The opinion of the court was delivered by: Leisure, District Judge:
This is an action for violation of § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b
promulgated thereunder, as well as state law claims for fraud,
rescission, and breach of contract and fiduciary duties. On May
29, 1991, 765 F. Supp. 111, this Court granted a motion for
summary judgment made by defendants Comstock Gold Company,
L.P., United Mining Corporation, Raynham Hall Contracting,
Inc., Timothy Collins and Maurice Castagne (collectively "the
Moving Defendants")*fn1 with respect to plaintiffs' federal
securities fraud claim (the "May 29 Order"). Plaintiffs have
now moved, pursuant to Local Civil Rule 3(j), for reargument of
the May 29 Order. Plaintiffs have also moved, pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 21, to dismiss defendant Comstock Gold Company
L.P. ("Comstock") from this action in order to restore the
Court's diversity jurisdiction over the remaining state law
In its May 29 Order, the Court granted the Moving Defendants'
motion for summary judgment, dismissing plaintiffs' federal
securities fraud claim. The Court then dismissed plaintiffs'
remaining state law claims, pursuant to United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction over those claims.
Plaintiffs have now moved for reargument of the Court's May
29 Order, arguing that the Court erred in dismissing the state
law claims as "pendent" because the amended complaint alleges
both federal question jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
In addition, and apparently in contradiction to the logic
underlying their motion for reargument, plaintiffs concede that
this Court does not have diversity jurisdiction over this
action, and thus move, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 21, to dismiss
Comstock from this action so as to restore such jurisdiction.
The Moving Defendants object to plaintiffs' motion to dismiss
Comstock as a defendant in this action. The Moving Defendants
argue that this motion is untimely, and that, in any event,
Comstock is a necessary party that should not be dismissed from
this action. In addition, the Moving Defendants argue that the
findings of fact made by the Court in its May 29 Order apply
with equal force to plaintiffs' state law fraud claim, and
require dismissal of that claim. Finally, the Moving Defendants
have cross-moved for sanctions, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, on
the ground that plaintiffs' instant motion is frivolous.
Motions for reargument will be granted only if the Court
overlooked "matters or controlling decisions" which, if
considered by the Court, would have mandated a different
result. See Litton Industries Inc. v. Lehman Brothers Kuhn
Loeb, Inc., 1989 WL 162315, at 4, 1989 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 9145, at
9-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Moll v. U.S. Life Title Insurance Co.,
700 F. Supp. 1284, 1286 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Leisure, J.); Bozsi
Limited Partnership v. Lynott, 676 F. Supp. 505, 509 (S.D.N Y
1987). "The standard for granting a motion for reargument is
strict in order to dissuade repetitive arguments on issues that
have already been considered fully by the Court." Ruiz v.
Commissioner of Dept. of Transportation, 687 F. Supp. 888, 890
In the case at bar, plaintiffs do not seek reargument of that
part of the
May 29 Order granting summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs'
federal securities fraud claim.*fn3 Rather, plaintiffs argue
that the Court erroneously described the state law claims in
this action as "pendent." Implicit in this argument is the
notion that this Court has jurisdiction over the state law
claims on the basis of diversity of the citizenship of the
parties. However, plaintiffs concede, as they must, that
diversity of citizenship of the parties does not exist. This
fact is obvious from the face of the amended complaint,
including the caption of this action, in which plaintiffs are
suing, inter alia, a limited partnership in which they are
limited partners. See Carden v. Arkoma Associates,
494 U.S. 185, 110 S.Ct. 1015, 108 L.Ed.2d 157 (1990) (citizenship of a
limited partnership is determined by reference to the
citizenship of its limited, as well as its general, partners).
Because there clearly existed no basis for the Court's subject
matter jurisdiction over the non-federal claims other than
pendent jurisdiction, the Court's characterization — and
dismissal — of those claims as "pendent" was correct.
Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion for reargument is denied.
II. Dismissal of Comstock as a Defendant
Plaintiffs have also moved, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 21, to
dismiss Comstock as a defendant in this action. The purpose of
this motion is to eliminate the non-diverse party, and thus
restore the Court's diversity jurisdiction over plaintiffs'
state law claims.*fn4
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that it is
questionable whether Rule 21 is the proper procedural vehicle
for plaintiffs' motion. The Second Circuit has held in a
Rule 21 was adopted to obviate the harsh common
law adherence to the technical rules of joinder,
and not in order to deal with problems of
defective federal jurisdiction. Here the plaintiff
is not seeking to drop a party in order to cure
defects of misjoinder or nonjoinder. The motion
more properly is an amendment of the pleadings
under Rule 15(a) which would result in the
dismissal of the complaint against [the