely entirely upon depositions and documents in evidence. That is because none of the witnesses participating in the events appeared at the trial. All those concerned at the scene, Wijsmuller employees on the one hand and officers and crew of the FURER on the other, testified by deposition. This presents certain disadvantages for the trial judge. He cannot observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify, and has no opportunity to pose questions of his own which he considers (inaccurately perhaps) would clarify a point at issue. In these circumstances, contemporaneous notations in documents, always significant in the fact-finding process, take on an added importance.
11. Following the unsuccessful effort to refloat during the afternoon of June 30, Cdr. Edwards, in consultation with his officers, decided to pump out the sonar dome. He had previously been reluctant to do so because he was concerned that it would affect the FURER's stability while aground. Wijsmuller's salvage master Captain Handgraaf, on board the CYCLOOP, was advised of Edwards' intention, and agreed to it. Handgraaf had decided to commence the next effort at refloating the FURER at about three hours before the next high tide, predicted for 0456 hours on July 1, with a tidal range of 5.9 feet.
The effect of pumping out the dome's 94 tons of water, which requires several hours, is to raise the dome about 18 inches, lower the FURER's propeller about 7 inches, and raise the vessel as a whole a little over 3 inches.
While Edwards testified at his deposition (pp. 73, 87) that they started pumping the dome at 1700 hours on June 30 and finished at about 2300, I find on the basis of the FURER's deck logs, DXA-1 and DXA-2, that pumping of the dome commenced at 1935 hours on June 30 and was still in progress at the beginning of the 0000-0400 watch on July 1.
12. Edwards went to his cabin to sleep at about 2200 hours on June 30, leaving orders with the FURER's executive officer, Lt. Cdr. Robert Burns, to wake him at midnight. At that time, the BARENDSZ and the UTRECHT were anchored astern of the FURER, each with a towline leading to bitts aboard the FURER. The UTRECHT was directly astern of the FURER, and the BARENDSZ was off the FURER's port quarter.
The CYCLOOP was made up "Chinese style," her bow facing the FURER's stern, on the FURER's port side. According to the CYCLOOP's log, PX18, she had been scouring sand with her engines from 1700 to 1800, and again from 1940 to 2125, when the propellers were stopped to clear away broken fenders. At 2140 the CYCLOOP began scouring again, and was ordered to stop at 2240 until the next high tide. She remained made up alongside the FURER's port side. Handgraaf testified at his deposition (p. 133) that the CYCLOOP scoured continuously from 2100 hours on June 30 until 0215 on July 1, when the FURER refloated, but I reject this testimony, given almost three years after the event, in favor of the contemporaneous log entries. The TITAN, according to her log, PX21, anchored near the FURER at 1900 hours on June 30. At 0005 on July 1 she started her engine, heaved her anchor up at 0105, made fast alongside the FURER's starboard side at 0130, and started scouring sand. Again, I accept these contemporaneous entries, and find that the TITAN comported herself as described, rejecting any contrary testimony by the witnesses.
13. While the salvors contemplated initiating a concerted effort at refloating the FURER somewhat in advance of high tide, they were partially overtaken by events. At some time during the 0000 to 0400 watch, and before the Wijsmuller tugs had begun trying to pull the FURER off the strand, the FURER was observed to be moving at the bow. Executive Officer Burns, who remained on the bridge after Edwards retired, thought he noticed "a slight up and down movement of the bow"; the time was "very, very close to about 1:30."
Burns went forward to the bow, where he was joined by Boatswain's Mate Robert Garcia, who had been stationed on the fantail and got a feeling "like the ship came alive again"; it also appeared to him that the BARENDSZ and UTRECHT, anchored astern of the FURER, were closer.
At the FURER's bow, Burns and Garcia took lead line readings. Burns testified, and I find, that when he was taking soundings on the FURER's starboard bow, a Wijsmuller tug was positioned alongside the warship's starboard side scouring sand; the tug's wash created a 60 degree angle on the lead line.
The vessels' log books help establish the time. The tug on the FURER's starboard side was the TITAN; her log recites that she moored alongside the FURER and started scouring sand at 0130. The FURER's deck log reports the TITAN as made up to the starboard side amidship at 0120. Burns felt "a definite up and down movement at the bow," further testified that he saw the two tugs "that had been astern of us anchored were now coming forward" so that they were "almost off our bow itself," and concluded that "we were free at that time."
Burns wakened Edwards with a report that the FURER had refloated.
