MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
AMON, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
On November 5, 1990, argument was held on defendants' original motion to dismiss the amended complaint in this case, plaintiff's cross-motion to disqualify defendants' counsel, and defendants' motion for sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. After hearing argument, the Court denied plaintiff's motion to disqualify and denied defendants' motion for sanctions. Defendants' motion to dismiss was granted as to the first cause of action alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, with leave to replead, and a decision on defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's pendent state claims and strike plaintiff's demand for compensatory damages pursuant to his Title VII claim was reserved.
Plaintiff then amended his complaint for the second time restating his Section 1981 claim in his first and fifth causes of action. In his first cause of action, plaintiff asserts that the defendants' actions violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981, in that the relevant grievance procedures outlined in the manual were not complied with at any time, although such procedures were complied with for similarly situated white individuals. (Complaint, P17). As a fifth cause of action plaintiff again invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1981 alleging that Section 1981 was violated when defendants refused to enter into a new contract to rehire him in another position, although defendants routinely did so for similarly situated white individuals. (Complaint, P25).
Defendants subsequently renewed their motion to dismiss these claims and the pendent state claims, and to strike plaintiff's demand for compensatory damages under Title VII. On January 15, 1992, the Court issued a Memorandum and Order dismissing the plaintiff's Section 1981 claims, as contained in his first and fifth cause of action, and his demand for compensatory damages under Title VII. The state law claims were retained as pendant to the Title VII claim.
The Court found that as to plaintiff's argument that the defendants entered into the employment contract with an intent to either not honor the contract or to terminate the contract because of plaintiff's race, such a Section 1981 claim was barred by the Supreme Court's holding in Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989). Plaintiff's theory that defendants' failure to rehire him after his discharge was actionable under Section 1981, was found to be simply a claim for discriminatory discharge, again barred by Patterson. As to plaintiff's claim that defendants discriminatorily failed to enforce the relevant grievance procedures, the Court found no evidence of any obstruction of plaintiff's access to judicial or non-judicial fora for resolution of the employment dispute.
Plaintiff has since moved for reargument maintaining that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be applied retroactively to the instant case. Plaintiff argues that application of the 1991 Act would result in reinstatement of his dismissed Section 1981 claims,
as well as allowing compensatory damages and a jury trial on his Title VII claim. The Court agreed to hear reargument on the issue of the retroactivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 is to be applied prospectively, and plaintiff's motion is therefore denied.
On November 21, 1991, President Bush signed into law the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. Law No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (the "Act" or "CRA"). The CRA was the product of a congressional effort to pass a civil rights bill that would "respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination." Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 3.
The Act altered prior law in three ways which are relevant to the instant case. Section 101 of the Act amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981, by adding a new subsection (b) which states:
For purposes of this section, the term 'make and enforce contracts' includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.