The opinion of the court was delivered by: Wexler, District Judge.
Petitioner Edgar Ramos ("petitioner" or "Ramos"), appearing pro Se,
petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons set forth below, petitioner's
application is denied.
Petitioner was indicted for the murder of Manuel Vidal, Sr., who had
been found dead in his home on July 2, 1981, in Brentwood, New York.
Ramos and another individual, Manuel Martinez, had been renting rooms in
the victim's home. It was the prosecution's theory at trial that
petitioner, along with Martinez, fatally stabbed Vidal following an
argument which occurred when petitioner and Martinez returned home
intoxicated. The prosecution established its case, in part, by evidence
of certain oral admissions by petitioner. On April 21, 1982, following a
jury trial, Ramos was convicted of murder in the second degree. N.Y.Penal
Law § 125.25 (McKinney 1990). Thereafter, petitioner was sentenced to
an indeterminate term of incarceration of twenty-five years to life.
On May 18, 1987, the appellate division affirmed the conviction,
130 A.D.2d 688, 515 N.Y.S.2d 610; leave to appeal to the New York Court of
Appeals was subsequently denied. Petitioner then brought a motion to
reargue his direct appeal to the appellate division, which was denied.
Lastly, petitioner brought a motion to vacate judgment, pursuant to
§ 440.10 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL"), asserting
that his conviction was based on the perjured testimony of an expert
witness. The New York Supreme Court, Special Term, denied the motion, and
the appellate division denied leave to appeal.
Respondent contends that the petition should be dismissed on the ground
that petitioner failed to exhaust the remedies available to him in the
state court system, in that the petitioner's claims were not presented as
constitutional claims to the state court. For the reasons set forth
below, this Court holds that although petitioner has exhausted his state
remedies, all of the claims asserted in support of the petition are
I. EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES
A federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus only when a
petitioner has exhausted the available remedies in the state court
system. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b). The petitioner must have "fairly
presented" every one of his federal claims to the highest state court
possible. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512, 30
L.Ed.2d 438 (1971); Daye v. Atty. Gen. of New York, 696 F.2d 186, 191 (2d
Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1048, 104 S.Ct. 723, 79
L.Ed.2d 184 (1984). In order to have "fairly presented" his federal claim
to the state courts, the petitioner must have informed the state court of
both the factual and legal premises of the claims asserted in the federal
habeas petition. Daye, 696 F.2d 186, 191. Furthermore, a federal district
court is precluded from entertaining a "mixed" habeas corpus petition,
i.e., one that includes both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Rose v.
Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982).
In Daye, the Second Circuit described several methods by which a
petitioner could sufficiently alert the state courts to the constitutional
nature of a claim. These include:
(a) reliance on pertinent federal cases employing
constitutional analysis, (b) reliance on state cases
employing constitutional analysis in like fact
situations, (c) assertion of the claim in terms so
particular as to call to mind a specific right
protected by the Constitution, and (d) allegation of a
pattern of facts that is well within the mainstream of
The present petition contains a constitutional claim which was made on
direct appeal, as well as several other claims made by petitioner on the
collateral attack of his conviction ("the § 440 motion"). For the
reasons set forth below, this Court finds that petitioner has exhausted
his state remedies.
A. Claim Addressed on Direct Appeal
On direct appeal, petitioner argued that his oral confession was
involuntary and thus should have been inadmissible at trial. In his
appellate brief, petitioner relied on two federal cases, Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979), and Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949).
Since both cases employ a constitutional analysis, reliance upon these
cases is an acceptable method of alerting the state court to the