to resubmit his FECA claim to the OWCP for further
consideration. On December 18, 1987, the OWCP rejected
plaintiff's claim on the merits, and the Government then moved
this Court for summary judgment. The motion was granted on
March 8, 1989 and summary judgment was entered for the
Government. The crux of the Memorandum Opinion and Order was
that FECA is an exclusive remedy that precludes election of
coverage under the FTCA. See FECA, 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) ("The
liability of the United States or an instrumentality thereof .
. . with respect to the injury or death of an employee is
exclusive and instead of all other liability of the United
States or the instrumentality to the employee . . ."). Thus,
because the Secretary of Labor had determined that plaintiff's
injuries were covered by FECA even though FECA provided no
compensation, this Court granted the Government's summary
judgment motion because FECA barred plaintiff from bringing an
action under the FTCA for those injuries. See Memorandum
Opinion and Order, March 8, 1989, at 61.
On April 5, 1989 plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal with the
Second Circuit; the parties subsequently stipulated that the
appeal would be withdrawn so that plaintiff could request a
rehearing of his workers' compensation claim by the Department
of Labor. He filed a request for rehearing on June 12, 1989; it
was denied on January 22, 1990. Plaintiff then appealed the
denial to the Employees' Compensation Appeals Board in
Washington, D.C. On June 6, 1990, the Director of the Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs moved the Appeals Board to set
aside the denial and remand for a de novo review. On August 1,
1990, the Appeals Board set aside the denial and remanded the
claim for a de novo decision. On May 23, 1991, the OWCP
reversed its original position and held that plaintiff was
not covered under FECA because the evidence did not establish
that plaintiff had sustained an injury in the course of his
employment. After filing a Notice of Motion with the Second
Circuit to reinstate his appeal in this case, plaintiff
withdrew the appeal in favor of moving this Court to relieve
him from the July 3, 1989 entry of summary judgment against
Plaintiff moves for relief under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(6), which confers broad discretion on the court
to relieve a party from a final judgment or order for "any . .
. reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
A court may exercise its discretionary power under the rule
whenever "appropriate to accomplish justice." Klapprott v.
United States, 335 U.S. 601, 615, 69 S.Ct. 384, 390, 93 L.Ed.
266 (1949). The Rule is properly invoked where there are
"extraordinary circumstances," Ackermann v. United States,
340 U.S. 193, 199, 71 S.Ct. 209, 212, 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950), or where
the judgment may work an extreme and undue hardship, see United
States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26, 32 (2d Cir. 1977), and "should
be liberally construed when substantial justice will thus be
served." Radack v. Norwegian America Line Agency, Inc.,
318 F.2d 538, 542 (2d Cir. 1963); see Dunlop v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., 672 F.2d 1044, 1051 (2d Cir. 1982).
While the OWCP's reversing its initial determination that
plaintiff's claim was covered under the FECA may not rise to
the level of an "extraordinary" circumstance, the Court finds
that not permitting plaintiff to present his claim under the
FTCA would impose upon him an extreme and undue hardship. Such
a decision would effectively give a reversed agency decision
continuing legal effect, thus denying plaintiff access to the
only legal remedy proper in his situation: a claim under the
FTCA. Thus, this Court grants plaintiff's unopposed motion for
relief from the March 8, 1989 grant of summary judgment in
defendant's favor. The grant of summary judgment is vacated and
this action is hereby reinstated to the active docket of this
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