The opinion of the court was delivered by: SOFAER
These class actions present a challenge to one of the scores of financial disclosure laws adopted by legislatures at all levels of American government since the political scandals of the Nixon Administration. Plaintiffs represent uniformed members of the New York City Fire and Police Departments who earn over $30,000 per year, and their spouses. They challenge the constitutionality of Local Law 48 of 1979, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 1106-5.0 (hereinafter "LL 48"), a financial disclosure law enacted by the New York City Council and approved by the Mayor. Plaintiffs claim that LL 48, as it applies to them, violates their constitutional rights under the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
Financial disclosure laws were recognized long before the "Watergate" scandal as a potentially useful device for discovering and deterring conflicts of interest. Post-Watergate developments, however, have dramatically expanded the number, scope, and impact of disclosure laws. Few jurisdictions had adopted disclosure laws prior to 1970; those that existed in general applied to officials holding policymaking positions, and required disclosure, limited to the government involved or to other interested persons, of financial facts relevant to the work of the reporting officer. Since then, hundreds of such laws have been adopted at all levels of government; they frequently apply to large groups of employees, including civil service personnel having little or no important policymaking power and they require disclosure to all members of the public, irrespective of any need to know or purpose in knowing, of all the financial facts concerning the reporting employee or official as well as those concerning all members of the reporting person's family.
The significance of these developments has been heightened by the large number of Americans now employed by government. Furthermore, since many financial disclosure laws affect not only the privacy of government employees but also the privacy of their spouses and other household members, the number of affected individuals is far greater than the number of employees actually covered. Financial disclosure laws thereby potentially invade the privacy of millions of Americans as individuals and in their marital and family relations.
Legislatively mandated financial disclosure laws do not normally violate the first, fourth, or fifth amendments to the Constitution. If any constitutional principle provides protection against disclosure of private, financial information it is the concept of privacy. Justice Harlan, in his illuminating dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 540, 6 L. Ed. 2d 989, 81 S. Ct. 1752 (1961), recognized that the Constitution is "the basic charter of our society, setting out in spare but meaningful terms the principles of government." The Constitution must protect "legitimate expectations of privacy," he wrote, not only against physical or electronic invasions but against "all unreasonable intrusion of whatever character." Id. at 550. See also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 72 L. Ed. 944, 48 S. Ct. 564 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). More recently, the Supreme Court has indicated that the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal information is constitutionally protected. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 53 L. Ed. 2d 867, 97 S. Ct. 2777 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 51 L. Ed. 2d 64, 97 S. Ct. 869 (1977). Yet, while virtually every court that has considered financial disclosure laws has stated that the Constitution shields individual and family privacy as to financial matters, few courts have placed constitutional limits of any sort on legislatures requiring financial disclosures and providing that they be available to the public.
Powerful reasons explain why courts have properly been restrained in reviewing disclosure laws on privacy grounds. The right of privacy, as protected by common law and the Constitution, relates to private revelations or direct public regulation of intimate activity, rather than to disclosures by government of information obtained and published for some public purpose.
Financial disclosure laws are analogous to long accepted, lawful techniques for obtaining information reasonably necessary for governmental objectives. Furthermore, the objectives sought by financial disclosure laws are in principle unassailable and theoretically justify a broad scope of inquiry. Honest government is so patently a worthy objective, and the capacity for venality in human behavior is so profound and ingenious, that virtually any disclosure law however intrusive might be rationally justifiable. Financial disclosure laws also derive considerable strength from the benefits widely felt to be derived from openness and from an informed public. Justice Brandeis, an eloquent advocate of privacy, said: "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." Brandeis, Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It 62 (1914), quoted in Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1127 n. 13 (5th Cir. 1978). The interest in an informed citizenry also supports a legislature's decision to adopt financial disclosure legislation. An informed public is essential to the nation's success, and a fundamental objective of the first amendment. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390, 23 L. Ed. 2d 371, 89 S. Ct. 1794 (1969); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964).
