from the DLA, the DOD Inspector General, the OPM, the EEOC and the MSPB.
Williams's FOIA claims against these defendants are dismissed. The FOIA authorizes claims against federal agencies, not individuals. See Petrus v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 581, 583 (5th Cir. 1987); Parks v. United States I.R.S., 618 F.2d 677, 684 (10th Cir. 1980); Times Newspapers of Great Britain, Inc. v. C.I.A., 539 F. Supp. 678, 685-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Inspector General Act Claims
Under the Inspector General Act, the Inspector General "may receive and investigate complaints of information from an employee of the establishment concerning the possible existence of an activity constituting a violation of law, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority or a substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety." 5 U.S.C. App. 3 § 7(a). The gravamen of the claims against Brown under the Inspector General Act is that she failed to attempt to prevent the suspension and removal that allegedly resulted from reprisal.
However, Brown is immune from claims that she violated the Inspector General Act under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Under this doctrine, the United States may not be sued for damages without its consent. Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 8 L. Ed. 2d 168, 82 S. Ct. 980 (1962). The doctrine also bars suit against an officer of the United States when relief against that officer would be obtained against the United States. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 688, 93 L. Ed. 1628, 69 S. Ct. 1457 (1949). Thus, absent an "unequivocal" waiver of sovereign immunity, the United States is immune from lawsuits. United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, Nos. 90-1341, 90-1517, 118 L. Ed. 2d 255, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 2547, 112 S. Ct. 1627 (U.S. Apr. 21, 1992); United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 117 L. Ed. 2d 181, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 1011 (1992); United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538-89, 63 L. Ed. 2d 607, 100 S. Ct. 1349 (1980).
The Inspector General Act contains no waiver of immunity, "unequivocal" or otherwise. Moreover, the complaints allege no facts suggesting that Brown acted beyond the scope of her official duties. Therefore, Brown is immune from suit for violations of the Inspector General Act, and these claims against her are dismissed.
Claim Against Walsh Under 18 U.S.C. § 1001
The complaint in Williams III charges Walsh with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001, a criminal statute providing in relevant part that one within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States who makes false or fraudulent statements shall be fined or imprisoned. No private right of action is provided under this statute, see Federal Sav. a Loan Ins. Corp. v. Reeves, 816 F.2d 130, 138 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding no "affirmative indication that Congress intended to furnish civil remedies"); House v. Hastings, No. 91 Civ. 3780 (JSM), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1951, at screen 1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1992) (statute "does" not readily provide for a private right of action"); Johnston v. Torres, No. 88 Civ. 7697 (MJL), 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15780 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1990), and the claim is therefore dismissed.
The Lloyd-LaFollette Act relates to labor-management and employee relations in the public and private sectors. The complaints fail to alleged any facts to which this statute is relevant and thus any claims made thereunder are dismissed.
Fees and Contempt
Williams's opposition papers request that the defendants and their attorney be held in contempt and that he be granted costs from February 1, 1991. Because there is no basis for these requests, they are denied.
Leave to Amend the Complaint in Williams III
Williams's opposition papers in Williams III state that he "would like to amend his complaint to eliminate Defendant Whitlock, Reukauf, Komer, Crum and Levinson as parties and to replace them with the Office of the Department of Defense Inspector General, Office of Special Counsel, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Merit Systems Protection Board, respectively." Williams Opp. Memo. at 4. Treating this request as a motion for leave to amend, in the absence of opposition, leave to amend the complaint in Williams III to this extent is granted.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for judgment on the pleadings in Williams II and the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in Williams III are granted, except to the extent of the non-discrimination component of the CSRA claims against General McCausland. These claims survive in conjunction with the Title VII claims against General McCausland, which were not the subject of either motion.
It is so ordered.
New York, N. Y.
April 27, 1992
ROBERT W. SWEET