B. Absent a Due Process Violation, The Remaining Claims*fn8
DeClara alleges that the defendants' failure to give him a
full trial before terminating his employment amounts to a
deprivation of due process in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The defendants maintain that DeClara was afforded
all the process due him through the appeal hearing (September
1, 1988) and the Adjustment Board hearing (decision issued
January 11, 1989), both held after DeClara received the
The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that there must
always be a hearing before the initial deprivation of
property. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540, 101 S.Ct. 1908,
1915, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds,
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d
662 (1986). The Court has further held that if adequate
post-deprivation procedures exist, the Due Process Clause is
not violated by failure to give a pre-deprivation hearing for
intentional deprivations since such acts are random,
unauthorized, making a predeprivation proceeding impracticable.
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3203, 82
L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). Insofar as DeClara alleged fraud and
misrepresentation by defendants in terminating the commission,
he has alleged an intentional deprivation, and, therefore, a
post-deprivation hearing would protect sufficiently his
Moreover, where an employee has the right under a contract
to seek arbitration of the dispute, his constitutional rights
are protected by those procedures. See Parrett v. City of
Connersville, 737 F.2d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 1984) ("dispute
resolution created by a collective bargaining agreement can
satisfy due process requirements"); Jackson v. Temple Univ.,
721 F.2d 931, 933 (3d Cir. 1983) ("the right to proceed to
arbitration provided [the employee] with an adequate due
process safeguard"); Gendalia v. Gioffre, 606 F. Supp. 363, 367
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("the existence of sufficient post-deprivation
remedies would provide the requisite due process. The . . .
employees do not dispute that the state remedies exist.
[Therefore] the complaint fails to state a § 1983 claim").
DeClara does not deny the existence of the arbitration
proceeding and he has already participated in an arbitrated
hearing on his termination. Indeed, DeClara questions the
Board's interpretation of the contract; he does not challenge
the post-deprivation hearings as constitutionally
insufficient. In light of established law in this field, the
arbitration proceedings safeguarded DeClara's due process
rights. The Board's unfavorable decision to DeClara does not
turn the process into a constitutional violation. Absent a due
process claim, DeClara has not alleged any loss of a federal
right under § 1983, nor has he put forth a potential fourth
exception to § 153 First (q).*fn9
Finally, DeClara is not entitled to equitable relief.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion is granted,
and DeClara's complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
It is so ordered.