The absence of any clear constitutional provision expressly protecting privacy no doubt adds to the judiciary's reluctance to fashion limits on laws justified as seeking to make government more ethical. None of the more specific and relatively well-defined provisions of the Bill of Rights applies to financial disclosure legislation. Courts are therefore left to consider possible limits based only upon the general right of privacy, an interest that permeates our constitutional scheme but finds no specific expression. While some former Justices of the Supreme Court could peer into the constitutional penumbra and discern with confidence the contours of the privacy right, less visionary readings now prevail. The sweeping claims generally advanced by plaintiffs challenging such laws have made judicial involvement even less tenable than the interests at stake might warrant. Courts have rarely if ever been provided the evidence in specific cases that might establish the propriety of limited protections against the overbroad use of an otherwise proper legislative device.
To the extent plaintiffs in these cases have presented a facial attack on LL 48, their challenge must fail. The Supreme Court's affirmances without opinion of three decisions upholding disclosure laws leave no room for an attack on LL 48's constitutionality as a whole. But plaintiffs in this case insisted, refreshingly, that the Court consider their particular claims, and not merely pass on the law as an abstract exercise. They produced comprehensive evidence of the law's purposes, its legislative background, its scope, its expected effects, and its potential utility. They also proved facts about themselves as municipal servants and human beings, the jobs they do, their record of performance, their fears and feelings.
Plaintiffs introduced strong evidence to support their claims that they should be relieved entirely of the burdens and intrusions created by LL 48. One could reasonably conclude from their evidence that LL 48 is a thoughtless and unwise intrusion by the City into the lives of many of its most valued employees. But the City is constitutionally free to abuse its employees and their families, so long as in doing so it is seeking to achieve a proper objective through a defensible means. Furthermore, with respect to the law's obligation that plaintiffs file the forms required by LL 48, plaintiffs lack any strong expectation of privacy, since such information is already available to the Fire and Police Departments, and the City was able to establish that disclosures of the information to City government might help deter and detect conflicts of interest and venality.
Plaintiffs did succeed, however, in establishing that on the present record the public disclosure aspect of the challenged law would interfere substantially with their privacy interests in autonomy and confidentiality. The law contains a mechanism that would enable covered employees to seek to have highly personal matters kept from public view. But that mechanism would itself be greatly destructive of privacy. Plaintiffs also proved that the public disclosure component of LL 48 serves no defensible purpose with respect to plaintiffs in this case. Public disclosure serves the useful purposes of deterring and detecting corruption, of enabling the public to perform its legislative and elective roles, and of increasing public confidence in and knowledge about government by enabling the public to evaluate all the facts relevant to public issues, including the financial facts about government policymakers. But these purposes lacked any evidentiary support or rational basis in this particular case. Plaintiffs are not elected, and they lack policymaking roles; rather, they are civil servants who achieved the lower managerial ranks of their agencies through success on competitive exams, after many years of service. The law's purpose as to these plaintiffs appears to be disclosure for disclosure's sake.
On the basis of the findings and conclusions that follow in this opinion, therefore, the City's financial disclosure law is upheld insofar as it requires disclosure to the City government of the family financial data sought from the plaintiff groups. The law is invalid, however, insofar as it mandates disclosure of all the information collected from the plaintiff groups, to any person irrespective of purpose or need.
LL 48 requires, on pain of criminal penalty,
that all covered individuals file annual financial statements with the City. The ordinance covers candidates for City office, most elected and appointed officials, and all civil service employees of the City who earn $30,000 per year or more.
LL 48 requires that these people disclose the following information:
"the name, address and type of practice of any professional organization in which the person reporting or his spouse" has any interest "from which income of one thousand dollars or more was derived during the preceding calendar year", § 1106-5.0b, subd. 1;
the source of items "received or accrued during the preceding calendar year" by the employee or his or her spouse constituting income for services rendered of $1,000 or more, § 1106-5.0b, subd. 2;
each capital gain of $1,000 or more from a single source, other than from the sale of the reporting person's residence, id.;
reimbursement for expenditures of $1,000 or more "in each instance," and honoraria or gifts from a single source aggregating $500 or more, id.;
each creditor to whom the employee or spouse owed $500 or more for 90 days or more during the preceding year, § 1106-5.0b, subd. 3;
the value and address of each investment or parcel of real property worth $20,000 or more held by the person reporting or spouse, § 1106-5.0b, subd. 4;
and each trust or other fiduciary relation in which the employee or spouse held a beneficial interest having a value of $20,000 or more, § 1106-5.0b, subd. 5.
The identity, source, and amount of each of the foregoing must be reported in detail. §§ 1106-5.0b, subd. 1-6.
