The opinion of the court was delivered by: Wexler, District Judge.
In the above-referenced action, Robins Island Preservation
Fund, Inc. ("plaintiff") seeks, inter alia, a declaration
regarding ownership interest and possessory rights in Robins
Island, an island of approximately 445 acres located in the
Peconic Bay in Suffolk County, New York. Briefly stated,
plaintiff's claim is premised on the argument that New York
State, in violation of certain national treaties, improperly
confiscated Robins Island in 1779 from plaintiff's alleged
predecessors-in-interest. Plaintiff, a not-for-profit Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Maryland,
thus claims present ownership to more than seventy percent of
Robins Island. Named as defendant is Southold Development
Corporation ("defendant"), a New York corporation which
currently holds title to Robins Island. In addition, a
third-party complaint naming the State of New York, ("the
State"), has been filed in the action. Currently before the
Court are defendant's and plaintiff's cross-motions for summary
judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In addition, defendant alternatively seeks
dismissal, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, for failure to join necessary and
indispensable parties. The State, as third-party defendant,
also moves for various relief, including infer alia,
dismissal of the complaint and summary judgment. After a brief
statement of the relevant background facts, the Court will turn
to address the parties' motions, beginning with the motions for
summary judgment made by defendant and the State.
According to the complaint, one Joseph Wickham purchased Robins
Island in 1715. In 1734, he devised the property to his son
Joseph "and to the male heirs of his body lawfully begotten or
to be begotten forever." Complaint at para. 9. Such a devise
created an "estate tail" in Robins Island whereby Joseph
Wickham II held the fee interest in the property for his life,
and upon his death the fee interest would belong to his eldest
son. In other words, from generation to generation, Robins
Island would be perpetually inherited by the eldest son in
direct descent from Joseph Wickham, Sr. In fact, upon the death
of Joseph Wickham II in 1749, his eldest son,
Parker Wickham, obtained the estate tail interest in Robins
Island.
On October 22, 1779, at a time during the Revolutionary War
when British forces occupied Long Island, the State of New York
passed the Act of Attainder. That act declared Parker Wickham,
among others, convicted of treason, and further declared that
all property owned by those named was forfeited to, and vested
in, the people of the State of New York. Prior to the
confiscation, as noted above, Parker Wickham possessed a "fee
tail" estate to various holdings in Suffolk County, including
Robins Island. Plaintiff contests the validity of the State's
confiscation of Robins Island in 1779, and argues that in any
event the 1779 Act of Attainder did not affect any estate or
interest held by Parker Wickham's eldest son at the time. See
Complaint at para. 13. More particularly, as to the former
point, plaintiff argues that at the time of the State's 1779
Attainder Act, ("the Attainder"), British forces occupied and
maintained control over New York City and Long Island. See
Plaintiff's Memo at 5. Consequently, plaintiff asserts that New
York exercised no sovereignty over Long Island during the
period, and therefore state law had no force or effect. Id.
As to the latter point noted above, plaintiff argues that even
if the Attainder was valid to confiscate Robins Island, the
future possessory interest of Parker Wickham's son remained
valid because the Attainder only sought to confiscate the
interest of the individuals specifically named in the statute.
Many of the historical facts are not in dispute, although there
is strong disagreement between the parties as to their
interpretation. At any rate, in 1782, New York State abolished
fee tail estate interests in land, and upon enactment of that
same legislation, converted those estates to fee simple
estates. In addition, in late 1782 the United States entered
into a Provisional Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, ("the
1783 Treaty"), which was executed in 1783. According to the
complaint, a portion of the 1783 Treaty was intended to restore
all confiscated "Estates, Rights and Properties" to, inter
alia, "real British subjects." Plaintiff further points out
that Article V of the 1783 Treaty provided that persons with
any interest in confiscated lands "shall meet with no lawful
impediment in the prosecution of their just rights." Complaint
at para. 16. Furthermore, Article VI of the Treaty prohibited
future confiscations of property. Id.
In May of 1784, the legislature of the State of New York passed
an Act for the speedy sale of confiscated estates, which
confirmed the confiscations authorized by the Attainder and
provided procedures for expediting the sale of those
confiscated estates. Thereafter, in August of 1784, the
Commissioners of Forfeiture of the State of New York conveyed
Robins Island in fee simple to Benjamin Tallmedge and Caleb
Brewster. See Plaintiff's Affirmation at exhibit 2. According
to the complaint, defendant in the action at bar holds title to
Robins Island based on a chain of title which commenced with
that 1784 conveyance.
