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FRIEDMAN v. NATIONAL PRESTO INDUS.

June 28, 1983

SAUNDRA FRIEDMAN and SIDNEY FRIEDMAN, Plaintiffs,
v.
NATIONAL PRESTO INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant



The opinion of the court was delivered by: NICKERSON

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

 NICKERSON, District Judge

 The court has diversity jurisdiction over this products liability case brought by plaintiff Saundra Friedman and her husband. She says she was injured on May 20, 1978 when the cover of a pressure cooker manufactured by defendant blew off. The amended complaint proceeds on theories of negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability for defective design, and failure to warn.

 Defendant has moved for orders (1) excluding a certain pressure cooker and its accompanying booklet from evidence at the trial, and (2) "excluding the legal issues of warning" with respect to plaintiff's theories of negligence and strict liability. The booklet is no longer in issue. Plaintiffs do not propose to offer it.

 Defendant contends that the pressure cooker said to have caused plaintiffs the injuries was manufactured in 1970, while the one being offered by plaintiffs was made by defendant in 1979. This later model, unlike the earlier one, has a device that locks the cover of the cooker while there is pressure in it. Defendant objects to its introduction, citing Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 407.

 Rule 403 provides, in pertinent part, that "although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury." According to the notes of the Advisory Committee, the nine rules that follow this rule including Rule 407, are "concrete applications" of Rule 403, evolved for particular situations and reflecting the policies underlying that rule.

 Rule 407 in its first sentence makes inadmissible evidence of subsequent remedial measures "to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection" with the event in issue. The rule's second sentence does not require the exclusion of such evidence "when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment."

 The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 407 state that, while it is "possible" to infer an "admission" of previous negligence or culpable conduct from the taking of remedial measures, the inference is not strong because such conduct "is equally consistent with injury by mere accident or through contributory negligence." Indeed, the Advisory Committee rejected "the notion that 'because the world gets wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish before,'" as Baron Bramwell put it. It seems clear, however, that the strength of the inference will vary with the circumstances of the case. The other ground for exclusion, described by the committee as "more impressive," rests on the social policy of encouraging, or at least not discouraging, the taking of steps in furtherance of added safety.

 As noted, Rule 407 does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when "offered" for a purpose other than "to prove negligence or culpable conduct," for example, when offered, as plaintiffs do here, to prove the "feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted." Plaintiffs say the 1979 model is admissible to show an alternative design that defendant could have adopted in 1970.

 To some extent Rule 407 may be ambiguous. To offer evidence of subsequent remedial measures to show feasibility may well be to offer evidence to "prove" at least one element of a negligence claim. For example, evidence of the feasibility of precautionary measures may be, and often is, pertinent to the question of whether a risk is reasonable.

 To the extent that a defendant's fault, his "culpability," plays a part in the determination of liability in a strict products liability claim, a similar ambiguity exists. Under New York law the plaintiff in a design defect strict products liability case must still prove the culpability of the defendant.

 A claim in strict products liability lies "where a manufacturer places on the market a product which has a defect that causes injury." Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division, 49 N.Y.2d 471, 478, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720, 403 N.E.2d 440, 443 (1980). One species of defect is an improper design, that is, a design that "presents an unreasonable risk of harm . . . . The ultimate question in determining whether an article is defectively designed involves a balancing of the likelihood of harm against the burden of taking precaution against that harm . . . ." Id., 49 N.Y.2d at 479, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 720, 403 N.E.2d at 443. Of course, the burden of taking precautions depends in part on the feasibility of safer designs at the time the product was marketed. See, e.g., Opera v. Hyva, Inc., 86 A.D.2d 373, 377, 450 N.Y.S.2d 615, 618 (4th Dep't 1982). Feasibility of alternatives in turn depends on the existence of safer designs that are within technological reach and could be substituted without adding expense or subtracting utility to an extent that would outweigh the gains in safety. See, e.g., Rainbow v. Albert Elia Bldg. Co., Inc., 79 A.D.2d 287, 291 n.2, 436 N.Y.S.2d 480, 483 n.2 (4th Dep't 1981).

 New York law thus still holds that design defect liability is predicated on a finding that the manufacturer knew or should have known of the dangers at the time of marketing. Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 386-87, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121-22, 348 N.E.2d 571 (1976); Opera v. Hyva, Inc., supra. Since the question of unreasonable danger is essentially one of negligence, evidence of subsequent measures may be relevant to whether defendant has engaged in "culpable conduct."

 Dicta in some cases suggest that New York may be reaching a "true" strict liability for design defects, so that the only question is whether in fact the utility of the design choice outweighs its danger. See Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Division, 49 N.Y.2d 471, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 403 N.E.2d 440 (1980) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A); Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 124 & n.6, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 256 & n.6, 417 N.E.2d 545, 550 & n.6 (1981). If that becomes New York law, the first sentence of Rule 407 would not apply to evidence of subsequent measures ...


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