United States District Court, Western District of New York
August 15, 1991
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF,
THE CITY OF BUFFALO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Curtin, District Judge.
Pending is the application of the attorneys for
intervenor-plaintiffs Afro-American Police Association, et al.
("intervenors"), for attorneys' fees and related expenses from
defendant City of Buffalo ("City"). In support of the
application, the intervenors have submitted affidavits with
exhibits of Paul C. Saunders, Esq. (Items 355, 359), and of
Richard T. Seymour, Esq. (Item 354). In opposition to the
application, the City has filed two affidavits of Michael Risman,
Esq., Senior Deputy Corporation Counsel (Items 358, 360).
There are several aspects to the application. The first
concerns efforts related to the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,
467 U.S. 561, 104 S.Ct. 2576, 81 L.Ed.2d 483 (1984). The intervenors
seek compensation for work done in successfully opposing the
motions brought in 1985 by the City and the United States
Department of Justice to eliminate the hiring goals ordered by
this court in light of Stotts. The intervenors also seek
compensation for the additional work done in opposing the appeal
subsequently taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, and for their efforts in pursuing a petition for
certiorari after the Second Circuit's affirmance.
The second aspect relates to work done by the intervenors in
resisting the motions by the City and the Department of Justice
to lift the 50% interim hiring goals. In regard to those motions,
the intervenors were not entirely successful because the court,
in an interim order dated August 9, 1989, and in the final order
dated September 5, 1989, see United States v. City of Buffalo,
721 F. Supp. 463 (W.D.N.Y. 1989), found that the City had
substantially complied with the conditions for lifting the 50%
hiring goals that had been implemented as part of the court's
1979 remedial decree.
The court did, however, direct that interim hiring goals were
still necessary and that they should be based on applicant flow,
a position urged by the intervenors in the alternative.
The third aspect relates to efforts of the intervenors in
preparing for trial on the issue of the validity of the City's
selection procedures. Much discovery was necessary, and on the
eve of trial the City agreed to develop a new test rather than to
attempt to establish at trial the validity of the existing test.
The intervenors argue that, since this was the relief they had
hoped to obtain at trial, their efforts in bringing about this
result merit a fee award.
Mr. Saunders has detailed his efforts and those of his
litigation team in his initial affidavit. A detailed statement of
the hours spent and the work done by him and by his associates is
set forth in this filing. He seeks a total fee — based on three
suggested alternative hourly rates of $225, $250, or $275 —
ranging from $128,162 to $159,282.10, as well as disbursements
totaling $22,438.35. The application reveals that Mr. Saunders is
well qualified and experienced. In addition, the records
submitted in support of the application are contemporaneous and
Mr. Seymour's affidavit indicates that he has specialized in
litigating many largescale employment-discrimination cases. In
this case, his main responsibility was to provide special advice
to Mr. Saunders and his associates in handling complicated legal
issues that arose during the course of the litigation. He seeks
compensation at an hourly rate of $225, and has provided a
detailed account of his qualifications and experience and of the
time he has spent working on this case. He seeks a total of
$15,975 in fees and reimbursement of $2,642.49 for out-of-pocket
The City opposes the fee application, arguing alternatively
that the intervenors did not prevail or, if it is found that they
did prevail, that there was only moderate relief granted. The
City argues that the actions that eventually led to the fee
application were initiated and pressed mainly by the Department
of Justice, and that, consequently, the City should not be
responsible for the intervenors' attorneys' fees. The City also
asserts that an examination of the application shows that there
is duplication of effort among the intervenors' lawyers, and that
the hourly rate sought for each is excessive.
The threshold issue for each aspect of the application is
whether the intervenors can be considered "prevailing parties."
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939,
76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). A plaintiff will be considered a prevailing
party if he or she "has succeeded on `any significant issue in
litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit the parties
sought in bringing suit.'" Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland
Independent School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791-92, 109 S.Ct. 1486,
1493, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe,
581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)). A plaintiff must receive "at
least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be
said to prevail." Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, 107 S.Ct.
2672, 2675, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987). See also Dague v. City of
Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1357 (2d Cir. 1991); Koster v.
Perales, 903 F.2d 131, 134-35 (2d Cir. 1990).