14. The FURER's motions were also observed by Wijsmuller personnel. Salvage master Handgraaf, stationed on the CYCLOOP which was fastened to the FURER's port side, testified that Captain Helenigh of the CYCLOOP told him "that there was some movement in the ship (that is, the FURER) and they wanted to start for the refloating."
He estimated the time as around 0100.
Handgraaf testified that the TITAN had joined the CYCLOOP alongside the FURER "around midnight,"
which I cannot accept in view of the TITAN's log entry that she made fast to starboard at 0130; however, I find on the evidence of all witnesses that as the FURER's motion became more pronounced, the CYCLOOP was fastened on her port side and the TITAN was fastened to starboard. Handgraaf ordered the BARENDSZ and the UTRECHT "to pick up their anchor and start pulling as well."
The BARENDSZ's log, PX19, recites that she started her engines, heaved up anchor, and started to pull on her towing wire at 0145. Captain Johannes Hopman of the BARENDSZ noted that his towing wire was not pointing in the direction of the FURER, an indication that it was caught somewhere on the bottom. Hopman slowly increased power to get the wire clear; he "almost needed full power to get it clear."
The BARENDSZ, according to her log, was pulling at full power at 0200. Handgraaf had boarded the FURER and gone aft. He noticed movement in the FURER "as the WILLEM BARENDSZ started pulling"; he also observed that the UTRECHT's towing wire had fouled the FURER's propeller, and ordered the UTRECHT not to pull.
The UTRECHT's log, PX20, shows that she raised her anchor at 0135. The log contains no reference to the UTRECHT pulling on her towing wire before being ordered to stop. Her master, H. J. Korendijk, testified that at 0135 he noticed motion in the FURER, and thereafter raised anchor, and used the UTRECHT's engines to pull the FURER "loose of the bank" for at least some time before observing that the pennant of his towing wire was fouled at the FURER's stern, which he reported to Handgraaf.
Korendijk's testimony, as it emerges in deposition form and through an interpreter, is obscure. I find on balancing the evidence the UTRECHT did not contribute by towing to the refloating of the FURER; her contribution was limited to such force as was generated by the catenary effect of her towline. As for the CYCLOOP and TITAN, the CYCLOOP's log, PX18, recites that at 0200 "all hands on deck, tried to pull the J.A.F. afloat." The TITAN's log, as noted, stated that she had started scouring sand at 0130. The FURER's deck log notes that at 0157: "taking tension on forward tug line." Plaintiff interprets this entry as an indication that the TITAN was scouring, which would generate a tension on the line.
It is equally plausible that the reference is to the CYCLOOP the "forward tug" is not identified which, as her log indicates, was attempting at 0200 "to pull the J.A.F. afloat." In any event, it is clear that a forward, freeing force was being generated by both these tugs.
15. The Government contends that "the FURER floated free in a time period of approximately 0120 to 0130 hours on July 1"; that only after she floated free were the CYCLOOP and TITAN "reactivated, moored on opposite sides and utilized to further push the FURER astern to its ultimate anchorage area"; and that neither the UTRECHT nor the BARENDSZ towed the FURER at all, their contributions being limited to having their lines "attached to the stern of the vessel and the weight of the line acting as a force assisting the astern movement of the FURER." In short, says the Government: "At the time of the freeing of the FURER there were no affirmative activities underway on the part of the four tugs."
That position, if sustained by the evidence, would certainly minimize Wijsmuller's contribution to the refloating, and thus reduce the amount of a salvage award. I find, however, that the FURER had not "floated free" of the strand as early as 0120 or 0130. The phrase connotes a state of total liberation from earlier confinement, so that the vessel may again maneuver freely. The FURER did not recapture that state of grace until after 0200 on July 1. All the logs and contemporaneous reports attest to that fact. The CYCLOOP's log recites: "0215 J.A.F. afloat, and started to pull the ship to an anchor position . . ." The log of the TITAN states: "0215 J.A.F. refloated, towing vessel in direction 300o into deep waters." The log of the BARENDSZ states: "0215 J.A.F. afloat and towing her into deep water." The log of the UTRECHT states: "0210 J.A.F. afloat." This cannot be disregarded as a conspiracy of false entries by Wijsmuller personnel. The FURER's own log is in full accord. Lt. Cdr. Robert Norris, an engineering officer, was on watch on deck from 2348 hours on June 30 to 0213 hours on July 1. When motion was observed in the FURER, Lt. W. F. Bassett, a deck officer, was called to relieve Norris, who returned to the engine room. Bassett reached the FURER's bridge at about 0200 and relieved Norris at the watch at 0213.
