supra, 725 F. Supp. 162. Cozza's current situation is
indistinguishable from that faced earlier by Friedman. Cozza
has argued that his situation differs from Friedman's since
irreparable harm may inure from alleged constitutional
violations in the process followed by the Court Officers. But
like Friedman, in this instance Cozza has suffered no
deprivation, either alleged or actual. In the event that the
Independent Administrator should rule adversely, Cozza
automatically may appeal that determination to this Court
pursuant to ¶ F.12.(A) of the Consent Decree. At that time,
Cozza may then petition this Court to overturn the Independent
Administrator's ruling. Indeed, Cozza has not put forth a
single argument in support of this injunction that he could not
validly raise in a later appeal of the decision of the
Independent Administrator to this Court.
Cozza's substantive argument, that the charges are too
inspecific for him to properly prepare a defense, was
similarly considered in the Friedman and Hughes matter. There,
this Court held that challenges to the specificity of charges
are properly brought on a member's appeal of a decision by the
Independent Administrator pursuant to ¶ F.12.(A) of the Consent
Decree. March 8, 1990 Opinion and Order, 735 F. Supp. 506, 517
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd (2d Cir. June 1, 1990).
Cozza faces a disciplinary hearing before the Independent
Administrator. At this point, harm is merely speculative since
the charges have not been substantiated against him. The
Independent Administrator has made no determination on the
charges. No punitive penalties have been imposed on Cozza. In
sum, Cozza faces no cognizable irreparable harm from the July
14, 1990 hearing before the Independent Administrator.
Further, it is disingenuous for Cozza to now argue that
prosecution under the remedial scheme which he specifically
assented to deprives him of any rights. In this instance,
Cozza faces the equivalent of an internal union disciplinary
proceeding on charges that as a member of the GEB, he violated
a provision of the IBT constitution by knowingly associating
with organized crime figures. Indeed, the Consent Decree
actually vests IBT members with a right of review of the
internal disciplinary proceedings beyond that mandated by the
LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.
The timing of Cozza's motion for a preliminary injunction
further reveals its speciousness. The Investigations Officer
filed these disciplinary charges against Cozza in September of
1989. Cozza petitioned the Independent Administrator for
further specificity in the charges in November of 1989, which
the Independent Administrator denied. Yet, Cozza waited until
February of 1990 to commence the instant action, and two weeks
before the July 14, 1990 hearing to file this motion. Such
actions belie any claims of irreparable harm.
Cozza identifies numerous flaws with the Investigation
Officer's charges, and asserts that his facing such charges
transgresses his Constitutional rights. In order for Cozza to
be deprived of his Constitutional rights, he must demonstrate
that the Court Officers are government actors whose authority
is limited by the Constitution. The parties submissions on
this matter generated much discourse over whether the Consent
Decree's remedial scheme constitutes state action. Since such
a determination is unnecessary to decide the instant motion,
this Court will refrain from determining this question.
Further, Intervenor United States of America moves this
Court to (1)(a) dismiss the complaint by failure to state a
claim on which relief may be granted or (b) grant the
Government summary judgment; (2) consolidate this action with
the underlying suit; and (3) for sanctions against Cozza.
These motions will not be considered in this memorandum.
For the reasons stated above, it is hereby ordered that
plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.