If I find the intervenors to have prevailed on a given aspect
of their application, I shall then use the instruction set forth
by the Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart with regard to any
fees awarded. The court stated in that case:
The most useful starting point for determining the
amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours
reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a
reasonable hourly rate. . . .
The district court also should exclude from this
initial fee calculation hours that were not
"reasonably expended." . . . Cases may be
overstaffed, and the skill and experience of lawyers
vary widely. Counsel for the prevailing party should
make a good-faith effort to exclude from a fee
request hours that are excessive, redundant, or
otherwise unnecessary. . . . Hours that are not
billed to one's client also are not properly billed
to one's adversary pursuant to statutory authority.
The product of reasonable hours times a reasonable
rate does not end the inquiry. There remain other
considerations that may lead the district court to
adjust the fee upward or downward, including the
important factor of the "results obtained." This
factor is particularly crucial where a plaintiff is
deemed "prevailing" even though he succeeded on only
some of his claims for relief. . . .
In some cases a plaintiff may present in one
lawsuit distinctly different claims for relief that
are based on different facts and legal theories. In
such a suit, even where the claims are brought
against the same defendants — often an institution
and its officers . . . — counsel's work on one claim
will be unrelated to his work on another claim.
Accordingly, work on an unsuccessful claim cannot be
deemed to have been "expended in pursuit of the
ultimate result achieved." . . . The congressional
intent to limit awards to prevailing parties requires
that these unrelated claims be treated as if they had
been raised in separate lawsuits, and therefore no
fee may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful
461 U.S. at 433-35, 103 S.Ct. at 1939-40 (citations and footnotes
omitted) (emphasis supplied).
Keeping these criteria in mind, I will first discuss the merits
of each claim and, if I conclude that the intervenors have
prevailed on any claim, then determine a percentage figure
indicating the extent to which they have prevailed. The claims
may be conveniently divided into three general categories: a) the
Stotts claim, which will be further divided into separate
consideration of that claim before the Second Circuit and in the
petition for certiorari that followed; b) the motion to terminate
the 50% hiring goals, which also shall be further divided; and c)
the order granted on the eve of trial.
A. The Stotts Claim
Mr. Saunders's firm, Cravath, Swaine, & Moore, and the Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, with which Mr. Seymour is
associated, were asked to appear for the intervenors when the
Department of Justice, the City, and other intervenors attempted
to vacate or to modify this court's order of November 23, 1979,
which had set 50% minority hiring goals for the Buffalo Police
Department. After intervention was granted, counsel for the
intervenors filed papers opposing these efforts. The motions
filed by the City and the other parties were based upon the
Supreme Court's decision in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 104 S.Ct. 2576, 81 L.Ed.2d 483 (1984).
This court held that Stotts did not apply, noting that the
Second Circuit's decision in EEOC v. Local 638 . . . Local 28 of
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir. 1985),
aff'd, 478 U.S. 421, 106 S.Ct. 3019, 92 L.Ed.2d 344 (1986),
clearly appeared to be controlling. See United States v. City of
Buffalo, 609 F. Supp. 1252, 1253 (W.D.N.Y. 1985). The ensuing
appeal to the Second Circuit resulted in the affirmance of this
court's order. See 779 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 3333, 92 L.Ed.2d 739 (1986). The appeal
was taken by the United States but, although it did not file a
notice of appeal, the City filed a brief in support of the
Department of Justice's position.
It is apparent that the intervenors have prevailed on this
issue. The City argues, however, that fees should be charged to
the United States and not to the City. But the attorney for the
City appeared before and urged this court to modify the 1979
order. And although the City did not file a notice of appeal, its
attorney was present at oral argument before the Second Circuit
and lent support to the Justice Department's formal appeal.
As to this part of the application, the intervenors prevailed
over the opposition of both the City and the United States. The
question thus arises whether the City's liability for fees and
expenses should be considered
joint and several. In Koster v. Perales, the Second Circuit
provided the following guidance:
Although the law governing apportionment of
attorney's fees assessments remains relatively
unsettled . . . district courts have appropriately
considered a variety of factors in allocating fee
liability including the relative culpability of the
parties . . . and the proportion of time spent
litigating against each defendant. . . .
