The opinion of the court was delivered by: LEONARD D. WEXLER
Petitioner served her prison term and thereafter voluntarily returned to her native country after final deportation procedures. She was subsequently re-arrested in New York City and indicted on drug charges. After being notified of petitioner's presence and arrest in the United States, the Parole Commission conducted an initial revocation hearing after which it revoked petitioner's Special Parole Term, ruled that she receive no credit for time served on Special Parole, and ordered that she serve a prison term of seventy-two months.
Petitioner claims that the Parole Commission's decision was not supported by sufficient evidence. Petitioner requests vacatur of her present sentence, credit for Special Parole time served, reduction of her sentence to time served, and immediate release from custody. For the reasons stated below, petitioner's motion is dismissed.
Petitioner was arrested September 25, 1984 at John F. Kennedy International Airport after arriving on a flight from Bogota, Colombia. During a routine customs inspection, forty-three condom-wrapped balls of cocaine were found sewn into the lining of petitioner's cloth carry-on bag. A physical search of petitioner revealed forty-eight more cocaine filled condoms taped to her upper thigh. Upon questioning, petitioner admitted that she was also carrying cocaine internally. She was brought to a hospital by customs officials and over the course of several days evacuated twenty-eight more cocaine filled condoms. In total, petitioner was charged with smuggling 1,013 grams of high-quality cocaine into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute it in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Petitioner pled guilty to the count of illegally importing cocaine into the United States. She was sentenced on January 24, 1985 to a term of three years of imprisonment and a Special Parole Term of ten years with a special condition that she not illegally re-enter the United States if she were deported or otherwise left the country. The charge of possession was dismissed at the time of sentencing.
Petitioner finished serving her prison term in 1986. She was released directly to Immigration and Naturalization Services on August 25, 1986, placed in custody, and released therefrom on a recognizance bond on October 3, 1986. Her Special Parole Term began on March 28, 1987. On August 10, 1987, after final deportation procedures, petitioner voluntarily left the United States to return to Columbia.
On June 9, 1988, petitioner was again arrested in New York City after one of her companions attempted to sell a kilogram of cocaine to an undercover police detective. A physical search revealed that petitioner was carrying twenty-six grams of cocaine in her pocketbook. She was charged with criminal facilitation and placed in custody.
The Parole Commission was informed of petitioner's presence and arrest in the United States and, on July 6, 1989, conducted an initial revocation hearing. Petitioner was represented at this hearing by counsel from the Federal Defenders Office. In a Notice of Action, the Parole Commission revoked petitioner's Special Parole Term, ruled that she receive no credit for time already served on Special Parole, and ordered that she be incarcerated for seventy-two months before receiving presumptive parole. The Parole Commission noted that its reasons were based on petitioner's criminal facilitation of a cocaine sale, as well as her possession of cocaine.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 authorizes the sentencing court to discharge or resentence a prisoner in custody if it concludes that "the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2255; United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185, 60 L. Ed. 2d 805, 99 S. Ct. 2235 (1979). Subsequent actions by the Parole Commission do not negate the validity of the sentence itself and do not provide a basis for collateral attack pursuant to § 2255. Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 190. Thus, a § 2255 motion must address the imposition of the sentence, and not the manner in which it is executed. Dioguardi v. ...