the government for the first time included as "complaints"
allegations of discourtesy or less serious conduct. Adjusted
to account for this change in recording, the statistics
suggest, if anything, that there has been a significant
reduction in the number of complaints filed over the last 12
years. In addition, counsel offers no evidence as to which of
the complaints filed had merit. The court thus has no basis to
infer an improper policy.
Furthermore, the statistics from the Fire Arm Review Board
that list the number of people killed per year from 1977-1987
by officers and from the Medgar Evers Center that lists the
number of minorities killed by officers are not sufficient to
make a prima facie case. Without the facts of the individual
cases and evidence as to how the City responded to each
incident, there is an insufficient basis to draw the inference
Plaintiff has not submitted sufficient admissible evidence
to establish a municipal policy condoning the use of police
brutality. The § 1983 claim against the City is dismissed.
ii) Pendent Claims
Because the City and the plaintiff are not of diverse
citizenship, the court must determine whether there is
"pendent-party jurisdiction, that is, jurisdiction over parties
not named in any claim that is independently cognizable by the
federal court." Finley v. U.S., ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2003,
2006, 104 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989) (emphasis in original).
In Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 49 L.Ed.2d
276 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a municipality could
not be sued as a pendent party to an action brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To permit suit would be inconsistent with
Congress' intent to exclude a municipality from liability under
the statute. Two years later, after the Supreme Court
recognized municipal liability under § 1983, Monell v. New York
City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56
L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), courts began to question the continuing
validity of Aldinger's categorical ban. See, e.g., O'Connor v.
City of Chicago, 1989 WL 15976, 1989 U.S.Dist.Lexis 1726
(N.D.Ill. Feb. 21, 1989) and cases cited.
However, last year in Finley, the Court did not question
Aldinger and instead emphasized that "`neither the convenience
of the litigants nor considerations of judicial economy can
suffice to justify the extension of the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction.'" 109 S.Ct. at 2008, citing Owen Equipment &
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 2404,
57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978). In recent cases, courts have rejected
the contention that municipalities are proper pendent parties
under § 1983. See, e.g., Hill v. City of Chicago, et al., 1990
WL 16243, 1990 U.S.Dist.Lexis 1526 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 12, 1990);
Alexander v. Jefferson Parish, et al., 1990 WL 11365, 1990
U.S.Dist.Lexis 1326 (E.D.La. Feb. 6, 1990); Fleming v. D.C., et
al., 1989 U.S.Dist.Lexis 11796 (D.C.D.C. Oct. 5, 1989).
This court concludes that, by establishing liability only
against a "person" who "subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen" to the "deprivation of rights, privilege, or
immunities secured by" federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) do not affirmatively grant pendent-party
jurisdiction over the City, which is not liable for such
deprivation. Aldinger, supra; Cf. Finley, supra, 109 S.Ct. at
2009; Stallworth v. City of Cleveland, 893 F.2d 830, 838 (6th
Cir. 1990) (no pendent party jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
over state law claim of loss of consortium).
The plaintiff may proceed on his excessive force claim
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Dorsty and
Rohan. All other claims are dismissed.
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