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decided: June 24, 1982.



Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'connor, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 758. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 764. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 797.

Author: Powell

[ 457 U.S. Page 733]

 JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil damages from a former President of the United States. The claim rests on actions allegedly taken in the former President's official capacity during his tenure in office. The issue before us is the scope of the immunity possessed by the President of the United States.


In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost his job as a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force. Fitzgerald's dismissal occurred in the context of a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in

[ 457 U.S. Page 734]

     which his job was eliminated. In announcing the reorganization, the Air Force characterized the action as taken to promote economy and efficiency in the Armed Forces.

Respondent's discharge attracted unusual attention in Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained national prominence approximately one year earlier, during the waning months of the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. On November 13, 1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress. To the evident embarrassment of his superiors in the Department of Defense, Fitzgerald testified that cost-overruns on the C-5A transport plane could approximate $2 billion.*fn1 He also revealed that unexpected technical difficulties had arisen during the development of the aircraft.

Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation for his congressional testimony, the Subcommittee on Economy in Government convened public hearings on Fitzgerald's dismissal.*fn2 The press reported those hearings prominently,

[ 457 U.S. Page 735]

     as it had the earlier announcement that his job was being eliminated by the Department of Defense. At a news conference on December 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was queried about Fitzgerald's impending separation from Government service.*fn3 The President responded by promising to look into the matter.*fn4 Shortly after the news conference the petitioner asked White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another job within the administration.*fn5 It also appears that the President suggested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that Fitzgerald might be offered a position in the Bureau of the Budget.*fn6

Fitzgerald's proposed reassignment encountered resistance within the administration.*fn7 In an internal memorandum of January 20, 1970, White House aide Alexander Butterfield reported to Haldeman that "'Fitzgerald is no doubt a top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low

[ 457 U.S. Page 736]

     marks in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the game.'"*fn8 Butterfield therefore recommended that "'[we] should let him bleed, for a while at least.'"*fn9 There is no evidence of White House efforts to reemploy Fitzgerald subsequent to the Butterfield memorandum.

Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission. In a letter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that his separation represented unlawful retaliation for his truthful testimony before a congressional Committee.*fn10 The Commission convened a closed hearing on Fitzgerald's allegations on May 4, 1971. Fitzgerald, however, preferred to present his grievances in public. After he had brought suit and won an injunction, Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 152 U. S. App. D.C. 1, 467 F.2d 755 (1972), public hearings commenced on January 26, 1973. The hearings again generated publicity, much of it devoted to the testimony of Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Although he denied that Fitzgerald had lost his position in retaliation for congressional testimony, Seamans testified that he had received "some advice" from the White House before

[ 457 U.S. Page 737]

     Fitzgerald's job was abolished.*fn11 But the Secretary declined to be more specific. He responded to several questions by invoking "executive privilege."*fn12

At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the President was asked about Mr. Seamans' testimony. Mr. Nixon took the opportunity to assume personal responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal:

"I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be fired or discharged or asked to resign. I approved it and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was not a case of some person down the line deciding he should go. It was a decision that was submitted to me. I made it and I stick by it."*fn13

A day later, however, the White House press office issued a retraction of the President's statement. According to a press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald with another former executive employee. On behalf of the President, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had "put before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald."*fn14

After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the Chief Examiner for the Civil Service Commission issued his decision

[ 457 U.S. Page 738]

     in the Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, as reprinted in App. 60a. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable civil service regulations. Id., at 86a-87a.*fn15 The Examiner based this conclusion on a finding that the departmental reorganization in which Fitzgerald lost his job, though purportedly implemented as an economy measure, was in fact motivated by "reasons purely personal to" respondent. Id., at 86a. As this was an impermissible basis for a reduction in force,*fn16 the Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority.*fn17

[ 457 U.S. Page 739]

     The Examiner, however, explicitly distinguished this narrow conclusion from a suggested finding that Fitzgerald had suffered retaliation for his testimony to Congress. As found by the Commission, "the evidence of record does not support [Fitzgerald's] allegation that his position was abolished and that he was separated . . . in retaliation for his having revealed the C-5A cost overrun in testimony before the Proxmire Committee on November 13, 1968." Id., at 81a.