The completed forms are filed with the City Clerk, who must automatically make them available to any member of the public, § 1106-5.0c, unless the employee has requested the City's Board of Ethics in writing that a specific item be withheld because public disclosure of it would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy, § 1106.5d.
No action is taken on privacy claims until a request for inspection of a particular form is filed by a member of the public. When a request for inspection is made, the law requires that the public members of the Board of Ethics rule on all privacy claims after considering three factors: whether the item is of "a highly personal nature"; whether it "in any way relates to the duties of the position held by such person"; and whether it "involves an actual or potential conflict of interest." § 1106-5d, subd. 2. The Board must render a written decision and forward it to the City Clerk. The Clerk may then make the form requested available for disclosure, except those items exempted from disclosure by a decision of the Board. § 1106-5d, subd. 4.
LL 48 is a modified version of a disclosure law passed by the City Council in 1975, Local Law 1 of 1975 ("LL 1"). The New York courts declared the public disclosure provisions of LL 1 invalid because the law did not safeguard privacy interests. Hunter v. City of New York, 58 A.D.2d 136, 396 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1st Dep't 1977), aff'd, 44 N.Y.2d 708, 376 N.E.2d 928, 405 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1978). LL 48 differs from LL 1 principally in that the Council added the "privacy mechanism" just described.
After passage of LL 48 in 1979, certain members of the New York City Fire Department and their spouses filed one of the instant actions to enjoin its application to them. Slevin v. City of New York, No. 79 Civ. 4524 (S.D.N.Y.). The plaintiff classes in Slevin include Fire Department Battalion Chiefs, Deputy Chiefs, Medical Officers, and the spouses of these three officer classes. The officers involved are all uniformed city employees, occupying competitive civil service positions, who are required to file financial disclosure reports because they earn over $30,000 annually. This Court preliminarily enjoined application of LL 48 to these plaintiffs on September 6, 1979. Slevin v. City of New York, 477 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Just prior to issuance of that preliminary injunction, certain members of the New York City Police Department and their spouses filed the companion action, Barry v. City of New York, No. 79 Civ. 4627 (S.D.N.Y.), challenging LL 48 as applied to them. The Barry plaintiffs also represent four groups: Captains, Lieutenants, Police Surgeons, and their spouses. All the officers represented are uniformed city employees, occupying competitive civil service positions, who earn in excess of $30,000 annually. On September 10, 1979, the preliminary injunction issued in Slevin was expanded to include the Barry plaintiffs. The matters were consolidated, and tried on the merits, after which the parties briefed the issues prior to submitting the case for judgment.
Defendants urge the outright rejection of plaintiffs' claims, because the Supreme Court has dismissed for lack of a substantial federal question three appeals from decisions by state supreme courts upholding financial disclosure laws. Montgomery County v. Walsh, 274 Md. 502, 336 A.2d 97 (1975), app. dismissed, 424 U.S. 901, 96 S. Ct. 1091, 47 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1976); Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash. 2d 275, 517 P.2d 911 (en banc), app. dismissed, 417 U.S. 902, 94 S. Ct. 2596, 41 L. Ed. 2d 208 (1974); Stein v. Howlett, 52 Ill.2d 570, 289 N.E.2d 409 (1972), app. dismissed, 412 U.S. 925, 93 S. Ct. 2750, 37 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1973). These dismissals are dispositions on the merits, binding on "the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions." Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176, 53 L. Ed. 2d 199, 97 S. Ct. 2238 (1977) (per curiam); see Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344, 45 L. Ed. 2d 223, 95 S. Ct. 2281 (1975); Port Authority Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Port of New York Authority, 387 F.2d 259, 262 n.3 (2d Cir. 1967). They do indeed foreclose several of plaintiffs' claims, especially in conjunction with other Supreme Court decisions. But they cannot fairly be said to preclude all of plaintiffs' challenges. Here, as in Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1125 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129, 59 L. Ed. 2d 90, 99 S. Ct. 1047 (1979), the statute at issue differs from each of the statutes upheld in those cases, and the nature of the challenge made in this case differs in important respects from the challenges to those statutes.