On the basis of these considerations, the district
court may allocate the fee award between the
responsible parties, setting the percentage for which
each is liable where the claims against the
defendants are separate and distinct or where
culpability is significantly unequal . . . or it may
hold the responsible parties jointly and severally
liable for the fee award.
903 F.2d at 139 (citations omitted). The court further noted that
"although apportionment may in some cases be a more equitable
resolution, there is no rule in this circuit that requires it
whenever possible." Id. Although these guidelines on
apportionment were set forth in the context of determining the
relative liability for fees between two or more defendants who
had been found substantively accountable on an underlying cause
of action, I find the guidelines useful in the context presented
here: of the two parties responsible for the fees incurred by the
intervenors, one — the United States — is a plaintiff.
Under the circumstances presented here, it would be most
difficult and impractical to pinpoint the relative responsibility
of the City and of the United States for the collective position
taken. In any event, I find that the City was no less responsible
than the United States for the intervenors' efforts in regard to
the Stotts claim before both this court and the Second Circuit.
Therefore, I hold that the City should be held fully answerable,
and thus impose joint and several liability for these fees and
After the intervenors' success before the Second Circuit, both
they and the United States petitioned for a writ of certiorari.
Mr. Saunders explains that this was done for the purpose of
attempting to consolidate this case with two other cases in which
the Supreme Court had already granted certiorari to review the
same issue and which, in Mr. Saunders's view, had less favorable
factual settings. The Supreme Court denied the petitions on July
7, 1986. In the present case, the original application for
certiorari was made by the Justice Department and not by the
City. Consequently, no award shall be made against the City for
B. The 1989 Motion to Terminate Hiring Goals
In June, 1989, the Department of Justice and the City again
moved to vacate the 50% hiring goals. The City argued that the
minority composition of both the police and fire departments
sufficiently reflected the minority composition of Buffalo's
civilian labor force so as to justify terminating the one-for-one
interim hiring requirements. The United States agreed that the
50% goals should be terminated, arguing that the City had
substantially complied with that part of the court's 1979
remedial decree. The City also argued that it had valid
job-selection procedures in place, thereby obviating the need for
additional interim hiring requirements; in the alternative, the
City argued that the court, if it were to reject that argument,
should impose an interim requirement of 20% for Blacks and
Hispanics but no interim ratio for women.
The intervenors opposed the attempt to lift the one-for-one
interim hiring requirements as they applied to the police
department. Alternatively, they argued that, should the court
decide to lift the 50% hiring requirements, appointments should
be made based on "applicant flow" — that is, in proportion to the
percentages of Blacks, Hispanics, and women who took the written
examination from which the eligibility list was developed — until
the City was able to demonstrate that its selection procedures
were predicated on a valid test.
A hearing was held on this application on July 21, 1989. In an
order dated September 5, 1989, the court determined:
The City has substantially complied with the
court's direction that the interim hiring goal for
Blacks and Hispanics would remain in effect until the
minority composition of the uniformed personnel of
the Police Department is at least equal to the
percentage of those minorities in the labor force of
the City of Buffalo according to the most recent
United States v. City of Buffalo, 721 F. Supp. at 468. The
court, however, rejected the City's other arguments and ordered
that future interim hiring goals were required and would be based
on applicant flow as urged by the intervenors and the United
States. Id.*fn1 The effect of this provision was to reduce the
interim hiring requirements per class from 50% minority to about
The City urges that it is clear from the court's order that the
relief it sought along with the United States was granted and
that the intervenors did not prevail in their efforts to prevent
the lifting of the interim hiring goals. That, however, is hardly
a fair characterization of what transpired. In fact, the City
sought much more than simply the lifting of the one-for-one
hiring requirement; it also contended that no additional hiring
requirements were justified because it had implemented valid
selection procedures. That position was successfully opposed by
the intervenors, and the court further adopted the applicant-flow
hiring procedure supported by the intervenors. Although the City
urges that the principal proponent of applicant-flow hiring was
the Justice Department, I find that Mr. Saunders's early,
vigorous, and persuasive arguments for applicant-flow hiring were
an integral part of a joint successful effort. The intervenors
thus have prevailed in part on this issue and should be given
appropriate credit for their success.
