officer possesses a reasonable belief based on `specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant' the officer in
believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may
gain immediate control of weapons." 463 U.S. at 1049, 103 S.Ct.
at 3481, quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. "In a
sense, Long authorized a `frisk' of an automobile for weapons."
Buie, 110 S.Ct. at 1097.
Although the Court refused in Chimel to sanction the search
of defendant's entire house in the course of a burglary arrest,
it did conclude that "it is reasonable for the arresting
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapons that the latter might seek to use" as well as "to
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in
order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary items must, of course be governed by a like rule."
395 U.S. at 763, 89 S.Ct. at 2040. In Buie, the Court held that
an officer arresting a suspected armed robber in the latter's
home has an interest analogous to that protected in Terry and
Long, and may look about the home "to assure themselves that
the house in which the suspect is being or has just been
arrested is not harboring other persons who are dangerous and
who could unexpectedly launch an attack." 110 S.Ct. at 1098.
The Court recognized also that, "unlike an encounter on the
street or along a highway, an in-home arrest puts the officer
at the disadvantage of being on his adversary's `turf.' An
ambush in a confined setting of unknown configuration is more
to be feared than it is in open, more familiar surroundings."
Id. Accordingly, the Court held not only that the officer in
question was justified in looking in the basement whence had
come the defendant and where the officer then saw incriminating
evidence in plain view, but also "that as an incident to the
arrest the officers could, as a precautionary matter and
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets
and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from
which an attack could be immediately launched." Id. Finally, in
Summers, the Court recognized that even in the absence of
specific evidence of the record of potential harm to police
executing a search warrant, they were justified in detaining
the occupants of the premises where the search was being
conducted while it was ongoing. "The risk of harm to both the
police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely
exercise unquestioned command of the situation." 452 U.S. at
702-03, 101 S.Ct. at 2594.
The circumstances of this case fit comfortably within the
principles set forth above. The deputies had a warrant for a
fugitive whose premises previously had been found to contain
weapons, and who conducted himself on the street just before
the arrest in a fashion to suggest he was armed. He was
accompanied by two apparent cohorts. Once inside the apartment,
in the unfamiliar and hostile environment that constituted
Hernandez's "turf," the deputies encountered Barrow, whom they
had not seen on the street but who there was every reason to
believe was in league with Hernandez. Like the officers
executing the search warrant in Summers, the deputies had every
reason to "routinely exercise unquestioned command of the
situation." 452 U.S. at 702-03, 101 S.Ct. at 2594.
In analogous circumstances, a woman who came upon the scene
"against a background that comported with `the violent nature
of narcotics crime,'" United States v. Barlin, 686 F.2d 81, 87
(2d Cir. 1982), quoting United States v. Vasquez, 634 F.2d 41,
43 (2d Cir. 1980), although previously unknown to the agents,
was properly detained and her pocketbook appropriately
searched. Id. Like that woman, and unlike the bar patrons
impermissibly searched in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100
S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979), Barrow "was not innocuously
present in a crowd at a public place." Id. Although the
deputies here, unlike those in Barlin, did have handcuffs,
there was every reason to assure that the area immediately
around Barrow was free of weapons. If Barrow were left
unattended even for a short period
of time and knew where the gun was, it would not be an
impossible task even for one handcuffed from behind to work her
hands between the mattress and the box spring and grab the
weapon. In any event, the luxury of hindsight does not give me
the right to engage in "unrealistic second-guessing" about
Barrow's manual dexterity. United States v. Sharpe,
470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). That
Barrow herself, unlike the woman in Barlin, eventually was not
arrested, and that the search disclosed evidence incriminating
of Hernandez rather than of her, does not make the search of
the area immediately around her any less reasonable. The
seizure of the pistol and the bullets it contained accordingly
The seizure of the scale is directly validated by the holding
in Buie that arresting officers may search a closet immediately
adjoining the place of arrest, as was the closet in this case.
110 S.Ct. at 1098. The remaining items — the bag of money, the
beeper and the driver's license — apparently were in plain
view when the deputies entered the apartment and there was
probable cause to believe they constituted evidence of a crime,
albeit not the one for which Hernandez was being arrested.
Accordingly, the seizure of those items as well was proper.
Horton v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d
112 (1990); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct.
2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); see Buie, 110 S.Ct. at 1096.
For the reasons set forth above, the motion to suppress is
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