All three dismissals involved facial challenges to the disclosure laws at issue; here, plaintiffs challenge LL 48 as it applies to them. Furthermore, none of the dismissed cases focused on the constitutionality of requiring public disclosure by employees with little or no policymaking authority. In Fritz v. Gorton, supra, only disclosure by elected officials, candidates for elective office, and lobbyists was at issue. The ordinance challenged in Montgomery County v. Walsh, supra, unlike LL 48, provided for disclosure by employees only "where it is determined by designated authority that it is 'desirable to promote the trust and confidence of the citizens of the County,'" and exempted from the filing requirements persons whose job responsibilities posed little likelihood of conflict of interest or corruption. 336 A.2d at 102. The Illinois Supreme Court's opinion in Stein v. Howlett, supra, was based entirely upon state law, and, as in Fritz and Montgomery County, the appeal to the United States Supreme Court was dismissed in 1973, before the Supreme Court's decisions in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 51 L. Ed. 2d 64, 97 S. Ct. 869 (1977) and Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 53 L. Ed. 2d 867, 97 S. Ct. 2777 (1977), which both recognized a constitutional "interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 599.
The plaintiff classes in this case have demonstrated that public disclosure of their finances will substantially and adversely affect recognized privacy interests, while serving no substantial public purpose. The Supreme Court has not considered the public disclosure aspects of disclosure laws on a full evidentiary record, revealing both the effects of and need for disclosure to the government and to the public of private information obtained from particular groups of employees. Consequently, although the dismissals for lack of a substantial federal question may "caution . . . against finding [LL 48] unconstitutional", Plante v. Gonzalez, supra, 575 F.2d at 1126, this Court must "undertake an independent examination of the merits," Mandel v. Bradley, supra, 432 U.S. at 177.
Plaintiffs argue that LL 48 infringes their fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, their fifth amendment right against compelled self-incrimination, their first amendment rights of free speech and association, and their fourteenth (or ninth) amendment right to privacy, that is, their right not to be deprived of the liberty interest in privacy without due process of law. Only the privacy claim has merit, and only to the extent delineated below.
The fourth amendment guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. . . ." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "The evil the amendment was designed to prevent was broader than the abuse of a general warrant," Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980), though the amendment has not been "translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy,'" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967). The fourth amendment seems applicable to governmental acquisition of information whatever means are chosen, see generally California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 59-63, 39 L. Ed. 2d 812, 94 S. Ct. 1494 (1974) (discussing relevance of fourth amendment to reporting income as required by federal tax statutes); certainly it applies "to the orderly taking under compulsion of process," United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651, 94 L. Ed. 401, 70 S. Ct. 357 (1950). "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, . . . and whenever an individual may harbor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy,' . . . he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968) (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs have not argued that the fourth amendment limits the uses to which information legitimately "seized" may be put. Therefore, plaintiffs do not contend that the amendment is directly relevant to the provisions permitting public access to the forms. See Slevin Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum at 72-74. Insofar as the City has required filing, however, plaintiffs argument fails because they lack the requisite expectation of privacy. See Whalen v. Roe, supra, 429 U.S. at 602. An employee in the upper echelons of the Fire or Police Department, or his or her spouse, cannot reasonably expect to keep his financial dealings and holdings, or his address, or any other information required by LL 48, secret from his employer. Plaintiffs established at trial that all of the information sought by LL 48 is available to the Fire and Police Departments through confidential, in-house inquiries. Transcript of Trial (Nov. 6, 7, 12, 13, 1980) at 524-25 [hereinafter "T."]; Transcript of Trial (Dec. 3, 1980) at 60-68 [hereinafter "T.D."].
If plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the filing regulations would nevertheless satisfy the fourth amendment. In this context the amendment demands only reasonableness, i.e., that the information sought be "particularly described" and relevant to an inquiry the investigating agency is authorized to make, and that the legislative judgment have a reasonable basis. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, supra, 416 U.S. at 62-63; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208-09, 90 L. Ed. 614, 66 S. Ct. 494 (1946); O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914, 97 S. Ct. 2173, 53 L. Ed. 2d 223 (1977). The uniform application of the filing regulations leaves no room for discretionary abuse by enforcement officers and therefore requires no warrant to curb narrowly focused intrusions into the privacy rights of those regulated. See Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 387 U.S. at 530-32; See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943, 87 S. Ct. 1737 (1967); cf. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 464 n.26, 53 L. Ed. 2d 867, 97 S. Ct. 2777 (1977). The information sought by the forms is uniform, described in detail, and relevant in general to the proper governmental objectives of investigating and deterring conflicts of interest. While the scope of inquiry mandated by LL 48 is broad, it cannot be equated with a general warrant, since each type of information sought has logical relevance to valid government objectives.
