religion, we cannot evaluate the other Turner factors.
In O'Lone, a group of prisoners who practiced the Islamic faith challenged policies adopted by prison officials which resulted in preventing them from attending a weekly Muslim congregational service that is compulsory under the Koran. See O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 345. Though the Court did not question that the inmates' sincere religious beliefs compelled attendance at this service, it held that the regulations did not violate the inmates' First Amendment rights. This was true despite the fact that the regulations provided the inmates with no alternative means of attending the service: "while we in no way minimize the central importance of Jumu'ah [the service] to respondents, we are unwilling to hold that prison officials are required by the Constitution to sacrifice legitimate penological objectives to that end." Id. at 351-52. The Court also reaffirmed its deference to prison officials in matters of prison administration: "we take this opportunity to reaffirm our refusal, even where claims are made under the First Amendment, to 'substitute our judgment on . . . difficult and sensitive matters of institutional administration,' for the determinations of those charged with the formidable task of running a prison." Id. at 353 (citation omitted).
Given the uncertainty of the infringement on free exercise in this case and the deference shown to prison officials in O'Lone, we conclude that plaintiff has not adequately set forth an allegation which states a deprivation of First Amendment rights. We therefore grant defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim.
Though not clearly alleged in the amended complaint, plaintiff appears to be arguing that his punishment was due not to the violation of any prison rule, but because he had filed an inmate grievance against Officer Pisco and threatened to file a lawsuit against him. See Plaintiff's Mem. of Law at 14, 41. Plaintiff argues that this retaliation violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
A cause of action may arise under section 1983 for administrative decisions made in retaliation for the exercise of an inmate's constitutional rights. See Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 194-195 (2d Cir. 1987); Baker v. Zlochowon, 741 F. Supp. 436, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). However, as we stated in Baker, in order to prevail on such a claim, plaintiff must show that the allegedly retaliatory action "'would not have been taken but for the exercise of such rights,' and must include factual allegations with a 'high level of detail.'" Baker, 741 F. Supp. at 439 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that he filed a grievance report against Officer Pisco on April 4, the day of the incident in question, and that its contents were shown to Pisco on that day; plaintiff contends that Pisco filed the disciplinary report the next day. See Amended Complaint P5. Though not explicitly alleged in the amended complaint, plaintiff appears to be implying that Pisco instituted the disciplinary action in retaliation for the grievance report.
Officer Pisco contends that he filed the misbehavior report, also signed by three other officers, on April 4, and that it was in response to plaintiff's behavior during the incident. According to Pisco, plaintiff became agitated during the episode, attempted to create a disturbance and threatened Pisco. See Pisco Aff. PP7-9.
However, construing the sequence of events in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we find that he has not alleged facts sufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion on the issue of retaliation. Plaintiff has not denied the conduct that Officer Pisco contends led to the filing of the Misbehavior Report, nor has he offered affidavits or other evidence sufficient for the Court to conclude that there are genuine issues for trial. Therefore, we grant defendants' motion for summary judgment on the retaliation issue.
II. ACTION II
Plaintiff's claims in Action II focus upon his medical needs and allege inadequate medical treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 97 S. Ct. 285 (1976), the Court recognized that failure to provide adequate medical treatment in a prison setting may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. As the Court recently reaffirmed in Hudson v. McMillan, the standard establishing an Eighth Amendment violation varies according to the type of conduct alleged. See Hudson v. McMillan, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 1372, *8, 112 S. Ct. 995 . The Estelle Court established that in the context of medical treatment, a plaintiff must show "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs" in order to allege a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
In their motion to dismiss, defendants argue that the plaintiff has failed to allege serious medical needs. In his complaint, plaintiff makes a variety of claims, including his need for an adequate wheelchair, and for orthopedic treatment. He also alleges the failure to provide him with a liquid dietary supplement. Defendants do not dispute that plaintiff is a paraplegic. Taking plaintiff's allegations as true, as we are obliged to do in a motion to dismiss, we cannot say that these claims do not constitute serious medical needs for someone in plaintiff's situation. Therefore, we deny the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint.
Plaintiff's first motion for a preliminary injunction seeks medical treatment and supplies at the Green Haven facility. Because plaintiff has now been transferred to another facility, we dismiss his claim for injunctive relief as moot. Plaintiff's second motion for a preliminary injunction alleges retaliatory transfer to a new institution without a paraplegic facility. He further alleges that he lacks such necessities as adequate access to a toilet, and that he is being denied items essential to his personal hygiene such as a catheter. Plaintiff seeks transfer back to Green Haven. We deny this motion, because his request for injunctive relief is not properly directed to the defendants named in this action. However, this denial is without prejudice for plaintiff to bring a new action, including one for injunctive relief, directed against the proper parties.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we grant defendants' motion in Action I in its entirety. Defendants' motion in Action II to dismiss the complaint is denied. Plaintiff's motions for preliminary injunction in Action II are denied. However, plaintiff may bring a new action, including one for injunctive relief, directed against the proper defendants. The parties are to provide the Court in writing with a discovery schedule for Action II by May 1, 1992.
Dated: March 17, 1992
New York, New York
Leonard B. Sand