The opinion of the court was delivered by: CANNELLA
Motion by defendant Miryung Construction Co.
to dismiss the complaint on the ground of forum non conveniens is granted on the conditions stated in this Memorandum and Order.
Plaintiff, a resident of Arizona, brings this diversity action for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and fraud against Miryung Construction Co. ("Miryung"), a South Korean corporation doing business in Saudi Arabia and New York, Suwaiket-Miryung Construction Co., Ltd. ("Suwaiket-Miryung") and Bechtel-Arabia Ltd. ("Bechtel-Arabia"), both Saudi Arabian corporations, and Bechtel International Inc. ("Bechtel"), a Delaware corporation doing business in Saudi Arabia. Plaintiff alleges that Miryung was interested in bidding on certain government-sponsored construction projects at Riyadh International Airport in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and that to become qualified to make such a bid under Saudi law, Miryung formed a joint venture with A.M. Al Suwaiket, a citizen and resident of Saudi Arabia. The joint venture, in which plaintiff apparently had no ownership interest, was incorporated as Suwaiket-Miryung on April 2, 1978. Bechtel and Bechtel-Arabia served as construction managers at Riyadh Airport and in that capacity solicited bids and awarded construction contracts on behalf of the Government.
Plaintiff, who lived and worked in Saudi Arabia from 1973 to 1979, was an employee of and joint venturer with Mr. Al Suwaiket during his last two years there. Plaintiff claims to have used his personal contacts and specialized knowledge of Saudi bidding practices to secure for Suwaiket-Miryung the opportunity to bid on projects at the airport. He further alleges that, pursuant to an agreement entered into on March 10, 1978 between Miryung and Mr. Al Suwaiket, he had a participatory interest in the profits of Suwaiket-Miryung based on his and Mr. Al Suwaiket's efforts on behalf of the joint venture. The essence of plaintiff's claims for relief is that Miryung conspired with Bechtel, Bechtel-Arabia and a member of the Saudi Arabian royal family, who is not named as a defendant, to circumvent the March 10, 1978 agreement and deprive plaintiff and Mr. Al Suwaiket of compensation earned thereunder. Plaintiff contends that Miryung, which was not qualified to bid, fraudulently used the address of Suwaiket-Miryung to bid on certain projects at the airport. As a result, plaintiff claims that Bechtel and Bechtel-Arabia awarded three construction projects to Miryung, for which compensation was payable under the March 10 agreement, but that Miryung refused to make payment.
The parties do not dispute that all the events at issue took place in Saudi Arabia and that, except for plaintiff, all witnesses, documents and interested persons are located in Saudi Arabia. For that reason, Miryung has moved to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens. Plaintiff opposes that motion, essentially because an adequate alternative forum for this lawsuit purportedly does not exist elsewhere.
Under the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court may dismiss an action, even though it has jurisdiction and venue is proper, if, in its discretion, the court determines that justice and convenience warrant dismissal. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09, 67 S. Ct. 839, 843, 91 L. Ed. 1055 (1946), the Supreme Court set forth the factors a court must consider in deciding whether to invoke the doctrine. These factors require an evaluation of both the private interests of the litigants and the public interest in not burdening the limited judicial resources of a forum that has, at best, a tenuous connection to the controversy. In addition, the doctrine requires that there be an adequate alternative forum for suit, which presents obvious problems when the proposed alternative forum is a foreign country. Id. at 506-07, 67 S. Ct. at 842; Calavo Growers v. Generali Belgium, 632 F.2d 963, 968 (2d Cir. 1980).
The private interest factors include: (1) the ease of access to proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process; (3) the costs of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; (4) the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained; (5) evidence of an attempt by plaintiff to vex or harass defendant by his choice of forum; and (6) any other practical problems associated with pretrial and trial proceedings. In analyzing the public interest at stake, the court must consider: (1) the local interest in the controversy; (2) the administrative difficulties caused by congestion of local court dockets with foreign lawsuits; (3) the avoidance of unnecessary problems in choice of law and the application of foreign law; and (4) the imposition of jury duty on residents of a jurisdiction having little relation to the controversy. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, supra, 330 U.S. at 508-09, 67 S. Ct. at 843; Manu International, S.A. v. Avon Products, Inc., 641 F.2d 62, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1981); Calavo Growers v. Generali Belgium, supra, 632 F.2d at 966-68; Alcoa Steamship Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147 (2d Cir.1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890, 101 S. Ct. 248, 66 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1980); Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156, 1164-65 (2d Cir. 1978).