Plaintiffs also assert that LL 48 "implicates the Fifth Amendment protection against compelled testimony that may be self-incriminating." Slevin Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum at 74-75. Methods employed by the state in requiring disclosures must be "consistent with the limitations created by the privilege." Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 44, 19 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 697 (1968). LL 48 affixes a criminal penalty to failure to respond to the questionnaire, so it exerts real compulsion upon covered employees. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562, 35 L. Ed. 1110, 12 S. Ct. 195 (1892). Further, LL 48 elicits "testimony" rather than requiring production of pre-made financial records. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408, 48 L. Ed. 2d 39, 96 S. Ct. 1569 (1976). Where the information an individual is asked to provide is "testimony which might tend to show that [he] had committed a crime," Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra, 142 U.S. at 562; see Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 38 L. Ed. 2d 274, 94 S. Ct. 316 (1973), the filer is entitled to assert his or her privilege against self-incrimination.
But the fact that the privilege might be available to individuals within the plaintiff classes does not invalidate the law. Like the fourth amendment, the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment is not "a general protector of privacy. . . . The Fifth Amendment protects against 'compelled self-incrimination, not [the disclosure of] private information.'" Fisher v. United States, supra, 425 U.S. at 401 (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233, 45 L. Ed. 2d 141, 95 S. Ct. 2160 n.7 (1975)). Thus, the privilege does not justify refusal to file an income tax return simply because certain disclosures might tend to incriminate. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 71 L. Ed. 1037, 47 S. Ct. 607 (1927). This is not a case like Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 19 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 697 (1968), or Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 19 L. Ed. 2d 906, 88 S. Ct. 709 (1968), where the compulsory disclosure applied only to a group "the great majority of whom [are] likely to incriminate themselves by responding." Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 660, 47 L. Ed. 2d 370, 96 S. Ct. 1178 (1976). Plaintiffs exerted much effort at trial successfully establishing that only a small proportion of class members are engaged in criminal activity. True, the disclosure forms at issue are not directed to the public at large; but, as with tax returns, "the great majority of persons" filing these forms will "not incriminate themselves" by filing. Garner v. United States, supra, 424 U.S. at 661.
Nor does LL 48 improperly coerce plaintiffs to waive the privilege. As with income tax statutes, if the form calls for answers that a particular filer is privileged from making he can raise the objection on the form. United States v. Sullivan, supra, 274 U.S. at 263. A conviction under LL 48 for failure to respond "cannot be based on a valid exercise of the privilege." Garner v. United States, supra, 424 U.S. at 662. "As long as a valid and timely claim of privilege is available as a defense" for failure to file, the fifth amendment is not violated. Id. at 665. Moreover, plaintiffs could not be discharged from their jobs solely because they claimed the privilege on the form, because the form does not contain "questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of [their] official duties. . . ." Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 278, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1082, 88 S. Ct. 1913 (1968) (footnote omitted). Neither the statute nor the questionnaire makes the prohibited suggestion that a failure to waive the privilege will result in dismissal. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497-98, 17 L. Ed. 2d 562, 87 S. Ct. 616 (1967). Finally, the questionnaire's failure to inform filers of the availability of the privilege is not a constitutional violation, since the ordinance is not part of a focused investigation. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964).
Plaintiffs have failed to establish that LL 48 will significantly inhibit the exercise of their first amendment rights of speech and association. LL 48 was not adopted for the purpose of requiring disclosure of organizational membership. Statutes that require such disclosures have been held to violate the first amendment where they were found to have been intended to restrain the freedom of association. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 6 L. Ed. 2d 301, 81 S. Ct. 1333 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231, 81 S. Ct. 247 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson 357 U.S. 449, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488, 78 S. Ct. 1163 (1958). Here, as Judge Wisdom noted in Plante v. Gonzalez, supra, 575 F.2d at 1132, "memberships, associations, and beliefs are revealed, if at all, only tangentially." The law requires disclosure of certain assets, income, debts, gifts, and reimbursements, and therefore neither focuses on some political or religious financial relationships as opposed to others, nor discriminates among those political or religious affiliations that might be revealed. Moreover, the filing requirements do not seek "to expose" first amendment activities "for the sake of exposure," Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1273, 77 S. Ct. ...