Even were I to hold otherwise, the defendants have had a full
and fair opportunity to contest the Division's dismissal and
are thus collaterally estopped from relitigating that issue
now. Giuntoli v. Garvin Guybutler Corp., 726 F. Supp. 494, 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); J. Moore, 1B Moore's on Federal Practice ¶
0.416, at 536 (1988). Accordingly, I need not reach
defendants' remaining jurisdictional argument.
2. Exercise of Pendent Jurisdiction
Although plaintiff is not barred from seeking relief in
federal court on her state law claim, I nonetheless decline to
exercise pendent jurisdiction over it and, therefore, affirm my
earlier ruling on this issue. "Pendent jurisdiction is a matter
of the court's [sound] discretion, rather than the plaintiff's
right," Margarella v. Manoir International, Inc., No. 86 C 9348
(N.D.Ill. 1987) (Avail. on Westlaw 1987 W.L. 9009), the
exercise of which is guided by considerations of judicial
economy, convenience and fairness to the litigants, United
Mineworkers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct.
1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). Specifically, a trial court
should dismiss state law claims where: (1) "state issues
substantially predominate" over federal issues; (2) state
claims raise novel or unsettled issues of state law so that the
state court would provide a "surer footed reading" of the
applicable law; and (3) there is a possibility of "jury
confusion in treating divergent legal theories of relief" in a
single proceeding. Id. at 726-727, 86 S.Ct. at 1139-40.
Application of these principles to the instant case counsels
against entertainment of plaintiff's Human Rights Law claim.
First, the remedies and therefore the type of proof differ
substantially with respect to plaintiff's state and federal
claims such that her pendent claim might well become the
predominant element of the lawsuit. Bouchet v. Nat'l Urban
League, Inc., 730 F.2d 799, 805 (D.C.Cir. 1984); Billings v.
Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., 678 F. Supp. 984, 987
(D.Conn. 1988). Unlike the relatively limited scope of recovery
available under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, Hybki v.
Alexander and Alexander, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 483, 484-85 (W.D.Mo.
1982), plaintiff's Human Rights Law claim entitles her to full
compensatory and punitive relief, including damages for
suffering and anguish. N.Y.Exec.Law § 297(4)(c)(iii); Batavia
Lodge No. 196, Loyal Order of Moose v. New York State Div. of
Human Rights, 35 N.Y.2d 143, 145-46, 359 N.Y. So.2d 25,
316 N.E.2d 318 (1974); Bd. of Educ. v. McCall, 108 A.D.2d 855, 855,
485 N.Y.S.2d 357 (2d Dep't 1985) (mem.). Thus, plaintiff's
proof on her state law cause of action, most of which will
presumably focus on her emotional well-being at the time of the
alleged discriminatory conduct, will be irrelevant to her
federal claims and might prejudice the jury in her favor. See
Burger, 684 F. Supp. 46, 50 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Curtin v.
Hadco Corp., 676 F. Supp. 408, 411 (D.N.H. 1987); Alveari v.
American Intern. Group, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 228, 232 (S.D.N Y
1984); Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 448 F. Supp. 1168,
1173 (E.D.Mich. 1978) (assumption of pendent jurisdiction
over plaintiff's state law claims, which would involve proof as
to their mental states before and after defendants' allegedly
discriminatory acts, would inject substantial new issues into
the proceedings). Furthermore, submitting federal and state law
claims to a jury which involve differing theories of relief
could likely lead to confusion on the issue of damages. Burger,
684 F. Supp. at 50; Barbetta v. Chemlawn Services Corp.,
669 F. Supp. 569, 571 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (Telesca, J.); but see Rio v.
Presbyterian Hosp. in City of New York, 561 F. Supp. 325, 328
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (court will exercise pendent jurisdiction where
theories of plaintiff's state and federal claims are identical
and only differences go to differing scope of remedy). In sum,
entertaining plaintiff's Human Rights Law claim here would
complicate an otherwise straightforward trial under Title VII
and the Equal Pay Act. Given the probability of jury confusion
and the potential predominance at trial of plaintiff's state
law issues, I decline to exercise jurisdiction over her Human
Rights Law claim and accordingly affirm
my earlier order of dismissal.*fn4
Aside from the traditional Gibbs calculus, I am also inclined
to dismiss plaintiff's Human Rights Law claim on the grounds
set forth in Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties Corp., 731 F.2d 143
(2d Cir. 1984). In that case, the Second Circuit held that an
ADEA plaintiff cannot recover compensatory damages in federal
court given their unavailability under the ADEA prelitigation,
administrative, conciliation process. The Second Circuit
If an individual alleging discrimination knew he
could recover compensatory damages if he refused
to settle during the administrative process, and
commenced a civil suit, he would have little
incentive to resolve the dispute during the
conciliation process. Johnson, 731 F.2d at 147.
At least one district court has extended this rationale to
preclude ADEA plaintiffs from bringing claims under the New
York Human Rights Law. See Realmuto v. Fellow Freight System,
Inc., 712 F. Supp. 287, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). The court in that
case reasoned that "there would be little incentive for a
plaintiff [under such circumstances] to settle during the EEOC
conciliation process." Id. (also holding that ADEA and Human
Rights Law claim would lead to jury confusion on the damages
issue). I find such reasoning similarly applicable here. In
light of all of the above, I hereby dismiss plaintiff's Human
Rights Law claim.