Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Daley v. Koch

decided: December 20, 1989.

TIMOTHY J. DALEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
EDWARD I. KOCH, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, BENJAMIN WARD, POLICE COMMISSIONER, CITY OF NEW YORK, JUDITH LEVITT, PERSONNEL DIRECTOR, CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK CITY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES



Appeal from so much of a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Knapp, J.) as dismissed appellant's claim under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701-796i as well as pendent state law claims. The judgment is affirmed.

Miner and Mahoney, Circuit Judges, and Carman, Judge.*fn*

Author: Carman

Carman, Judge:

Appellant, an unsuccessful candidate for appointment to the New York City Police Department (hereinafter Police Department) appeals from so much of a summary judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Knapp, J.) as dismissed him claim under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701-796i as well as pendent state claims.

BACKGROUND

Appellant passed the December 1984 New York City Civil Service Examination and his name was certified to the Police Department on a list of candidates deemed eligible for appointment. On February 20, 1986 appellant reported to the Psychological Services Division of the Police Department to complete the written segment of his psychological profile, which included the California Psychological Inventory, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory and a Police Candidate Questionnaire. Appellant answered affirmatively to Question Number 65 of the Police Candidate Questionnaire, indicating he had held more than three jobs in the past two years.

On March 30, 1986 appellant returned to the Psychological Services Division for a screening interview with Dr. Ernest Adams. Appellant told Dr. Adams that he had never been referred to or sought help from a psychologist, psychiatrist or social worker. Appellant also informed the doctor that, since 1983, he had held four different jobs and had four periods of unemployment. Appellant said he worked from January to April 1983 as a valet, but left because there was no room for advancement. He said he worked in a jewelry business from July of 1984 to January of 1985, but was fired on the ground of being unproductive after an unexplained absence of three days. Appellant recounted that he worked from March to July of 1985 at a store that sold police equipment, including firearms, but left because he objected to the policy of prohibiting sales-people from entering the storage area where the guns were kept. Dr. Adams noted that appellant said he resented this rule because he felt it was an obstacle to doing his job properly and that appellant objected to the rule because he considered himself to be an honest person. Appellant did not work again until November of 1985 when he was employed on a part-time basis as an independent consultant to a business called the Guardian Group. Appellant also told Dr. Adams that he had enlisted in the United States Marine Corps in June of 1982 and was part of a Marines reserve unit.

On the basis of appellant's test results and interview, Dr. Adams concluded that appellant showed "poor judgment, irresponsible behavior and poor impulse control" which rendered plaintiff "unsuitable to be a police officer." Plaintiff was not diagnosed as having any particular psychological disease or disorder.

In a subsequent review of appellant's file and Dr. Adams' report, the Coordinator of the Psychological Services Testing Program agreed with the doctor that appellant had "significant personality traits" that would prevent him from effectively functioning as a police officer. An independent psychiatric consultant also reviewed appellant's file and sustained the finding that appellant was unsuited for police work.

After appellant learned of his disqualification in October of 1986, he appealed to the New York City Civil Service Commission. In support of his appeal, he submitted a report dated December 12, 1986 compiled by Dr. A. J. Quatrano, a psychologist. The report stated that appellant was then employed as an assistant safety inspector at a trucking company, was attending John Jay College, had continued in the Marine Corps Reserves and had no record of undergoing psychological treatment. After interviewing appellant and reviewing his test results, Dr. Quatrano concluded that appellant demonstrated no "undue anxiety, thought disorder or underlying psychosis." The appeal was denied by the Civil Service Commission in January of 1988.

Appellant then brought an action in the Southern District of New York asserting federal claims under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as pendent state claims under New York Executive Law § 296, Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8-101, New York Military Law §§ 242, 243 and the New York Civil Service Law. Appellees moved for summary judgment and appellant cross-moved for summary judgment. Appellees were granted summary judgment on the Rehabilitation Act claim, the Civil Rights Act claim was dismissed for failure to state a claim and the state law claims were dismissed since there was no longer a basis for pendent jurisdiction once the federal claims had been rejected. Appellant has chosen to pursue only his claim under the Rehabilitation Act in this appeal, although he has requested this Court to exercise its discretion to reinstate the pendent state claims should the Court find in his favor.

Discussion

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits a state program receiving federal funding from discriminating against a handicapped person solely by reason of that person's handicap.*fn1 School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 275, 94 L. Ed. 2d 307, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987). In order to succeed in his claim, appellant must come under the definition of an "individual with handicaps" as outlined in the Rehabilitation Act. A handicapped person is defined as one who:

(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.