The opinion of the court was delivered by: Edelstein, District Judge:
Defendants Richard Skowronski and Lawrence Taylor move this
Court (1) to suppress wiretap evidence, (2) for a bill of
particulars (3) for additional discovery, (4) to facially
challenge the indictment, (5) that venue is improper, and (6)
for severance. Defendant's motions are denied in all respects.
Defendants argue that the wiretapped conversations obtained
during the first period of interception should be suppressed
since the Government seeks to use those conversations as
evidence that the defendants committed a crime other than those
specified in the first wiretap order. Further, defendants argue
that since the Government has not sought authority to use these
conversations in this trial pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5),
the wiretap authorization statute, it may not use them at all.
Both of these arguments are without merit.
In this circuit, intercepted conversations relating to an
offense not specifically designated in the wiretap order may
still be introduced as evidence relating to that offense under
18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) when the judicial officer authorizes the
continuation of interception after being "made aware of
`material facts constituting or clearly relating to [the] other
offenses' in the application for the continuance." United
States v. Ardito, 782 F.2d 358, 362 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting
United States v. Masciarelli, 558 F.2d 1064, 1068 (2d Cir.
In this situation, this standard was clearly met. The initial
30-day wiretap authorization in this case was made by Judge
Weinstein in the Eastern District, on November 6, 1989. The
initial affidavits submitted to Judge Weinstein indicated that
"[t]he organization's activities also involve the commission of
armed robberies and burglaries by the core members." The
progress reports supplied to Judge Weinstein set forth the
conversations relating to the instant infraction. The December
7, 1989 re-application added the instant offense, 18 U.S.C. § 1951,
as an authorized offense. As a result, the judicial
officer was "made aware of the `material facts constituting or
clearly relating to'" the instant violation in the
Accordingly, defendants' motion to suppress these
conversations is denied.
Defendants move for an order that the Government produce a
bill of particulars. The defendants have failed to establish
that the Indictment did not "set forth the essential elements
and facts needed to inform [him] of the charges."
States v. Panza, 750 F.2d 1141, 1148 (2d Cir. 1984). The
important question is whether the information sought is
necessary, not whether it is helpful. United States v.
Guerrerio, 670 F. Supp. 1215, 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); United
States v. Payden, 613 F. Supp. 800, 816-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The
Government will not be compelled through a bill of particulars
to disclose the manner in which it will prove the charges or
preview its evidence or legal theory. United States v. Torres,
901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Bortnovsky,
820 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1987). Thus, an application for a
bill of particulars seeking in effect to obtain evidence must
This Indictment adequately informs the defendants of the
charges against them, and comports with the specificity
requirements of Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and applicable law.
Further, in this case, the Government has supplied defense
counsel with a list of the intercepted telephone calls the
Government is likely to introduce at trial. The Government has
provided copies of the wiretap applications, tape cassettes of
intercepted phone calls, and log sheets. This material is
sufficient for the defendants to glean the essential elements
needed to be informed of the charges against them.
III. Additional Discovery
The record indicates that the Government provided defense
counsel with detailed discovery after the defendants' motions
were filed. Defendants may expect that the Government will