The opinion of the court was delivered by: PRATT
Claiming to be the harbinger of thousands of similar claims, plaintiff veterans and members of their families seek relief because of injuries claimed to have been sustained from use by the military in Vietnam of "Agent Orange", a defoliant chemical referred to for convenience as 2, 4, 5-T, which defendants manufactured and sold to the government.
For the second time in the nine month history of this MDL litigation, lead counsel for plaintiffs
has filed a re-amended complaint after oral argument on defendants' motion to dismiss a prior amended complaint. While properly criticizing plaintiffs' disregard for the filing requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, all defendants indicate, by letter dated October 23, 1979, that they are "prepared to accept service of the TAVC (third amended verified complaint) in Chapman v. Dow, et al, * * *." Furthermore, defendants have signed a consent to the TAVC and agreed that:
(To) avoid further delay arising from the necessity for a new motion addressed to the TAVC, we would ask the Court to deem our motion with respect to the SAVC (second amended verified complaint) as having been made with respect to the TAVC. We do not contemplate, however, that any further briefing will be required with respect to our motion.
Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss or strike the SAVC in whole or in part, a motion argued to the court on October 3, 1979, is deemed directed against the TAVC filed October 22, 1979. For reasons set forth below, defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is denied, as is defendants' motion to dismiss or strike various allegations of the complaint.
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The TAVC alleges two bases for jurisdiction: (1) the "equitable jurisdiction" of the federal courts; and (2) "federal question" jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The first basis is without merit. Federal courts have no independent "equity jurisdiction"; they may grant equitable relief, but not unless there is an independent statutory basis for federal jurisdiction, which is conferred only by specific congressional enactment. See 7 Moore, Federal Practice, P65.03(2.) (1979).
The second basis, federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, is alleged to arise under "the common law and/or the statutory laws of the United States of America." The court will first consider whether a private cause of action may be implied from statutory law, and then will turn to plaintiffs' claims under federal common law.
Implied Causes of Action Under Federal Statutes
The TAVC lists four statutes "from which a cause of action can be implied": the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k; the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act (FEPCA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y; the Toxic Substances Control Act (TOSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq.; and the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051 et seq.
The federal statute regulating herbicides, including defoliants such as 2, 4, 5-T, is FIFRA. Before 1972, FIFRA regulated "economic poisons", which were defined to include: "any substance or mixture of substances intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or dessicant." 7 U.S.C. § 135(a)(2). In 1972, Congress amended FIFRA by enacting the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act (FEPCA).
FEPCA regulates "pesticides", which are similarly defined to include "any substance or mixture of substances intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or dessicant * * *." 7 U.S.C. § 136(u). Thus, FIFRA, as amended by FEPCA, treats defoliants as "pesticides", which has led the parties to refer to 2, 4, 5-T as a pesticide, and leads the court to do likewise, although common usage would undoubtedly categorize 2, 4, 5-T and other defoliants as herbicides, not pesticides.
Because of FIFRA, the other two statutes under which plaintiffs ask the court to imply a private right of action, TOSCA and CPSA, are inapplicable to this litigation. TOSCA, enacted in 1977, regulates "chemical substances". However, "Such term does not include * * * any pesticide (as defined in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act) when manufactured, processed or distributed in commerce for use as a pesticide * * *." 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(B)(ii). CPSA, enacted in 1976, regulates, "consumer products". However, "such term does not include * * * pesticides (as defined by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act) * * *." 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1)(D). TOSCA and CPSA clearly exclude FIFRA pesticides from coverage. Since FIFRA pesticides include defoliants such as 2, 4, 5-T, TOSCA and CPSA are patently inapplicable to this case.
This leaves plaintiffs with only FIFRA, as amended by FEPCA, on which to base an implied private right of action. Plaintiffs' argument is set forth succinctly in their memorandum opposing defendants' motion to dismiss (plaintiffs' memorandum):
While federal pesticide legislation (viz. FIFRA) does not specifically provide civil remedies for the plaintiff veterans and their families, nevertheless, it is manifest that such laws establish regulatory schemes within the context of which it is intended that a remedy be fashioned by the Courts.
Plaintiffs' memorandum at 22.
Plaintiffs cite no legislative history and offer no detailed statutory interpretation to support their argument, resting instead on the "legislative purpose" and "broad federal policy" said to underlie federal legislation concerned with toxic chemicals.
The test for implying a private cause of action under a federal statute is set forth in the leading case of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S. Ct. 2080, 45 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1975):
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted," (citation omitted, emphasis supplied by the Supreme Court) that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? (citation omitted). Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? (citations omitted). And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
Id. at 78, 95 S. Ct. at 2088.
Here, the plaintiffs qualify under the first part of the Cort v. Ash test, as persons meant to be protected by FIFRA. However, plaintiffs fail the next part of the test, since there is clear indication that Congress intended not to allow suits by private citizens under FIFRA:
While it is true that nowhere on the face of the statute is it stated that the enforcement powers of the administrator of the EPA or the Attorney General are or should be exclusive, the legislative history of the statute in question clearly indicates that Congress considered and rejected on more than one occasion proposed amendments which would have provided for citizens' civil actions to enjoin violations. * * *
We recognize that changes in a statute in the course of enactment must be observed with caution in determining legislative intent. However, rejection of specific provisions is in our view more significant, may be properly considered and is more persuasive in the circumstances here found. (citations omitted). Thus, the Congressional intent to us at least is clear enough: Enforcement of FIFRA is reserved by Congress to the Environmental Protection Agency and to the Office of the Attorney General, and violations thereof are not the proper subject of civil actions by citizens.
People For Environmental Progress v. Leisz, 373 F.Supp. 589, 592 (C.D.Cal.1974)
See also Kelley v. Butz, 404 F.Supp. 925 (W.D.Mich.1975), upholding the standing of a state attorney general to bring suit under FIFRA, but noting that "the Court is convinced from its review of the authorities that there are significant manifestations of a legislative intent to exclude suits by private citizens under the statute." Id. at 940.
Recognizing the force of these cases, plaintiffs would distinguish them away:
Each of these cases was properly brought in the Federal District Court because of its jurisdiction over enforcement of the federal pesticide laws. The fact that the courts denied the plaintiffs therein standing to enforce the provisions of those laws is immaterial here, because in none of these cases was there a claim similar to that brought by the plaintiff veterans and their families in this case. The "Agent Orange" cases are unique on their facts and hopefully, as was the case with thalidomide, not likely to occur again.
Plaintiffs' memorandum at 23.
Plaintiffs' argument reduces to a claim that the large number of potential claims and the unique circumstances surrounding this litigation justify implying a private cause of action under federal pesticide legislation. But the number of claims and the nature of the injuries, unique as they may be, are not proper factors to be considered under the Cort v. Ash test, which focuses on Congressional intent and displacement of state law.
Moreover, under each of the federal pesticide statutes, Congress provided explicitly for suits by the EPA administrator to protect the public interest. The circumstances underlying the instant litigation, involving large numbers of claims arising from widespread exposure to toxic chemicals, seem more likely to generate a suit by public officials, such as the EPA administrator, and thus, if anything, present a less compelling case for implying private causes of action than smaller cases involving fewer plaintiffs and more limited exposure. The court concludes that a private cause of action should not be read into FIFRA, or any ...