UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
July 30, 1982
WASSAIC DEVELOPMENTAL CENTER and NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL SERVICE
The opinion of the court was delivered by: WEINFELD
WEINFELD, District Judge.
Plaintiff was terminated from his position as a psychologist at the Wassaic Developmental Center, effective April 15, 1977, for intentionally making false statements of material fact in his application. Plaintiff had indicated on the application that he had never been dismissed or discharged from any employment for reasons other than lack of work or funds and that he had never resigned in lieu of charges. A subsequent investigation revealed that he had been terminated from his two prior positions at Willard State Hospital and the New York City Department of Corrections for unsatisfactory performance and had been permitted to resign in lieu of termination. Upon plaintiff's Article 78 petition, N.Y.C.P.L.R. Art. 78, the New York Supreme Court, Albany County determined that plaintiff was properly terminated without a hearing for intentionally making false statements of material fact on his application. The decision of the lower court was affirmed on appeal. Prasad v. Merges, 65 A.D.2d 663, 409 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1978), appeal dismissed, 46 N.Y.2d 939, 415 N.Y.S.2d 1028, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 861, 62 L. Ed. 2d 82, 100 S. Ct. 126 (1979).
On September 7, 1977, plaintiff filed a complaint with the New York Division of Human Rights ("NYHRD") charging the Wassaic Developmental Center and the New York Department of Mental Hygiene with discrimination against him on the basis of his race, color and national origin, and of retaliation. The NYHRD sent the complaint to the EEOC, which deferred the charge back to it. After conducting an investigation, the NYHRD concluded that there was no probable cause to believe that Wassaic had engaged in the unlawful discrimination practice complained of and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appealed to the State Human Rights Appeal Board, which affirmed the determination of the NYHRD as "not arbitrary, capricious or characterized as an abuse of discretion." Plaintiff filed a petition with the Appellate Division, Second Department to set aside the adverse administrative determination on the grounds that he had been terminated because of his color and national origin and in retaliation, and that he had not received a fair hearing. On January 15, 1979, the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the determination of the Appeal Board. Plaintiff could have, but did not seek review by the New York Court of Appeals.
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