The opinion of the court was delivered by: SWEET
The Trustees of the UIU Health and Welfare Fund and UIU Pension Trust (the "Union Funds") have brought this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132, 1145 to collect allegedly delinquent contributions owed by the defendants New York Flame Proofing Co., Inc. ("Flame Proofing"), General Drapery Services, Inc. ("General Drapery"), Joseph I. Belmont ("Belmont") and Upholstery Employers Association, Inc. (the "Association") pursuant to a series of collective bargaining agreements between the defendants and the Upholsters' International Union of North America. Belmont and the Association have brought motions to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them. In response, the Union Funds have cross-moved for partial summary judgment against Flame Proofing. For the following reasons, the motions of Belmont and the Union Funds are granted, and the motion of the Association is denied.
As alleged in the Union Funds' complaint, there has existed a collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the defendants Flame Proofing, General Drapery and Belmont from 1978 to the present. The first collective bargaining agreement was signed on behalf of Flame Proofing as of September 1, 1978 to be effective for a period of three years. A second similar agreement was signed as of September 1, 1981 and continued in force until August 30, 1984. Flame Proofing does not contest the validity of these agreements. The most recent collective bargaining agreement, however, was executed by the Association and became effective as of September 1, 1984. The Union Funds allege that this last agreement was executed by the Association on behalf of Flame Proofing and General Drapery, but these defendants deny being a party to this agreement.
Pursuant to each of the collective bargaining agreements, the employer is obligated to make contributions to the Union Funds. Under the 1978 agreement, the employer was obligated to pay each month 5% of the "total gross monthly earnings" of the employees to the UIU Health and Welfare Fund, together with a flat fee of $22.50 per month. In addition, the employer was required to pay an amount equal to 5% of the employees' earnings to the UIU Pension Trust. This latter contribution was increased to 6% as of September 1, 1980. The 1981 agreement also provided for these same contributions to the Union Funds with a small increase in the flat fee payable to the UIU Health and Welfare Fund. Finally, the 1984 agreement provides only for a flat monthly fee of $173.50 (increased to $204.50 as of September 1, 1985) for each employee payable to the UIU Health and Welfare Fund and a continuation of the 6% contribution to the UIU Pension Trust.
Together with the required fees, the employer was obligated to submit a monthly contribution report to the Union Funds. The complaint alleges that during the years of 1980 through 1983 the defendants submitted contribution reports which understated the amounts of the total gross monthly earnings of the employees and therefore reduced the contributions required under the agreements. The audit allegedly compared the contribution reports to wage forms filed by the employees. It further alleges that between June 1984 and the present, the defendants have failed to make any payments to the Union Funds.
Although the 1978 and 1981 agreements were executed only by Flame Proofing, the agreements apparently cover employees of both Flame Proofing and General Drapery. According to the deposition testimony of Belmont, there are three corporations which do business on the same premises at 635 West 23 Street in New York City: Flame Proofing, General Drapery and Sol-R-Veil, Inc. Belmont is the sole shareholder and sole corporate officer of each of these corporations. According to his testimony, the same machines are used in the business of these three corporations and the work is done by the same group of employees. Thus, employees who engage in work for General Drapery or Sol-R-Veil are paid by Flame Proofing. Belmont stated that he understood that the agreements covered a "good majority" of the workers employed by Flame Proofing and General Drapery.
A. Union Funds' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
The Union Funds seek partial summary judgment for alleged deficiencies in contributions from Flame Proofing from 1980 through August, 1984. These alleged deficiencies can be separated into two components: the partial deficiencies from 1980 through 1983 and the absence of any payments from June through August, 1984. Since the validity of the agreements covering these contributions is not in dispute, the only issue raised by this motion is whether there is a factual dispute regarding the amount of contributions required under the agreements.
In support of the Union Funds' motion for summary judgment to recover the partial deficiencies, counsel for the Union Funds has filed an affidavit asserting that an audit was conducted which compared the wage forms ("W-2 forms") of the bargaining unit employees to the contribution forms prepared by Flame Proofing setting forth the monthly wages of each employee. A copy of the detailed audit was furnished to the defendants setting forth, for each year, the name and social security number for each bargaining unit employee and a comparison between the earnings reported by Flame Proofing and those reported on the W-2 forms.
Flame Proofing has asserted the existence of several factual issues regarding the computation of earnings for each employee. Flame Proofing contends that the audit examination of W-2 forms overstates the earnings governed by the agreements in several ways. First, Flame Proofing suggests that some of the employees were not members of the union during the entire year. For these employees who joined the union after working as a non union employee, the W-2 forms would overstate the amount of money earned pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. This contention, however, fails to raise a material issue because the two employees, Lorenzo and Brenes, who apparently joined the union during the middle of 1982, were not included in the audit for that year and therefore Flame Proofing's assertions are irrelevant.
In addition, Flame Proofing has noted that certain bonuses were paid to union employees in 1983 and asserts that these bonuses, although reportable on the W-2 forms, were not required by the agreements and therefore not includable as earnings under the provisions requiring contributions to the Union Funds. Similarly, it contends that wage payments for sick days and vacation days are not includable for the purpose of contributions.
The governing provision of Article 12 of the agreement states that contributions to the Union Funds are to be based on a percentage of the total gross monthly earnings of the employees." Although this term is not specifically defined elsewhere in the agreement, its plain meaning indicates that the employer is obligated to make contributions based on all wages paid to employees in connection with their employment during the previous month. In accordance with this interpretation, Flame Proofing's contributions must be calculated by including all wages stated on the W-2 forms including bonuses, sick pay and vacation. There is no indication from the agreement that these specific types of payment should be excluded nor does the agreement limit contributions to a percentage of the hourly wages earned.
Where a contractual term is clear from the face of the agreement, the interpretation of that term is a matter of law which is appropriate to determine on a motion for summary judgment. See e.g., Leslie Fay, Inc. v. Rich, 478 F. Supp. 1109, 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Flame Proofing, as the employer with records of the total wage payments made, could have raised any objections to the detailed calculations set forth in the audit statements filed by the Union Funds. Flame Proofing having failed to raise any objections, this portion of the Union Funds' motion for summary judgment is granted in the amount ...