The Court recognizes that once the various factors and interests involved have been weighed, "unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum (will not) be disturbed." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, supra, 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S. Ct. at 843; accord, Manu International, S.A. v. Avon Products, Inc., supra, 641 F.2d at 65. This burden on defendant is increased by the fact that travel and communications are far easier and more convenient in 1981 than they were in 1947 when the Supreme Court decided Gulf Oil. See id. Yet, if ever there was a case appropriate for transfer to a more convenient forum, this is it. Although two of the defendant corporations do business or are qualified to do business in this district,
their operations here had absolutely nothing to do with the events at issue in this litigation; all such events took place entirely within Saudi Arabia. The agreements at issue were negotiated, executed and performed there. The construction projects involved were to be built there. All of the probable witnesses, except plaintiff, reside in Saudi Arabia, and all of the relevant documents remain there. Thus, if the suit is maintained here, the sources of proof will be substantially inaccessible, defendants will be unable to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses, and the costs to defendants of transporting willing witnesses will be much higher than plaintiff's costs in travelling to Saudi Arabia. In addition, Saudi Arabia possesses a sophisticated legal system capable of enforcing a judgment if one is obtained. Indeed, it appears to the Court that plaintiff may be seeking to extract a settlement by making defendants' litigation expenses so high that compromise would be preferable.
With respect to the public interest, initially there is no local interest in the controversy, especially since plaintiff is not a resident of New York. To impose jury duty on the residents of this district would thus be unfair. Moreover, the likely administrative burden on this Court will be great because of the entirely international nature of the litigation, and the choice of law and application of foreign law problems presented by litigation in this Court appear great. Under New York's choice of law rules, which the Court must apply in this diversity case, see Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020, 85 L. Ed. 1477 (1941), the Court must choose " "the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation.' " Loebig v. Larucci, 572 F.2d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 481, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 749, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283 (1963)). On the facts so far presented to the Court, there is no doubt that the law of Saudi Arabia would apply to all issues in the case. While this would not be an impossible burden for the Court to undertake, it would certainly be difficult. Determining the content of Saudi Arabian law and applying that law to the facts would be far easier at trial in Riyadh. See Schertenleib v. Traum, supra, 589 F.2d at 1163 & n.13, 1165. Farmanfarmaian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 437 F. Supp. 910, 924 (S.D.N.Y.1977), aff'd, 588 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1978).
Thus, the Court finds that the balance of convenience weighs strongly in favor of defendants, and that Saudi Arabia has a superior interest in the litigation, which compels the conclusion that the controversy should be litigated in Saudi Arabia.
Nevertheless, there remains one important consideration which the Court must address.
As stated above, a dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds presupposes the existence and availability of an adequate alternative forum. See Calavo Growers v. Generali Belgium, supra, 632 F.2d at 968; Schertenleib v. Traum, supra, 589 F.2d at 1160. Plaintiff argues that none exists, relying on his own experience and knowledge of Saudi Arabian legal requirements, see Affidavit of Steven Shields (filed Mar. 28, 1980) ("Shields Affidavit"), and on the observations of a Saudi Arabian attorney, see Affidavit of Zaki Mustafa (filed May 29, 1980) ("Mustafa Affidavit"). Defendant Miryung counters with the sworn statement of an American attorney who currently resides and practices law in Saudi Arabia, see Affidavit of Adam Fremantle (filed May 6, 1980) ("Fremantle Affidavit"). When such a dispute among experts arises, the Court may dismiss if it "justifiably believes" that there is an adequate alternative forum, as long as the dismissal is made conditional on defendants' consenting to suit elsewhere and on the transferree court's accepting jurisdiction. Calavo Growers v. Generali Belgium, supra, 632 F.2d at 968 n.6; Schertenleib v. Traum, supra, 589 F.2d at 1163. Unfortunately, this Court has been unable to find a precise definition in the case law of what constitutes an "adequate alternative forum." It is apparent, however, that some inconvenience or the unavailability of beneficial litigation procedures similar to those available in the federal district courts does not render an alternative forum inadequate. See Calavo Growers v. Generali Belgium, supra, 632 F.2d at 968 n.6; Purser v. American Home Products Corp., No. 80 Civ. 710, slip op. at 8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 1981).
Plaintiff argues that Saudi Arabia is not an adequate alternative forum for the following reasons: (1) that he cannot return to that country to pursue his claims; (2) that he cannot obtain counsel in Saudi Arabia; (3) that his personal safety would be endangered if he pursued litigation in Saudi Arabia involving a dispute with Saudi Arabians, especially since his claims involve allegations of wrongdoing on the part of a member of the royal family; (4) that under Saudi law he would be subject to detainment in Saudi Arabia pending resolution of the controversy; (5) ...