Bassett's first entry in the deck log, PXA-2, is: "0213 Assumed the watch. Aground as before." The next entry, at 0220 reads: "Believe there is up and down movement in the bow suggesting ship is free." The "situation report" which was sent from the FURER to other naval authorities states that the vessel "floated free" at 0220 on July 1.
The seagoing witnesses, Dutch and American, who prepared these contemporaneous reports, presumably knew when the FURER floated free of the strand. With one voice, they described that event as having occurred subsequent to 0200. The several notations range between 0210 and 0220. The discrepancies are insignificant. What is significant is that the contemporaneous entries are fatal to the Government's contention that the FURER floated free as early as 0120 or 0130. The efforts of the Navy witnesses, in depositions taken within the litigation context, to establish an earlier time of floating free are unpersuasive. I accept that the FURER's personnel observed a motion in the bow at about 0130; those on board the Dutch tugs observed the same phenomenon. That motion resulted from the lightening effect of pumping out the sonar dome. But pumping out the dome would raise the bow only about 18 inches. That would not be sufficient to float the vessel free of the strand. The dome had been buried in the sand at least to a depth of five feet.
She had not floated free, even with tug assistance, at 1620 hours on June 30, when the predicted high tide was 6.0 feet.
The Government argues in its brief (p. 9) that the FURER floated free "as a result of the bow rising 17 inches due to the pumping of the dome and the presence of additional water of approximately 11/2 meters due to oncoming heavier winds and seas that were predicted for the afternoon of July 1." But there is no evidence from which I could find that 11/2 meters of additional, storm-generated water were assisting the FURER's floatation at 0130 on July 1.
The fact of the matter is that pumping out the FURER's sonar dome was simply insufficient to refloat the vessel at the time in question. The FURER floated free, shortly after 0210 on July 1, as the result of several factors: prior scouring of sand by the Wijsmuller tugs; a possible weakening of the sand "nest" imprisoning the dome by the prior, unsuccessful salvage efforts; pulling by the BARENDSZ when the motions of the FURER were observed; the forward thrust of the CYCLOOP and the TITAN, moored to the port and starboard sides of the FURER, respectively; and the increased floatation realized by the pumping of the sonar dome. Pumping of the dome, in and of itself, would not have been sufficient to cause the FURER to float free.
16. The events that transpired subsequent to the freeing of the FURER from the strand are not in dispute, and are summarized in the Statement of Agreed Facts. Edwards indicated to Handgraaf where he wished the FURER to be towed. The Wijsmuller tugs towed the FURER to a place of safety, where it anchored at about 0303 hours on July 1. The TITAN was sent to Ijmuiden to pick up Wijsmuller divers and cutting gear to clear the UTRECHT's towing wire; but after the TITAN left, a Dutch Navy diving boat arrived with divers who were to inspect the FURER for underwater damage, and, using the FURER's cutting gear, these divers freed the warship's propeller from the UTRECHT's wire which was entangled in it. The CYCLOOP and WILLEM BARENDSZ stood by until the UTRECHT's wire had been cut free. The BARENDSZ was dismissed from the scene at 0730 hours and returned to Ijmuiden, arriving in berth at 1055. A redelivery certificate, under the Lloyd's Open Form salvage agreement was executed at about 0755 hours. The CYCLOOP departed the scene at 0805, and arrived in berth at Ijmuiden at 1245. The TITAN had arrived in berth at 0725. The UTRECHT stood by until 0835, when it returned to its salvage station, arriving there at 1738. The Dutch Navy divers reported that there was no evidence of underwater damage to the FURER, except that the ends of two of the propeller blades had been slightly damaged. The FURER's crew conducted steering and engine tests, which were satisfactory. The FURER got underway for Denmark at 0757.
17. The parties dispute the degree of danger from which the FURER was rescued. That is an important element in determining the salvage award. I accept the testimony of the Government's expert witness John O'Brien, employed by the Naval Ships Engineer Center, that in her position "aground somewhere by the bow," and in the conditions of current and seas prevailing at the time, the FURER was in no particular physical danger from the time of grounding to refloating. O'Brien's testimony was based on his calculations of such technical factors as "grounding load" and "still water bending moment."
