The opinion of the court was delivered by: DUFFY
Plaintiff, Mathial Bonhomme, brings this employment discrimination suit pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., against defendants, Ozone Industries, Inc. ("Ozone"), a subsidiary of Joy Manufacturing Co., Gilbert Austein, and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, District No. 15 ("District 15"), alleging that defendants discriminated against plaintiff because of his race and national origin by laying him off and subsequently refusing to rehire him. A two-day nonjury trial was held on November 19-20, 1984. The following shall constitute my findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Defendant Ozone is a Delaware corporation which designs and manufactures aerospace hydraulics and which is licensed to do business in New York State. Plaintiff is a black legal resident of the United States who is of Haitian ancestry and who resides in Brooklyn, New York. Plaintiff worked for Ozone, primarily as a porter, from September 18, 1974 until April 4, 1977, at which time he was laid-off pursuant to a general reduction in Ozone's work force. At all material times, plaintiff's union was District 15.
Defendant Austein, the Industrial Relations Manager of Ozone at the time plaintiff was released, testified that, as part of the reduction, twenty hourly employees had to be laid-off. Of these twenty employees, sixteen were white, two were black, and two were Spanish. As a result of these lay-offs, and the exercise of bumping rights, the number of porters was reduced from five (four blacks and one white) to four (all blacks).
In the afternoon of April 4, 1977, the day plaintiff's lay-off was to become effective, a wrist watch was taken from Al Sisto, an employee of Ozone. Mr. Sisto immediately reported to Mr. Austein that his watch was missing. Although he did not see anyone take the watch, Mr. Sisto stated that when he left his work bench, where the watch was last seen, the only people in the area were plaintiff and Guy DiManche, also a black porter of Haitian ancestry who was being laid-off as of that day.
At the trial, Mr. Austein testified that, upon hearing of the possible theft, he tried unsuccessfully to contact both Mr. DiManche and plaintiff. The next morning, on April 5, 1977, Mr. Austein again attempted to contact the two but was unable to speak to either. That afternoon, however, Mr. DiManche returned Mr. Austein's call and indicated that he had the watch and would return it the next day. On April 6, 1977, when Mr. DiManche returned the watch, he explained "that his friend Mr. Bonhomme 'found' the watch upon arriving home and gave it to him (DiManche)." Defendant's Exh. C. (Written Agreement dated April 6, 1977, signed by Gilbert Austein and Paul Panza, the Chief Shop Steward of District 15).
Convinced that both men had stolen the watch, Mr. Austein made an initial determination "to change the lay-off of both DiManche and Bonhomme to a discharge for cause." Id. However, after discussing the matter with Mr. Panza and realizing that such a change would result in a loss of unemployment benefits for each man, Mr. Austein agreed with Mr. Panza that the lay-off would remain effective. "However, [Mr. Austein and Mr. Panza] further agreed that in the event of a recall that would enable Mr. DiManche or Mr. Bonhomme to a recall opportunity, such recall would be waived." Id. As a result of this agreement, neither Mr. Bonhomme nor Mr. DiManche was recalled by Ozone even though their positions were eventually refilled as a result of recalls. The individuals who were recalled instead of Mr. Bonhomme and Mr. DiManche were both white.
It should be noted at the outset that plaintiff's counsel conceded at trial that, with regard to the initial lay-off, there was no discrimination. Rather, plaintiff only claims that he was subsequently not recalled because of his race and national origin. Defendants deny that the refusal to recall plaintiff was in any way discriminatorily based, arguing that the decision resulted solely from the belief that plaintiff had stolen a fellow employee's watch.
The allocation of plaintiff's and defendants' burdens in a Title VII discrimination action, as set forth in the seminal opinion in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973), was restated by the Supreme Court in its more recent decision in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981). The Court stated:
First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant 'to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.' Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination . . . [Note, however, that the] ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.
Id. (citations omitted). In McDonnell Douglas, the Court stated that the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination may be satisfied by showing:
(i) that [plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, and the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Although McDonnell Douglas involved a claim of discriminatory failure to hire and the instant action is for discriminatory failure to recall, the above criteria, with slight modification, is still applicable.