reported for its loan to Boothe. NYSHE returned the form and
confirmed the accuracy of the outstanding loan balance
reflected in TRW's records and contained in Boothe's credit
profile. Micelli Aff. ¶ 7, Ex. C. In a letter dated December 1,
1987, TRW informed Boothe that both contested items were
accurate. See Pl.Opp. Ex. C-2.
On December 9, 1987, December 28, 1987 and March 8, 1988,
Boothe wrote to TRW requesting that a consumer statement be
added to his credit profile noting that he still disagreed
with NYSHE and the accuracy of the bankruptcy petition.
Pl.Opp., Exs. B-2(a), E, F. On or about March 15, 1988, TRW
added a statement to Boothe's credit profile that read: "I
dispute the amount NYSHE says I owe," and immediately notified
Boothe of its inclusion of such statement. TRW did not include
a similar statement for Boothe's bankruptcy petition. Pl.Opp.,
In early May 1988, Boothe applied for, and was denied, a
$300.00 loan from AVCO. Pl.Opp., Exs. M & N. Boothe advised
TRW of AVCO's action in a letter dated May 16, 1988. Pl.Opp.,
Ex. G-1. In the letter, Boothe also complained that the
consumer statement added to his credit profile in March of
that year was not sufficiently specific. Id. In a letter dated
May 23, 1988, TRW requested Boothe to supply the "exact
statement" he wished to have included in his profile. Boothe
never responded to this request. Reply Affidavit of Mark S.
Sullivan, sworn to June 19, 1990 ("Sullivan Aff.") ¶ 12, Exs.
The gravamen of Boothe's complaint is that AVCO denied him
credit on the basis of an inaccurate credit profile from TRW.
Boothe also alleges that TRW failed to include a proper
consumer statement indicating that he disputed certain
information appearing in his credit profile. Specifically,
with respect to his bankruptcy filing, Boothe alleges that TRW
failed to incorporate a consumer statement reflecting that his
bankruptcy petition "was not a Petition for one who owed a big
sum of money; but was to ease the pressure of HUD . . . `off
my back', to resolve the circumstances." Rebuttal to Affidavit
of Micelli dated May 18, 1990, at ¶ 1. With respect to the
NYSHE loan, Booth alleges that TRW failed to include a
sufficiently specific statement indicating that he disputed the
balance of his AVCO loan. Boothe seeks $100,000.00 in damages
for economic loss and emotional distress stemming from TRW's
alleged failure to comply with certain FCRA requirements.
TRW now moves for an order, pursuant to Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, granting it summary judgment
dismissing the complaint. TRW contends that the undisputed
facts establish that Boothe's credit profile was entirely
accurate and that it is entitled to summary judgment
dismissing the complaint as a matter of law.
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on
file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In testing whether the movant has met this
burden, the Court must resolve all ambiguities against the
movant. Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1187 (2d
Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc.,
369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Adickes v.
S.H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26
L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). The movant may discharge this burden by
demonstrating to the Court that there is an absence of evidence
to support the non-moving party's case on which that party
would have the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d
265 (1986). The non-moving party then has the burden of coming
forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The non-movant
must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348,
1355, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
B. Substantive Claims
The Court construes Boothe's pro se complaint to allege
violations of sections 607(b) and 611 of the FCRA.*fn1
1. Section 607(b)
Boothe claims that TRW violated FCRA Section 607 by
inaccurately reporting his bankruptcy petition in July 1981
and the outstanding balance of his NYSHE loan.*fn2 Section
607 provides in relevant part:
Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a
consumer report it shall follow reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of
the information concerning the individual about
whom the report relates.
15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). The threshold question in a Section
607(b) action is whether the challenged credit information is
inaccurate. "If the information is accurate, no further inquiry
into the reasonableness of the consumer reporting agency's
procedures is necessary." Houston v. TRW Information Services,
707 F. Supp. 689, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing Todd v. Associated
Credit Bureau, 451 F. Supp. 447, 449 (E.D.Pa. 1977), aff'd,