Following the Commission's decision, Fitzgerald filed a suit for damages in the United States District Court. In it he raised essentially the same claims presented to the Civil Service Commission.*fn18 As defendants he named eight officials of the Defense Department, White House aide Alexander Butterfield, and "one or More" unnamed "White House Aides" styled only as "John Does."

The District Court dismissed the action under the District of Columbia's 3-year statute of limitations, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F.Supp. 688 (DC 1974), and the Court of Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, White House aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 180 U. S. App. D.C. 75, 553 F.2d 220 (1977). The Court of Appeals reasoned that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White House involvement in his dismissal at least until 1973. In that year, reasonable grounds for suspicion had arisen, most notably through publication of the internal White House memorandum in which Butterfield had recommended that Fitzgerald at least should be made to "bleed for a while" before being offered another job in the administration. Id., at 80, 84, 553 F.2d, at 225, 229. Holding that concealment of illegal activity

[ 457 U.S. Page 740]

     would toll the statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals remanded the action against Butterfield for further proceedings in the District Court.

Following the remand and extensive discovery thereafter, Fitzgerald filed a second amended complaint in the District Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this amended complaint -- more than eight years after he had complained of his discharge to the Civil Service Commission -- that Fitzgerald first named the petitioner Nixon as a party defendant.*fn19 Also included as defendants were White House aide Bryce Harlow and other officials of the Nixon administration. Additional discovery ensured. By March 1980, only three defendants remained: the petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides Harlow and Butterfield. Denying a motion for summary judgment, the District Court ruled that the action must proceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that Fitzgerald had stated triable causes of action under two federal statutes and the First Amendment to the Constitution.*fn20 The court also

[ 457 U.S. Page 741]

     ruled that petitioner was not entitled to claim absolute Presidential immunity.

Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed summarily. It apparently did so on the ground that its recent decision in Halperin v. Kissinger, 196 U. S. App. D.C. 285, 606 F.2d 1192 (1979), aff'd in pertinent part by an equally divided Court, 452 U.S. 713 (1981), had rejected this claimed immunity defense.

As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity available to a President of the United States, we granted certiorari to decide this important issue. 452 U.S. 959 (1981).


Before addressing the merits of this case, we must consider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his opposition to the petition for certiorari, respondent argued that this Court is without jurisdiction to review the non-final order in which the District Court rejected petitioner's claim to absolute immunity.*fn21 We also must consider an argument that an agreement between the parties has mooted the controversy.


Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1254, a statute that invests us with authority to review "[cases] in" the courts of appeals.*fn22 When the petitioner

[ 457 U.S. Page 742]

     in this case sought review of an interlocutory order denying his claim to absolute immunity, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Emphasizing the "jurisdictional" basis for the Court of Appeals' decision, respondent argued that the District Court's order was not an appealable "case" properly "in" the Court of Appeals within the meaning of § 1254. We do not agree.

Under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), a small class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to the courts of appeals. As defined by Cohen, this class embraces orders that "conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); see Cohen, supra, at 546-547. As an additional requirement, Cohen established that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory order must "[present] a serious and unsettled question." 337 U.S., at 547. At least twice before this Court has held that orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable under the Cohen criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). In previous cases the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also has treated orders denying absolute immunity as appealable under Cohen. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 186 U. S. App. D.C. 179, 227-229, 569 F.2d 10, 58-60 (1977) (Wilkey, J., dissenting on the appealability issue); McSurely v. McClellan, 172 U. S. App. D.C. 364, 372, 521 F.2d 1024, 1032 (1975), aff'd in pertinent part en banc, 180 U. S. App. D.C. 101, 107-108, n. 18, 553 F.2d 1277, 1283-1284, n. 18 (1976), cert. dism'd sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U.S. 189 (1978).

