constitutes the real body of a case, to which the federal
claim is only an appendage, the state claim may fairly be
dismissed." Gibbs, supra, 383 U.S. at 727, 86 S.Ct. at 1140.
The relationship between the federal claim and the
non-federal claims in the present case fails to satisfy the
Gibbs test. The claim against the FDIC is one for breach of a
lease agreement by CNB, and there is no allegation in the
complaint, nor any evidence before the Court, that CNB's
non-payment of rent is related to the non-federal claims in
this case so as to permit the exercise of pendent jurisdiction.
As far as the Court can ascertain, CNB's breach may be entirely
unrelated to the "nucleus of operative facts" from which the
twelve non-federal claims derive. The mere fact that there is
"some relationship" between the CNB lease and the parties and
property involved in the bulk of this action is insufficient to
support pendent jurisdiction under the teaching of the Supreme
Court and the Second Circuit. See United States v. Town of
North Hempstead, 610 F.2d 1025, 1029 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding
that federal law claim to close an incinerator did not support
pendent jurisdiction over state law claim against operation of
a landfill, although closing of incinerator would increase use
of the landfill). "While the courts in applying the Gibbs test
have generally not required that the fact patterns underlying
the claims be identical, they clearly have required something
more than the slight factual connection that is presented
here." Town of North Hempstead, supra, 610 F.2d at 1030
(discussing cases). Thus, the exercise of pendent party
jurisdiction in the instant case would be inappropriate.
Moreover, the Court does not believe that 12 U.S.C. § 1819
"federalizes" every case in which the FDIC is a party so as to
support pendent party jurisdiction over claims not involving
the FDIC. The Second Circuit has recently stated that "after
the Supreme Court's decision in Finley, the continued viability
of the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction in any context is
seriously in question." Roco Carriers, Ltd. v. M/V Nurnberg
Express, 899 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Staffer
v. Bouchard Transportation Company, Inc., 878 F.2d 638, 643 n.
5 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting in dicta that "pendent-party
jurisdiction apparently is no longer a viable concept."); C.
Wright & A. Miller, 13B Federal Practice and Procedure §
3567.2, at 25 (West Supp. 1990) ("lower courts are reading
Finley as putting an end to [pendent party] jurisdiction").
Although the Roco Court held that pendent party jurisdiction
may be exercised in admiralty cases, it did so only after
stressing "`the strong admiralty policy in favor of providing
efficient procedures for resolving maritime disputes.'" Roco,
supra, 899 F.2d at 1297 (quoting In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz
off Coast of France, 699 F.2d 909, 914 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Astilleros Espanoles, S.A. v. Standard Oil
Company (Indiana), 464 U.S. 864, 104 S.Ct. 196, 78 L.Ed.2d 172
(1983)). The Court thus concluded that "pendent party
jurisdiction is available in the unique area of admiralty."
Roco, supra, 899 F.2d at 1297 (emphasis added).*fn4
Even if we were to construe the adjective "unique" as
somehow ambiguous, the jurisdictional statute applicable to
this case, 12 U.S.C. § 1819, does not support the exercise of
pendent party jurisdiction. The language of the statute,
although conceivably broad in scope, does not in fact
"specifically confer[ ] jurisdiction over other claims against
additional parties," Roco, supra, 899 F.2d at 1295 (citing
Finley, supra), and, therefore, fails to overcome Finley's
holding that pendent party jurisdiction is inappropriate absent
"an affirmative grant" of such jurisdiction in the statute at
issue. Finley, supra, 490 U.S. at
553, 109 S.Ct. at 2009. To hold that § 1819 completely and
automatically "federalizes" any civil action in which the FDIC
is a party, would be to permit a plaintiff to gain access to
the federal courts simply by joining a single claim against the
FDIC to a variety of state law claims against other parties.
Clearly such "coattails" jurisdiction was not intended by
Congress when it enacted § 1819, and such a strained
interpretation will not be accepted by this Court. See Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Israel, 739 F. Supp. 1411, 1414
(C.D.Cal. 1990) (holding that 12 U.S.C. § 1819 does not provide
pendent party jurisdiction).
Finally, it is important to recall that "pendent
jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's
right." Gibbs, supra, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139. The
Court may consider, in exercising this discretion, issues of
judicial economy, convenience and fairness to the litigants.
Gibbs, supra, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139.*fn5 In the
instant case, although a consolidated action might be more
convenient for Associates, the Court believes that a state
court would be the more appropriate forum for the efficient and
just resolution of Associates' twelve state law claims against
the fifteen non-diverse defendants in this action, especially
given the weak or non-existent legal relationship between those
claims and Associates' claim against the FDIC. Dismissal of
Associates' non-federal claims will not prevent Associates from
pursuing those claims in state court. See Albano v. Restaurant
Associates Industries, Inc., 1991 WL 2995, 1991 U.S.Dist. LEXIS
25 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 1991) (dismissing pendent party claims
where plaintiffs could bring their action in state court).
Indeed, there is apparently pending a New York state court
declaratory judgment action that could provide a basis for
adjudication of the issues raised in the instant case.*fn6
Accordingly, even if this Court could properly exercise pendent
party jurisdiction over all the parties and claims in this
action, there exist sufficient and persuasive grounds to
decline to do so.
For the reasons set forth above, the Moving Defendants'
motion to dismiss the claims in this action, with the
exception of the federal claim against the FDIC, is granted.