As to this part of the application, I find that it may
conveniently be separated into two parts: one is the motion to
terminate the 50% hiring goals and the other is the attempt by
the Department of Justice and the intervenors to obtain a court
order providing for applicant-flow hiring. The intervenors were
not successful in their efforts opposing the motion to terminate
the 50% hiring goals, but they were successful in their efforts
to force the City to utilize applicant-flow hiring. Therefore,
the intervenors shall be compensated for 50% of the hours devoted
to this portion of the litigation.
C. Order Before Trial in 1990
Following the entry of the court's September 5, 1989, order,
the parties began preparing for trial on the issue of whether the
City, in fact, had developed valid selection procedures. Both the
United States and the intervenors believed that the test proposed
by the City would adversely impact upon Blacks, was invalid, and,
therefore, could not be used. The City was urged to continue its
efforts to develop a test that would not result in adverse
impact. The City refused to develop a new test at that time, and
trial was set for February 26, 1990. In order for the parties to
prepare for trial, they had to pursue extensive discovery of
documents and to conduct a number of depositions.
Shortly before the trial was to begin, the City sought an
adjournment. In the application, the City indicated that it and
the other parties were drafting a consent order under which it
would agree not to use the then-existing police-officer entrance
examination for hiring based on rank order; instead, the City
would continue hiring based on applicant flow until it developed
a new test that was found by the court to meet relevant legal
standards. The details of this proposal required intensive
negotiations in which the intervenors played a major role.
Finally, a consent order was approved on March 8, 1990.
The City maintains that the principal work in this effort was
made by its attorneys and those of the Department of Justice, but
I find that counsel for the intervenors contributed effectively
and importantly in these proceedings, which ultimately resulted
in a consent order establishing the steps the City would take to
develop valid selection procedures.
The intervenors clearly prevailed on this issue. What the
intervenors sought by trial was an order of the court directing
the City to develop a new and valid test. That is exactly the
relief that was obtained after trial preparation and negotiation.
See Koster v. Perales, 903 F.2d at 134. As noted by the Supreme
A lawsuit sometimes produces voluntary action by the
defendant that affords the plaintiff all or some of
the relief he sought through a judgment — e.g., a
monetary settlement or a change in conduct that
redresses the plaintiff's grievances. When that
occurs, the plaintiff is deemed to have prevailed
despite the absence of a formal judgment in his
Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. at 760-61, 107 S.Ct. at 2676. The
intervenors thus should be given full credit for their efforts in
COMPUTATION OF TIME DEVOTED TO EACH CLAIM
Mr. Saunders states the following in his affidavit:
With respect to the hourly rate to be applied to
the hours that we have devoted to this matter, set
forth below, for illustrative purposes only, is a
matrix showing different fee awards if three
different hourly rates are used. Each of the three
possible hourly rates is lower than my firm
customarily charges for such work based upon our
Hours Hourly Rates
Mr. Saunders 330.50 $225 $250
Mr. Cox 68.50 100 125
Ms. Breese 204.75 70 95
Mr. Neis 76.50 50 60
Paralegals 110.75 25 30
Secretaries 239.00 15 20
Disbursements $22,438.35 $22,438.35 $22,438.35
128,162.20 145,769.60 159,282.10
Total: $150,600.55 $168,207.95 $181,720.45
___________ ___________ ___________
___________ ___________ ___________
However, we will leave it to the Court to set an
appropriate hourly rate. In order to avoid any
dispute concerning the computation of a fee award in
this case, we hereby offer to accept — and not to
challenge — any hourly rate that the Court deems
Item 355 at ¶ 17.*fn2
He then attaches schedules for each
attorney, paralegal, and secretary showing the hours worked and
the reason why certain rates were charged.
While not agreeing with this analysis, Mr. Risman has broken
down the time worked by each attorney on the various aspects of
the case as follows:
An analysis of the attorneys [sic] time for each
portion reveals the following:
A. Stotts Motion and Appeal
Attorney Hours (approximate)
B. Motion to Terminate Hiring Goals
Attorney Hours (approximate)
C. Joint Order
Item 358 at ¶ 48.