As noted above, one of plaintiff's theories is based upon the
argument that New York exercised no sovereignty over Long
Island at the time of the Attainder, and thus it had no lawful
effect over the area. The crux of plaintiff's alternative
theory, based on, inter alia, clauses cited above from the
1783 Treaty, as well as identical language drafted into the
final Definitive Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, is that
the 1784 conveyance of Robins Island by the state was void.
More specifically, plaintiff argues that the Attainder
confiscated a mere life interest held by Parker Wickham. Thus,
plaintiff claims that Parker Wickham's son retained his
vested possessory fee tail estate as of the time of the
confiscation. Furthermore, plaintiff asserts that because New
York had abolished fee tails in the interim, when Parker
Wickham died in 1785 his son held the exclusive right to the
fee simple of Robins Island. As alleged successors-in-interest
to Parker Wickham's son, plaintiff claims the right to current
possession of Robins Island.
In response to the complaint, defendant points out that title
to Robins Island has remained stable for over two hundred
years, and that plaintiff's action destabilizes the title to
all land formerly owned by Parker Wickham, including parts of
the Towns of Southold, Riverhead and Southampton, New York.
Among the affirmative defenses asserted by defendant are,
inter alia: (1) that plaintiff has failed to name
indispensable parties: (2) that the action is barred by the
statute of limitations; and (3) that through adverse possession
title has been acquired by defendant and its predecessors. As
noted above, plaintiff and defendant move for summary judgment,
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In
addition to defendant's Rule 56 motion, which seeks dismissal
of the complaint, the State moves for various alternative
relief, including dismissal of the complaint, pursuant to Rule
12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and summary
judgment. Aside from asserting the statute of limitations as a
time bar, a defense also raised by defendant, the State
additionally asserts that plaintiff's causes of action are
barred by the doctrine of laches.
Given the unique nature of this case, and the lengthy arguments
made by the parties in their papers, the Court will address
only the issues which it considers to be dispositive of the
motions. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, the
Court finds that defendant's and the State's motions for
summary judgment must be granted. By way of an outline, the
Court will address the following points in the following
sequence: (A) New York's Act of Attainder of 1779 was validly
exercised over Parker Wickham, and at the time New York
conveyed Robins Island in 1784, it held a fee simple absolute
interest in the premises; therefore, the Court finds that
plaintiff has no claim under the 1783 Treaty, and that there is
no federal question jurisdiction over this case. (B) Pursuant
to the Court's diversity jurisdiction, the substantive law of
New York would apply, and therefore, based on both Supreme
Court precedent and New York law, the Attainder was valid.
However, even if the Court were to find that the Act of
Attainder was not valid, application of the state statute of
limitations would bar plaintiff's claim. (C) Even assuming,
arguendo, that Joseph Wickham did retain some future interest
in Robins Island, the equitable doctrine of laches bars
plaintiff's claim. Moreover, even if the Court were to find
that application of a state-law time bar was inappropriate,
public policy demands that plaintiff's claim cannot exist in
perpetuity and unsettle title to real property in New York.
For each of the points made below, the Court emphasizes that
the summary judgment standard of Rule 56(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure controls. Accordingly, it is to be
noted that a motion for summary judgment may be granted only
when it is shown that "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53,
91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Donahue v. Windsor Locks Bd. of Fire
Comm'rs, 834 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1987); Winant v. Carefree
Pools, 709 F. Supp. 57, 59 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 891 F.2d 278
(2d Cir. 1989). The burden on such a motion is upon the moving
party to clearly establish the absence of a genuine issue as to
any material fact. Donahue, 834 F.2d at 57. In addition, the
court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. With these
principles in mind, the Court notes that many of the factual
issues raised by the parties herein involve questions regarding
the interpretation of both
historical documents and historical events. Therefore, in light
of the fact that this case poses a number of mixed issues of
law and fact, albeit ancient fact, and given that no one
involved in this case has any personal knowledge of the great
majority of the facts, the Court views this case as one
particularly well-suited to disposition by motions.
Consequently, in consideration of all the documentation
submitted by the parties, the Court finds as follows.
A. Validity of New York's Act of Attainder
As noted above, plaintiff asserts that the Attainder had no
lawful effect on Parker Wickham's interest in Robins Island,
since the British forces allegedly occupied the Long Island
area at the time of the Attainder. See Plaintiff's Memo. at
4-6. However, the cases relied upon by plaintiff to support
this proposition are far outweighed by the Supreme Court cases
cited by defendant and the State, which stand for the
proposition that an act taken by a state after July of 1776 was
an act taken by a sovereign and independent government. Ware
v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 224-25, 1 L.Ed. 568 (1796);
M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 209, 212, 2
L.Ed. 598 (1808). It is of particular significance that the
court in ...