over the alleged harassment that plaintiffs suffered at the job
A plaintiff may state a claim for hostile environment sexual
harassment against an employer that "knew or should have known
of the harassment in question but failed to take prompt
remedial action." Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
903-05 (11th Cir. 1982). The plaintiff can demonstrate
knowledge by showing that she complained to higher authority
who failed to take remedial action or by showing that the
harassment was so pervasive that the employer should have known
about it. Id. Here, as stated above, plaintiffs allege
a series of similar acts of sexual harassment by their
co-workers. They also allege that they alerted their employers,
Local 3 shop stewards, and JIB*fn11 to their discriminatory
treatment, but that none of defendants took any action.
Complaint ¶¶ 51, 53, 61.
JIB and Local 3 argue that only the individual contractor
employers had responsibility and control over the working
environment at the job sites. These matters cannot be
determined until plaintiffs have had an opportunity for
discovery concerning facts relevant to this issue. The court
holds that plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a claim of
hostile environment employment discrimination against all
V. JIB's Motion for Severance
JIB moves to sever plaintiffs' claims for discriminatory
termination from the Apprenticeship Program (Plaintiffs'
Second, Third, Fifth and Sixth Claims) from plaintiffs' claims
for discriminatory treatment at the job sites (Plaintiffs'
First and Fourth Claims), because "it is beyond debate" that
the JIB has no authority over or role in determining the
employment conditions at the jobs sites, and likewise,
electrical employers play no role at all in an apprentice
electrician's termination from the Apprenticeship Program." JIB
Memo at 49.
As stated above, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that
all defendants are liable as a joint enterprise for
discriminatory treatment at the job sites that culminated in
plaintiffs' termination from the Apprenticeship Program.
Plaintiffs' claims against all defendants arise out of a series
of alleged discriminatory terminations and present common
questions of fact including, inter alia, whether
defendants constitute a joint enterprise, and whether certain
acts created a hostile work environment. Plaintiffs' claims
thus satisfy the requirements for joinder set forth in
Fed.R.Civ.P. 20. At this preliminary stage of the proceedings,
it is too early for the court to determine whether a separate
trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b) is appropriate.
Accordingly, the court denies JIB's motion for severance at
VI. JIB's Motion to Dismiss New York Human Rights Law Claims
In its Memorandum of Law, JIB argues that, should the court
dismiss plaintiffs' Title VII claims, it should also decline to
exercise jurisdiction over plaintiffs' pendent claims pursuant
to the New York Human Rights Law. The court's ruling that
plaintiffs' have properly stated Title VII claims renders this
In a letter to the court, dated February 20, 1990, JIB
asserts that the court should decline to assert jurisdiction
over plaintiffs' pendent state claims pursuant to New York's
election of remedies doctrine, citing Scott v.
Carter-Wallace, Inc., 147 A.D.2d 33, 541 N.Y.S.2d 780 (1st
Pursuant to New York Human Rights Law, N.Y.Exec.Law §
297(9), a plaintiff alleging unlawful discrimination may elect
to institute either judicial or administrative proceedings, but
not both.*fn12 Once a particular procedure is invoked, a
plaintiff is barred from electing any other remedy, unless the
NYDHR dismisses the complaint for administrative convenience.
Here, although both Streeter and Ellis filed administrative
charges, they were both subsequently dismissed for
administrative convenience by NYDHR. NYDHR Determination and
Order after Investigation, No. 2-E-S-88-130204E (Streeter);
NYDHR Determination and Order after Investigation, No.
2-E-S-88-132358E (Ellis). Accordingly, N.Y.Exec.Law §
297(9) provides no barrier to plaintiff's New York Human Rights
Law claim in either state court, Carter-Wallace, 541
N YS.2d at 780, or federal court, Song v. Ives
Laboratories, 735 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). JIB does
not suggest any other particular reason for the court to
decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction; accordingly, the
court denies JIB's request that it decline to exercise
jurisdiction over plaintiffs' pendent state claims. See
For the reasons stated above, the court denies defendants'
The court reminds the parties that any party wishing to file
a motion for summary judgment must first write to the court to
request a pre-motion conference. Once the court sets a
conference date, any party seeking to file a summary judgment
motion shall serve and file a Local Rule 3(g) Statement ten
days before the pre-motion conference; opposing counsel shall
serve and file a response to the 3(g) Statement five days
before the pre-motion conference. The court directs the parties
to its Individual Rules of Practice for further details
regarding the procedure for exchange of 3(g) Statements.
Any party intending to file a motion for summary judgment has
until June 28, 1991 to request a pre-motion conference from the
court. In the event that no motions for summary judgment are
filed, a joint pre-trial order is due July 17, 1991 and the
case will be placed on the ready trial calendar as of July 22,