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January 16, 1986


The opinion of the court was delivered by: SWEET

Plaintiffs Harold L. Drimmer ("Drimmer") and Mount Hope Mines, Inc. ("MMH") bring this motion to compel defendant Donald L. Appleton ("Appleton") to appear for deposition and to answer certain questions pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. *fn1" Appleton opposes this application for an order to compel him to answer these questions on the ground that they impinge on the attorney-client privilege, as they involve his conversations with counsel regarding settlement negotiations in a related Nevada State Court action. Because Appleton has waived his right to invoke the attorney-client privilege with regard to these discussions, Drimmer's motion to compel is granted.


 In May, 1979, Appleton instituted an action in the Seventh Judicial District Court for the State of Nevada. In the trial of that action, which commenced on October 25, 1982 and lasted for five days, Appleton sought to enforce a purported oral contract granting him an interest in MHM. On October 30, 1982, during the jury deliberations, the parties entered into an oral agreement settling all claims raised in the Nevada action. The agreement was negotiated by Peter D. Laxalt ("Laxalt") and Robert H. Perry ("Perry"), Appleton's attorneys, and by Drimmer and his attorneys Roger W. Jeppson and Williams Peterson. Appleton was not present, but had participated in earlier discussions with Drimmer on the subject of a settlement agreement.

 Later the same day, the jury returned a verdict in Appleton's favor, granting him 16 2/3% interest in the profits of MHM. According to Drimmer, Appleton then attempted to repudiate the settlement agreement, Laxalt removing his name from the original of the settlement agreement and refusing to give Drimmer's attorney a copy of the agreement. According to Appleton, the final settlement agreement did not comport with the tentative understanding which he had reached with Drimmer in prior discussions. Drimmer seeks to enforce this settlement agreement in the present action.

 Judgment was entered in Nevada in Appleton's favor based on the jury verdict, and Drimmer brought a motion for, among other things, summary enforcement of the settlement agreement or in the alternate for a new trial. At the November 30, 1982 hearing on the motion, Drimmer called Perry, Appleton's attorney, to testify about the events surrounding the settlement agreement. The transcript of this hearing reveals that Perry testified about the following details of the settlement agreement negotiations:

 (1) The circumstances surrounding the settlement meetings between opposing counsel. (2) Perry's conclusions about the legal validity of the settlement agreement. (3) Perry's discussions with Appleton about the provisions of the settlement. (4) The circumstances of Laxalt's repudiation of the settlement agreement and the renegotiation attempts.

 On May 23, 1983 Drimmer's motion for a new trial was granted.

 Drimmer of the New York proceeding, and on July 10, 1984, all proceedings were stayed until the resolution of the Nevada action or until June 30, 1985, whichever came earlier, except those relating to the first three causes of action which were not at issue in the Nevada action. Because of subsequent appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court and the disqualification of the original trial judge, the Nevada action is set for trial on March 10, 1986.

 During his disposition in this action, Appleton invoked the attorney-client privilege, a privilege that was waived, according to Drimmer, by Perry and Laxalt's prior testimony detailing the Nevada discussions, and refused to answer any questions which pertained to his conversations with Laxalt and Perry.


 Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that in civil actions in which state law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness should be determined in accordance with state law. As this claim was removed from the state to federal court on diversity grounds, the state law of privilege applies. See Dixon v. 80 Pine Street Corp., 516 F.2d 1278, 1280 (2d Cir. 1975). New York conflict rules thus determine which body of privilege law is to be applied to this action. Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487, 85 L. Ed. 1477, 61 S. Ct. 1020 (1941) (In diversity cases the substantive law of the state applies, including the state conflict of laws principles). In the case at hand, New York privilege rules govern this question of attorney-client privilege, as generally the New York courts apply the law of the place where the evidence in question will be introduced at trial, or the location of the discovery proceeding itself. Cepeda v. Cohane, 233 F. Supp. 465, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), 5 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York Civil Practice P 4503.03 (1978). See also Resorts International, Inc. v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., No. M8-85 (July 28, 1980 S.D.N.Y.) and cases cited therein. The presence of both of these factors in the case at bar makes it appropriate to determine the validity of this asserted privilege under New York law. This is the apparent conclusion of the parties, as they have briefed primarily New York State law of privilege.

 The transcript of Perry's testimony of the Nevada proceeding reveals that much of his in court discussion about the settlement agreement concerned matters within the scope of the attorney-client privilege. Judge Wyzanski's classic statement of the scope of the privilege, a codification universally adopted by the courts of this Circuit, provides:

 The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.

 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D.Mass. 1950). According to Appleton, Perry's testimony in Nevada concerned only the non-confidential underlying facts of the settlement agreement negotiations and not the communication between client and attorney which is covered by the privilege. However, the transcript of Perry's testimony demonstrates that Perry discussed his and Laxalt's ...

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