The distillation of his evidence is that the FURER was strong enough to withstand any pressure resulting from the sonar dome and bow area having grounded, and the rest of the vessel afloat, in calm weather. But this is hardly dispositive of the quantum of risk. Plaintiff's expert witness Captain William Searle, a salvage expert and former Navy Supervisor of Salvage, testified that in view of the predicted deteriorating weather, there was a danger of the FURER pivoting on the grounded sonar dome and broaching, that is, lying parallel with the sandbar and presenting her entire side to the direction from which the weather was coming.
If a vessel broaches, Searle testified, the sand builds up around the entire hull, the pounding of the waves can carry her further "up the beach," there is a risk of damage to machinery, "so far as the salvage operation is concerned, the situation would have gotten dramatically worse," and, if sand is scoured away from the bow and stern but remains at the midbody, a bending or "hogging" effect results which places a strain on the hull.
The risks attendant upon broaching are not controverted by the Government's expert; O'Brien made no calculations of the stress upon the FURER had she broached, admitted the stress would be greater, and agreed that broaching should be avoided if possible.
The Government's principal argument on this aspect of the case is that there was no danger of broaching because the FURER, having pumped out the sonar dome, would have floated free on her own at the next full high tide, at 0456 on July 1. The Government called no salvage expert to contradict Searle (O'Brien, a civilian technician, had no seagoing or salvage experience); the point was sought to be established on cross examination. The proposition is a close one. Searle calculated that the elevation achieved by the prior high tide at 1620 on June 30 was 4.7 feet; the FURER, with her sonar dome still full of water, could not be freed even with tug assistance. The pumping of the dome raised the bow by 18 inches. While that elevation was not sufficient to free the FURER at 0210 on July 1, on the rising tide, it might have done so at full high tide at 0450, which was predicted to be 5.9 feet. Searle appeared to concede the possibility.
However, accepting arguendo that the FURER, even if unattended by plaintiff's tugs, would have floated free on the high tide by virtue of pumping out the sonar dome, it does not follow that she would be free of danger. Raising the bow lowers the stern. The propeller and rudder thus come closer to the sand. To back off the sandbar, Edwards would have had to place the FURER's engines astern. His testimony shows that he was reluctant to do that. With engines astern, the stern tends to "squat" lower in the water, closer to the bottom. Furthermore, the FURER backs to port; that is, her stern moves to port and the bow to starboard. The current at high tide runs in a northerly direction. While the velocity at high tide was only .9 knots, this would be an additional factor operating upon the FURER's starboard side, inclining her to broach port side to the sandbar unless she was in full maneuvering control as soon as the bow came clear. In these circumstances, Searle envisioned a continued risk of broaching; he testified saltily:
"What I said was that with the port thrust of the propeller and still with the .9 knots this way, the chances of broaching are high because he's dragging right up the side of the gosh darn sandbar and he ain't got no way of maneuvering out here." Tr. 322.
I accept this testimony. The Government suggested in further cross examination of Searle that smaller Dutch Navy tugs could have assisted the FURER in keeping control when the warship, her dome pumped out, hypothetically refloated on the high tide. That is a revisionist theory which I disregard. The Dutch Navy had proclaimed itself inadequate to help the FURER and advised Cdr. Edwards to obtain civilian assistance, which Edwards did. I am not concerned with what might have happened if the Dutch Navy had continued to give assistance without plaintiff's presence. As the result of Edwards' perfectly sensible decision, the Dutch Navy disappears from the drama. The question is whether Wijsmuller's efforts preserved the FURER from risk of further expense or damage. I find that there was an appreciable danger to the FURER broaching, if Wijsmuller had not assisted in freeing her. Had the FURER broached, the worsening weather would have placed her in a position of considerably greater peril.
It cannot be said that Wijsmuller saved the FURER from certain severe damage or loss, but the plaintiff's efforts played a substantial part in preserving the FURER from a considerable peril.
18. The total times devoted by the four Wijsmuller tugs to the salvage operation, including time steaming to the site and returning to port or salvage station, are as follows: CYCLOOP, 0400 on June 30 to 1245 on July 1; WILLEM BARENDSZ, 1310 on June 30 to 1055 on July 1; UTRECHT, 0855 on June 30 to 1738 on July 1; TITAN, 0415 on June 30 to 0725 on July 1.
At the pertinent times Wijsmuller charged, on a daily contract towage basis, $ 1966.55 for the CYCLOOP and TITAN, $ 2556.52 for the UTRECHT, and $ 2753.17 for the WILLEM BARENDSZ, with a possible additional profit factor of up to 30% depending on market conditions.
The "main ingredients" of a salvage award under American law were declared in The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, ...