In "dismissing" the appeal in this case, the Court of Appeals appears to have reasoned that petitioner's appeal lay

[ 457 U.S. Page 743]

     outside the Cohen doctrine because it raised no "serious and unsettled question" of law. This argument was pressed by the respondent, who asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss on the basis of that court's "controlling" decision in Halperin v. Kissinger, supra.

Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that petitioner's interlocutory appeal failed to raise a "serious and unsettled" question. Although the Court of Appeals had ruled in Halperin v. Kissinger that the President was not entitled to absolute immunity, this Court never had so held. And a petition for certiorari in Halperin was pending in this Court at the time petitioner's appeal was dismissed. In light of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened breach of essential Presidential prerogatives under the separation of powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 691-692 (1974), we conclude that petitioner did present a "serious and unsettled" and therefore appealable question to the Court of Appeals. It follows that the case was "in" the Court of Appeals under § 1254 and properly within our certiorari jurisdiction.*fn23


Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for certiorari in this Court and respondent had entered his opposition, the parties reached an agreement to liquidate damages.*fn24 Under

[ 457 U.S. Page 744]

     its terms the petitioner Nixon paid the respondent Fitzgerald a sum of $142,000. In consideration, Fitzgerald agreed to accept liquidated damages of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immunity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner's immunity claim, no further payments would be made.

The limited agreement between the parties left both petitioner and respondent with a considerable financial stake in the resolution of the question presented in this Court. As we recently concluded in a case involving a similar contract: "Given respondents' continued active pursuit of monetary relief, this case remains 'definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.'" Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 371 (1982), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-241 (1937).



This Court consistently has recognized that government officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896), the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmaster General in a suit for damages based upon his official acts. Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English cases at common law, the Court concluded that "[the] interests of the people" required a grant of absolute immunity to public officers. Id., at 498. In the absence of immunity, the Court reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise

[ 457 U.S. Page 745]

     their discretion in a way "injuriously [affecting] the claims of particular individuals," id., at 499, even when the public interest required bold and unhesitating action. Considerations of "public policy and convenience" therefore compelled a judicial recognition of immunity from suits arising from official acts.

"In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his authority, should not be under an apprehension that the motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch of the government, if he were subjected to any such restraint." Id., at 498.

Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the defense of immunity to actions besides those at common law. In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), the Court considered whether the passage of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which made no express provision for immunity for any official, had abrogated the privilege accorded to state legislators at common law. Tenney held that it had not. Examining § 1983 in light of the "presuppositions of our political history" and our heritage of legislative freedom, the Court found it incredible "that Congress . . . would impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason" without some indication of intent more explicit than the general language of the statute. Id., at 376. Similarly, the decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), involving a § 1983 suit against a state judge, recognized the continued validity of the absolute immunity of judges for acts within the judicial role. This was a doctrine "'not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions

[ 457 U.S. Page 746]

     with independence and without fear of consequences.'" Id., at 554, quoting Scott v. Stansfield, L. R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The Court in Pierson also held that police officers are entitled to a qualified immunity protecting them from suit when their official acts are performed in "good faith." 386 U.S., at 557.

In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), the Court considered the immunity available to state executive officials in a § 1983 suit alleging the violation of constitutional rights. In that case we rejected the officials' claim to absolute immunity under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, finding instead that state executive officials possessed a "good faith" immunity from § 1983 suits alleging constitutional violations. Balancing the purposes of § 1983 against the imperatives of public policy, the Court held that "in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based." 416 U.S., at 247.

As construed by subsequent cases, Scheuer established a two-tiered division of immunity defenses in § 1983 suits. To most executive officers Scheuer accorded qualified immunity. For them the scope of the defense varied in proportion to the nature of their official functions and the range of decisions that conceivably might be taken in "good faith." This "functional" approach also defined a second tier, however, at which the especially sensitive duties of certain officials -- notably judges and prosecutors -- required the continued recognition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of prosecutions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (state judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial acts).