Mr. Risman's breakdown of time spent by the intervenors'
counsel seems to be within bounds, and I will accept his analysis
of the hours spent by the attorneys on each claim.
On the Stotts claim, I find that 50% of the time devoted by
the attorneys should be allocated to the efforts in this court
and 25% to the appeal before the Second Circuit; 25% shall be
assigned to the petition for certiorari. As I have previously
indicated, an award shall be made for the fees incurred as part
of the intervenors' efforts with respect to the Stotts claim
before both this court and the Second Circuit, but not for those
associated with the petition for certiorari. Therefore, the
following breakdown of hours to be compensated will result:
A. Stotts Motion and Appeal
As also indicated above, an award should be made for the
intervenors' efforts to secure hiring based on applicant flow,
but not for the intervenors' opposition to the motion to
terminate the 50% hiring goals. Therefore, I will apply a 50%
ratio to the breakdown of hours submitted by Mr. Risman in this
category. The following time is thus credited:
Motion to Terminate Hiring Goals
As to the intervenors' efforts with regard to the order before
trial in 1990, the following hours shall be credited:
Order Before Trial in 1990
I shall now consider other objections made by Mr. Risman to the
fee application. He contends that the hourly rate sought for each
of the intervenors' attorneys and their staff is unreasonable.
His argument that the appropriate rate is the one that would be
charged by a local attorney in this community for substantially
similar work is well taken. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886
895, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); McCann v.
Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112
, 130 (2d Cir. 1983). Furthermore, I find
that there is no reason to believe that services of equal quality
were unavailable in this community with respect to the issues
involved in this case. I find that the appropriate rate that
would be charged in this community for work of similar competence
would be as follows: for Mr. Saunders, $175 per hour; for Mr.
Seymour, $150 per hour; for Mr. Cox, $90 per hour; for Ms.
Breese, $70 per hour; for Mr. Neis, $50 per hour; and for the
paralegals, $25 per hour.
I agree that, as Mr. Risman suggests, there normally should be
a reduction for the hourly rate awarded for travel time. However,
in light of the many hours and out-of-pocket expenses that the
intervenors' counsel and staff have excluded from their
application in the exercise of billing judgment,*fn3 I shall not
reduce the award for those hours devoted to travel.
I find no support for the separate application for secretaries'
time, and, although a small matter, an award should not be made
for time spent in conversation with newspaper reporters.
I have considered carefully the City's argument that the time
spent by the intervenors' attorneys was excessive and
duplicative. I refuse, however, to reduce the award further. The
efforts of Mr. Saunders and his associates and those of Mr.
Seymour were essential to ensure that the orders of this court
were kept in force in the face of efforts by the City and, at
times, by the Department of Justice to dilute substantially the
impact of the 1979 remedial decree. In addition, a number of
meetings were held in court and in chambers, and at these
conferences Mr. Saunders always had constructive suggestions. The
court is also aware that much important work in this case was
completed by Mr. Saunders outside the courtroom. In short, Mr.
Saunders's forceful and skillful advocacy provided a moderating
influence to discussions and helped bring problems to prudent and
well-considered resolutions, while at all times thoroughly
protecting the rights of his clients. Furthermore, it is apparent
from the history of this litigation that at times the City has
been a difficult and obstinate defendant,*fn4 and there can be
no doubt that this factor contributed needlessly to the time and
effort required by the intervenors' counsel and staff.
It is well established that fee awards need not be reduced for
time expended on unsuccessful motions or contentions. See, e.g.,
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 434-35, 103 S.Ct. at 1939-40;
Green v. Bowen, 877 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1989); McCann v.
Coughlin, 698 F.2d at 129-30; Planned Parenthood of Cent. and
N. Arizona v. State of Arizona, 789 F.2d 1348, 1352-53 (9th
Cir.), aff'd, 479 U.S. 925, 107 S.Ct. 391, 93 L.Ed.2d 346
(1986). Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that, even after a
court chooses what it considers a reasonable hourly rate and
trims excess hours, it can adjust an award upward in light of the
quality and success of an attorney's efforts. See Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 434-35, 103 S.Ct. at 1939-40. In light of
these standards, the court believes the City is in no position to
complain about the award made today, particularly in light of the
fact that it has been reduced in regard to both the petition for
certiorari and the 1989 motion to terminate the 50% hiring goals.
In sum, in light of the pivotal role played by counsel for the
intervenors in this litigation, as well as their efforts to keep
costs down by excluding much time and out-of-pocket expenses from
their application, I shall not reduce the award any further.
The following is a tabulation of the time and rates upon which
I will base the award of fees and expenses to the intervenors'
counsel. I have rounded off each portion of the award to arrive
at a final figure.
TABULATION OF HOURS ALLOWED
AND HOURLY RATE APPROVED
Attorney Hours Rate Award
Saunders 114.00 $175 $19,950.00
Cox 51.375 $90 $4,623.75
Breese 153.5625 $70 $10,749.38
Paralegals 83.0625 $25 $2,076.56
Seymour 6.42525 $150 $963.79
Attorney Hours Rate Award
Saunders 42.00 $175 $7,350.00
Neis 38.25 $50 $1,912.50
Seymour .50 $150 $75.00
Order Before Trial in 1990
Attorney Hours Rate Award
Saunders 94.00 $175 $16,450.00
Seymour 71.367 $150 $10,705.05
D. Application for Disbursements
The application for disbursements for work done in preparing
the petition for certiorari must be disallowed. Those
disbursements appear to be as follows:
Pandick Press (for printing) $6,382.00
U.S. Supreme Court filing fee 200.00
Furthermore, because of the Supreme Court's decision in West
Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, ___ U.S. ___, 111
S.Ct. 1138, 113 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991), the application for costs in
the amount of $2,321.36 for the appearance of Dr. Eugene Ericksen
may only be permitted to the extent of $30.
It would be most difficult and impractical to determine what
part of the disbursements should be charged to each application;
therefore, the disbursements of Mr. Saunders's office shall be
allowed to the following extent:
Document Reproduction 3,143.83
Outside Data Base 295.70
Special Courier 180.25
Research Information Services 380.25
Mead Data-Lexis 3,073.65
In-House Data Processing 704.85
Pandick Press (cover for Second
Circuit Brief) 292.00
National Economic Research Assoc.
Associates (Document Reproduction
from Sonship Press) 180.97
Eugene R. Beckstein (Official
Court Reporter) 700.50
Jack Hunt (Court Reporter) 760.52
Dr. Eugene Ericksen 30.00
The travel expenses listed in Mr. Saunders's initial affidavit
(Item 355, Exhibit G at items 1 through 9) are allowed, yielding
a total award for travel expenses of $2,618.
Mr. Seymour also seeks compensation for disbursements,
including travel expenses (Item 354 at 24). All are allowed
except for item A.(3) in the amount of $337.36, which represents
travel expenses associated with the Stotts appeal before the
Second Circuit. Therefore, his award for disbursements shall be
reduced from $2,642.49 to $2,305.13.
I believe that a few additional comments regarding the
contributions to this case of Mr. Saunders and his litigation
team are in order. Although I felt constrained not to award the
full amount requested, that should not be read as a reflection of
the quality of the representation provided to the intervenors. As
lead counsel for the intervenors, Mr. Saunders has done no less
than a superb job. While it is important in any case that a party
receive diligent representation, it is particularly important in
civil-rights cases in light of the acute public interest that
always exists in such litigation independent of the interests of
the litigants themselves. In the present case, Mr. Saunders has
served the interests of both his clients and the public
outstandingly. Time and again he has demonstrated a keen
understanding of relevant legal authority as well as a thorough
familiarity with the full record, the latter being a particularly
impressive achievement in
light of the complicated history of this case and the fact that
he became involved in the lawsuit nearly twelve years after it
originally was filed. His firm grasp of both the law and the
facts has been of great assistance to the court, and his efforts
have been essential to the progress made in the case in the
In sum, the City shall pay the firm of Cravath, Swaine, & Moore
$63,112.19 for attorneys' fees and $13,564.99 for expenses, for a
total award of $76,677.18. The City shall pay the Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law $11,743.84 for attorneys'
fees and $2,305.13 for expenses, for a total award of $14,048.97.