This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. Economou,

[ 457 U.S. Page 747438]

     U.S. 478 (1978), when we considered for the first time the kind of immunity possessed by federal executive officials who are sued for constitutional violations.*fn25 In Butz the Court rejected an argument, based on decisions involving federal officials charged with common-law torts, that all high federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from constitutional damages actions. Concluding that a blanket recognition of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive officials, id., at 504, we held that federal officials generally have the same qualified immunity possessed by state officials in cases under § 1983. In so doing we reaffirmed our holdings that some officials, notably judges and prosecutors, "because of the special nature of their responsibilities," id., at 511, "require a full exemption from liability." Id., at 508. In Butz itself we upheld a claim of absolute immunity for administrative officials engaged in functions analogous to those of judges and prosecutors. Ibid. We also left open the question whether other federal officials could show that "public policy requires an exemption of that scope." Id., at 506.


Our decisions concerning the immunity of government officials from civil damages liability have been guided by the Constitution, federal statutes, and history. Additionally, at least in the absence of explicit constitutional or congressional guidance, our immunity decisions have been informed by the common law. See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, at 421. This Court necessarily also has weighed concerns of public policy, especially as illuminated

[ 457 U.S. Page 748]

     by our history and the structure of our government. See, e. g., Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, at 421; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S., at 498.*fn26

This case now presents the claim that the President of the United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil damages liability. In the case of the President the inquiries into history and policy, though mandated independently by our cases, tend to coverage. Because the Presidency did not exist through most of the development of common law, any historical analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our constitutional heritage and structure. Historical inquiry thus merges almost at its inception with the kind of "public policy" analysis appropriately undertaken by a federal court. This inquiry involves policies and principles that may be considered implicit in the nature of the President's office in a system structured to achieve effective government under a constitutionally mandated separation of powers.


Here a former President asserts his immunity from civil damages claims of two kinds. He stands named as a defendant in a direct action under the Constitution and in two statutory actions under federal laws of general applicability. In neither case has Congress taken express legislative action to subject the President to civil liability for his official acts.*fn27

[ 457 U.S. Page 749]

     Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind, we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts. We consider this immunity a functionally mandated incident of the President's unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers and supported by our history. Justice Story's analysis remains persuasive:

"There are . . . incidental powers, belonging to the executive department, which are necessarily implied from the nature of the functions, which are confided to it. Among these, must necessarily be included the power to perform them . . . . The president cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at least, to possess an official inviolability." 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1563, pp. 418-419 (1st ed. 1833).


The President occupies a unique position in the constitutional scheme. Article II, § 1, of the Constitution provides that "[the] executive Power shall be vested in a President of

[ 457 U.S. Page 750]

     the United States . . . ." This grant of authority establishes the President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive Branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the enforcement of federal law -- it is the President who is charged constitutionally to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed";*fn28 the conduct of foreign affairs -- a realm in which the Court has recognized that "[it] would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret";*fn29 and management of the Executive Branch -- a task for which "imperative reasons [require] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove the most important of his subordinates in their most important duties."*fn30

In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified immunity, the respondent relies on cases in which we have recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet officers. E. g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). We find these cases to be inapposite. The President's unique status under the Constitution distinguishes him from other executive officials.*fn31

[ 457 U.S. Page 751]

     Because of the singular importance of the President's duties, diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of government. As is the case with prosecutors and judges -- for

[ 457 U.S. Page 752]

     whom absolute immunity now is established -- a President must concern himself with matters likely to "arouse the most intense feelings." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S., at 554. Yet, as our decisions have recognized, it is in precisely such cases that there exists the greatest public interest in providing an official "the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with" the duties of his office. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 203 (1979). This concern is compelling where the officeholder must make the most sensitive ...

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